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Abstract 
 
Knowledge-based authentication is almost ubiquitous due to low cost and relatively 
straightforward implementation. Despite its popularity, there are some well-known 
problems associated with knowledge-based authentication, such as the cognitive load of 
memorising multiple codes. As people age and their memory declines, remembering 
multiple codes is even more challenging.  
 
Due to lack of objective evidence regarding the performance of older adults with 
existing knowledge-based systems, a study was carried out where younger and older 
participants were required to learn and remember multiple PIN codes and their 
performance was evaluated over a three-week period. The results from this PIN study 
demonstrated a clear age effect where younger participants performed significantly 
more accurately and faster than the older participants. These results reiterated the need 
for authentication systems that are inclusive of older users and provided a benchmark 
performance measure for future evaluations.  
 
In the next phase four graphical authentication systems (GAS) were evaluated with 
younger and older adults using the same methodology as the PIN study to determine 
whether any of them were an improvement. The first system, Tiles, was based on a 
single image and participants were required to recognise segments of their image from 
segments taken from other images and yielded disappointing results where overall 
performance was not an improvement over that of PINs. The second and third systems 
tested were picture-based and face-based recognition systems. The performance of older 
participants was promising, especially with the face-based system but the systems could 
be improved to be more suitable for older users.  
 
In the final study, the face-based system was improved by using old faces and ensuring 
that no two codes shared a face. The results from the final face-based system provide 
preliminary evidence that a graphical authentication system that is inclusive of older 
adults may be achievable if designed correctly. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
User authentication is an important part of computer systems which allows information 
to be accessible only to authorised users. Knowledge-based authentication (KBA), 
based on codes such as passwords or PINs, is ubiquitous due to low cost and relatively 
straightforward implementation. Despite its popularity, there are some well-known 
problems associated with KBA such as the memorability of multiple codes. As people 
age and their memory declines, remembering multiple codes could become even more 
challenging. In the past decade, graphical authentication systems (GAS) have been 
proposed as alternatives to alphanumeric passwords in part due to humans’ superior 
ability at recognising images over recalling random combinations of characters. These 
systems have achieved convincing results thus far, but have not been evaluated with 
older adults despite them being the fastest-growing group of internet users in developed 
nations (Hart, Chaparro, & Halcomb, 2008). Additionally, the memory literature 
suggests that older adults could also take advantage of the picture superiority effect. 
 
Two research questions were devised based on the existing authentication literature with 
the aim of designing a system that is inclusive of older adults. These questions were 
explored through a series of studies evaluating various authentication systems using 
younger and older adults:  
 
1. Are older adults disadvantaged by existing authentication systems? 
2. Can graphical authentication systems improve the performance of older adults in 
relation to existing authentication systems to be a more inclusive form of 
authentication? 
 
To answer these questions this thesis is structured as follows: 
 
The second chapter explores the literature on existing computer authentication systems 
and discusses their limitations. The literature on authentication makes it clear that a 
problem exists with regards to the memorability of passwords and other knowledge-
based authentication systems. However, a lack of empirical evidence makes it difficult 
to determine how big the problem is in reality. The literature on graphical authentication 
systems suggest that they may be better than passwords and PINs, but the lack of 
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control over the time delays, number of codes, etc. make it difficult to compare results 
between studies. To move forward, a consistent method should be applied to different 
systems.   
 
The third chapter covers age-associated memory declines that are likely to impact the 
performance of older adults using authentication systems. A few studies that explored 
authentication with older adults are also covered in this chapter, with the main finding 
being the high success rate that the older adults experienced. However, these studies do 
not evaluate the systems with younger adults making it difficult to establish the 
inclusiveness of the systems.  
 
A methodology was designed that would be consistently applied throughout the thesis 
that would allow for comparison between systems. This methodology included being 
able to compare results for memorability of two different sets of codes, and a consistent 
time frame. Chapters four to seven present the usability studies that were carried out 
using this methodology to evaluate PIN and five different graphical authentication 
systems. All studies were ethically approved by the School of Life Sciences’ Ethics 
Committee. 
 
Firstly, due to the relative lack of empirical evidence regarding the performance of older 
adults with existing KBA, a study was carried out where the younger and older 
participants were required to learn and remember multiple PIN codes and their 
performance was evaluated over a three-week period. This was done using a robust 
methodology that divided the multiple codes into two sets – original codes and new 
codes. Participants were given the original codes during the first week and the new 
codes during the second week and were tested on the recognition or recall throughout 
the three weeks. This study was the first to compare the performance of younger and 
older adults with multiple codes of an existing authentication system – in this case PIN 
– over the course of a short and long delay. The results showed a clear age effect where 
younger participants performed significantly better – in terms of both successful 
attempts and time taken to enter codes – than the older participants. These results 
reiterated the need for authentication systems that are inclusive of older users and 
presented a benchmark methodology performance measure that would be used for 
future evaluations. This study was the first to experimentally record the memorability of 
multiple PINs for both younger and older adults, rather than relying on self-reporting. 
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This study also highlights the problem of multiple PIN recall for older adults which 
leaves them vulnerable in the real world and possibly unable to gain access to systems.  
 
In the next phase, four GAS were evaluated with younger and older adults to determine 
whether any of them were an improvement over PIN for older adults. This series of 
studies were the first to evaluate the performance of younger and older adults with 
multiple GAS codes, and the first to use a consistent methodology that allowed 
comparisons. The first system, Tiles, was based on principles of cued-recall and 
recognition-based GAS. Participants were required to remember one picture per account 
and recognise segments from that image from amongst segments of other images in 
order to authenticate. This study was the first to evaluate this novel graphical system 
with the aim of reducing the age effects observed with PINs. The system yielded 
disappointing results that indicated the inadequacy of this solution for older adults over 
an extended period of time. The poor results were attributed to the abstract nature of 
some of the resulting segments which caused confusion. Part of this study was 
published in a leading international human-computer interaction conference, CHI 2012 
(Nicholson, Dunphy, Coventry, Briggs, & Olivier, 2012). See Appendix D for full 
paper. 
 
The next study evaluated a picture-based recognition system based on an existing 
graphical authentication system, VIP (DeAngeli et al., 2002) and a face-based system 
based on Passfaces. These two systems were chosen for their use of full images with the 
aim of improving the recognition for both age groups while measures were taken to 
make the systems realistic in terms of implementation. The nature of the images was 
changed to improve security, where the user had to choose an image from a group of 
similar images rather than dissimilar images. This study was the first to compare the 
performance of younger and older adults with multiple codes of face-based and picture-
based graphical systems. In terms of accuracy, older participants were better with Faces 
and Pictures than with PIN, especially with the face-based system. However, a time-
based performance decrement was observed for the older participants meaning that the 
systems in their form did not take full advantage of the visual properties. With this in 
mind, improvements were planned. 
 
The final study compared the performance of younger and older adults with two face-
based systems, one using young faces and the other using old faces to ascertain whether 
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the age of the faces used in the code affected memorability. This study was the first to 
evaluate a face-based system that was designed to take advantage of own-age effects 
and remove overlap between images used in different codes. The results showed a 
performance decrement over time but it was not age-specific meaning younger and 
older participants experienced the same decline rate in performance. This study found 
that when using older faces the older adult performance in the third week was not 
significantly different from younger adults for the memorability of 6 face-based codes.   
 
The results of these studies demonstrate that simply using graphical images in codes 
does not guarantee improvements in memorability and that they must be designed 
appropriately to create a more inclusive solution. One such improvement is the use of 
age appropriate faces, the other is ensuring that there is no overlap of images used 
within different codes.  
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2. COMPUTER AUTHENTICATION LITERATURE 
 
This chapter focuses on the issues in user authentication with a specific focus on 
graphical authentication systems. The basic mechanisms and the psychological 
principles behind the authentication systems will be reviewed before discussing the 
evaluation techniques that have been used in the domain. The principle aim of this 
chapter will be to highlight the flaws with system evaluations carried out in the past and 
to suggest improvements which will go on to be implemented in the subsequent 
experiments in this thesis. 
 
Authentication is the act of proving to a system that you are who you say you are. In the 
context of computers, authentication involves a person satisfying the computer system 
that they are the user they claim to be, either by presenting a shared secret, presenting a 
physical item, or presenting a unique personal characteristic that matches the one stored 
for that particular username. Renaud and De Angeli (2004) describe authentication as a 
three-step process where first the user has to be identified – identification: usually 
involving a username – then provide evidence to prove the identity – authentication – 
and finally access rights are granted by the system if successful – authorisation. 
Authentication is an important aspect of computer security that allows users to keep 
their information private from other users, and in essence allows a computer to serve 
more than just one person.  
 
Authentication systems typically fall into one of three categories: token-based 
authentication, biometric authentication or knowledge-based authentication. Token-
based authentication relies on the presence of a physical item to authenticate the user – 
if an appropriate token is presented then the person holding it is granted access. 
Biometric authentication relies on the users’ unique and stable characteristics in order to 
authenticate the user. If the presented feature matches the ‘template’ in the database, 
then the person is deemed to be the user and they are granted access. Knowledge-based 
authentication (KBA) systems rely on a string of information that is shared between the 
system and the user. The user is expected to remember a combination of some sort – 
usually letters for a password or numbers for a personal identification number (PIN) – 
and present that combination when they wish to access their account. The information 
string can be either secret – as is the case with passwords and PINs – or public – as is 
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often the case with challenge questions. Knowledge-based systems are the most 
common type of authentication – more specifically passwords (Herley, Oorschot, & 
Patrick, 2009; Renaud, 2005) – due to their relatively simple and inexpensive 
implementations in addition to being familiar to users. As a consequence, KBA will be 
the focus of this review. 
 
Knowledge-based authentication encompasses a wide array of systems, but these 
typically fall into two categories: pure recall or cued-recall. Pure recall systems require 
users to enter their string with no context provided. Passwords and PINs are examples 
of pure recall KBA systems – the user is asked to enter the code usually without any 
prompts. Cued-recall systems give users some contextual information during the login 
in order to aid the recall of the string. Challenge questions are an example of cued-recall 
KBA systems – the user is asked a question (the cue) and is then expected to answer 
that question. This review will firstly cover text-based pure recall systems (see 
subsection 2.1) and will then follow with text-based cued-recall systems (see subsection 
2.2). Graphical systems will be covered in subsection 2.3.  
 
2.1. PURE RECALL 
 
Passwords are the most popular pure recall knowledge systems in terms of 
implementation (e.g. Herley et al., 2009). Despite their widespread use, there are a 
number of problems that are associated with this type of system. One of the main 
problems lies with the constraints that are placed by providers in order to maintain the 
security of the systems such as update frequency (e.g. Sasse, Brostoff & Weirich, 2001). 
There are generally two main schools of thought when it comes to the construction of 
secure passwords: Complexity and Length.  
 
Researchers who believe in password complexity encourage users to utilise and 
interweave as many character sets as possible to create complex random codes such as 
f8pRy@7&. Proctor, Lien, Vu, Schultz, and Salvendy (2002) explored the vulnerability 
of different types of passwords to being cracked – i.e. guessed – by a computer program 
and found that enforcing users to use a specified length (five characters or eight 
characters) plus character restrictions (e.g. uppercase and lowercase letters plus 
numbers) resulted in passwords that were less vulnerable to attack than passwords that 
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only enforced length. Additionally, they report that the extra enforcements did not affect 
the login time of participants after a distractor task. However, the authors fail to report 
on the accuracy of the passwords inputted after the distractor task. Yan, Blackwell, 
Anderson, and Grant (2004) carried out a similar study investigating the effect of 
instruction on the quality of the generated passwords and found that the addition of 
symbols to the combination of uppercase and lowercase letters significantly improved 
the resistance of the codes to cracking.  This finding was supported by a series of 
studies by Vu et al. (2007) who also recommend using symbols in addition to letters and 
numbers to create strong passwords. Yan et al. (2004) mention that passwords 
composed of six or less characters were easy to crack regardless of the complexity, 
suggesting that length is very important to security. Just as with Proctor et al. (2002) the 
authors of both studies do not take into account the usability implications of their 
complexity recommendations.  
 
Researchers who believe in length encourage users to implement the maximum possible 
number of characters for codes but they do not necessarily have to be composed of 
complex combinations. They argue that the added password space (e.g. 13 characters 
over 8 characters) balances the smaller character set (e.g. not utilising symbols). This 
notion was summed up by Holt (2011) who concluded that password length was more 
important than password complexity. Komanduri et al. (2011) carried out a study where 
participants were given various restrictions on passwords they had to create and 
remember a week later. One of their most important findings was that longer passwords 
– at least 13 characters long – composed without any specific requirements had more 
entropy (i.e. more secure) than more ‘traditional’ passwords – e.g. requiring the use of 
uppercase and lowercase letters along with numbers and symbols. Additionally 
participants perceived the longer passwords as more ‘usable’ although they were also 
perceived as less secure than complex ones. Experts in this camp tend to take the 
usability of the system into consideration, although that is not always the case and the 
main focus remains on the security of the systems. 
 
Regardless of the approach favoured by experts or providers, the focus of security 
professionals over time has been to make systems more secure without taking into 
account the repercussions facing the users. Generally speaking, more secure systems 
involve making the system more complicated for the end user, or requiring the user to 
perform more steps than before. This is demonstrated by Weir, Aggarwal, Collins, and 
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Stern (2010) who suggest different methods for evaluating and rejecting ‘weak’ 
passwords despite being aware that such actions would result in user annoyance. 
Another perfect example lies in the suggestion by a security expert that the length of 
passwords should be a minimum of nine characters as well as being unique to each site 
(Goodin, 2012a). This change was suggested with the aim of keeping passwords safe 
from brute force and dictionary attacks – attacks where multiple combinations are 
attempted consecutively until one finally guesses the password (e.g. Morris & 
Thompson, 1979) – yet they are likely to cause more problems for users and will most 
likely encourage users to find a way around the security system rather than comply with 
the requirements (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010). This observation is backed by previous 
research that has shown that computer users wish to utilise the machine for their 
primary task and do not want to deal with added security settings which are perceived to 
be a hindrance (Dourish, Grinter, Delgado de la Flor, & Joseph, 2004; Sasse, Brostoff, 
& Weirich, 2001). Research by Weir, Douglas, Carruthers, and Jack (2009) in the 
context of ebanking authentication confirms that users value usable systems over secure 
systems if given a choice. In that study three two-factor authentication methods were 
evaluated. Also, the results found that participants preferred systems that were rated as 
‘usable’ – one of the measures being convenience – over systems that were rated as 
‘secure’. Additionally, it was found that systems that were rated as ‘usable’ were also 
rated as ‘insecure’, further demonstrating the conflict between the two camps. 
 
A possible reason for the defiance of security implementations amongst computer users 
is the perception of security as an abstract concept and therefore the impact of poor 
security is not wholly understood (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977). For example, Sjöberg and 
Fromm (2001) found that computer users rated potential security risks higher when 
generalising to all computer users, yet the same risks were considered much less likely 
when considered as personal risks. Research by West (2008) shows that while some 
users may take precautions and protect themselves when using computers, that 
protection will only encourage them to engage in riskier behaviour. Therefore, it is 
possible that users’ lack of perceived threat and the increasing complex methods being 
employed by experts drive users to engage in insecure behaviours such as sharing and 
writing down passwords. 
 
However, another potential reason for the circumvention of security comes from various 
research indicating a large volume of accounts that users have to secure with passwords. 
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There have been a number of studies investigating the number of passwords and 
accounts users are expected to remember, but numbers have varied across these studies. 
Gaw and Felten (2006) carried out a study with undergraduate students where they were 
asked to log in to all their accounts and record the number of passwords and accounts 
they had. The researchers found that the participants had an average of eight accounts 
that required a password, and that users generally did not have more than three unique 
passwords. Participants were open about their password reuse behaviours explaining 
that the reuse of codes made them easier to manage. On average, participants reused 
each password twice. A more recent diary study on password use carried out by Hayashi 
and Hong (2011) indicated that participants – the majority undergraduate students – 
needed to protect eleven accounts using passwords. Another password diary study was 
done by Grawemeyer and Johnson (2011) using a more diverse sample – i.e. not 
undergraduate students – and found that on average participants managed eight 
passwords. No details were given about password reuse by individual participants, but 
their results showed that 69 unique passwords were used for a total of 175 services, 
indicating a nearly 60% password reuse rate. A large-scale study on password use was 
carried out by Florencio and Herley (2007) involving half a million users over a three-
week period. Participants were required to download a software program that monitored 
their web password details, distinguishing this study from the others which were mostly 
self-reported. They found that users on average had 6.5 passwords that are shared across 
3.9 different sites – in other words most passwords are reused. This resulted in users 
having 25 accounts that require a password, a much larger and alarming number than 
other studies reported. This discrepancy could be due to the sample used in the latter 
study – the requirement to download and install a piece of software would indicate that 
more computer literate participants took part, and computer literate people tend to have 
more accounts and passwords than those that are not. However, it is also possible that 
the other studies led to an underestimate of account and password numbers due to the 
methodology employed – self-report diaries. Regardless of the exact number of 
accounts and passwords, it can be concluded that users are required to remember a 
considerable amount of information that leads to insecure behaviours. 
 
It is clear from the numerous password habit studies that a very common way of 
circumventing password demands is by reusing passwords across accounts. From a 
security standpoint, the problem with reusing passwords is that if one account gets 
compromised the credentials from that account – username and password – can then be 
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used with other accounts to access them (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004). Recently a 
number of usernames and passwords have been hacked and leaked for a number of 
online accounts including 453,000 Yahoo! credentials (Goodin, 2012b), 420,000 
Formspring passwords (Ragan, 2012) about 8 million LinkedIn passwords (Goodin, 
2012c), and 11 million Gamingo passwords (Goodin, 2012d). These security breaches 
occurred independently of the user’s actions, yet further accounts could be vulnerable if 
any passwords were reused. These breaches are a clear demonstration of the risks of 
reusing passwords.  
 
Another prevalent way of coping with the cognitive load of remembering multiple 
codes is writing down the codes (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010). By writing down the 
different codes, the user is able to maintain unique codes for different accounts. 
However, the problem then becomes the storage of the documentation as any attacker 
that gains possession of the written down codes will then have no problems gaining 
access to those accounts. The comprehensive study on password habits by Grawemeyer 
and Johnson (2011) found that while users do write their passwords down, the reuse of 
codes is by far more common. 
 
Using simple codes is another way to get around having to remember multiple codes. 
These simpler codes, consisting of short length, narrow character set, or both, are 
vulnerable to brute-force attacks and therefore compromise the security of the system. 
However, these weak codes are still prevalent as shown by leaked PINs (Bonneau, 
Preibusch, & Anderson, 2012) and by research in the workplace (Stanton, Stam, 
Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). 
 
Other pure recall KBA systems include passphrases and mnemonic passwords. 
Passphrases refer to systems where the user is able to generate longer ‘phrases’ as a 
code for a system, usually consisting of multiple words. Although initially viewed as an 
attractive alternative to passwords due to the increased security space, recent usability 
studies have demonstrated a similar memorability problem to passwords where users are 
unable to recall the exact combination of characters (e.g. Keith, Shao, & Steinbart, 
2007). Additional problems specific to passphrases included typographical errors that 
improved over time but affected the perceptions of the users. More recent work by 
Keith, Shao, and Steinbart (2009) has shown that the typographical errors can be 
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reduced by adding restrictions, but it is unknown what effect this has on the willingness 
of people to use the system. 
 
Mnemonic passwords have also been suggested as alternatives to traditional passwords. 
These types of passwords are formed by abbreviating a long phrase to the first letter of 
each word and substituting some characters – e.g. the phrase ‘We Could Be Heroes Just 
For One Day’ could become ‘WcbHj41d’. However, studies have found that users 
choose popular phrases for their mnemonic passwords, resulting in codes that can be 
cracked using specially made dictionaries (e.g. Kuo, Romanosky, & Cranor, 2006). 
 
In summary, pure recall-based KBA systems suffer from the reuse of codes, the writing 
down of codes and the simplification of the codes. These problems occur due to the 
restrictions that are set by providers that require users to learn and remember essentially 
a random combination of characters. 
 
2.2. CUED-RECALL  
 
Challenge questions are one of the most common types of cued-recall KBA systems. 
Challenge questions consist of a pre-established question that users have to provide an 
answer to. When authenticating, the system asks the question and the user is required to 
respond with the answer they entered during enrolment. The question can be chosen by 
the user or implemented by the provider. A common challenge question that is used by 
several providers is “mother’s maiden name” (Just, 2005).  
 
The strength of the system lies in the users’ familiarity with their personal information. 
Providers count on the fact that users will be able to remember their mothers’ maiden 
names, for example, or remember the name of their first pet. As most challenge 
questions are fairly personal—yet generalisable across the user base—users are 
expected to remember the information (Just, 2004). However, remembering answers to 
challenge questions is not always as straightforward as intended. For example, a user’s 
favourite food might change over time, and if they are accessing an account that has 
been inactive for a significant amount of time, the user might struggle to remember the 
registered answer—e.g. their favourite food at the time when they registered rather than 
their current favourite food (Just, 2004).  
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Another possible problem with challenge questions is regarding the registration method 
used for the answer. Just (2004) distinguishes between two methods for providing 
answers: fixed or open. Fixed answers requires user to select an answer to a question 
from a list of system-provided answers – e.g. a dropdown menu. While this approach 
controls the quality of the answers, it also has the potential to cause problems for the 
user: if none of the answers are relevant then there will be problems when it comes to 
recalling that answer. Similarly, if the system provides more than one answer that is 
relevant to the question then the user may be confused when asked to select the correct 
answer at a later date.  
 
Open answers allow the user to enter any text they wish as an answer. This approach 
guarantees that the user will have an answer to a question, but the problem lies in the 
repeatability of the answer. For example, a user might have provided an answer as being 
“Queen Elizabeth II”, but then they might struggle to remember exactly how they 
registered their answer, given that they could have registered it as “QE2”, “QEII”, 
“queen elizabeth 2”, or any other variation.  
 
One major problem with challenge questions, perhaps more so than with passwords due 
to the cue, is that people close to the user might be able to answer the challenge 
questions. For example, a friend of the previous user would probably know that his 
previous school was “Queen Elizabeth II” and therefore could make a very educated 
guess when answering the question. Just (2004) argues that the questions chosen should 
not be in the public domain in order to minimise these instances, but this may not 
always be possible, especially if it is the provider that is setting the questions. 
 
Just and Aspinall (2009) have suggested combining multiple challenge questions in 
order to increase the security of the system. In a series of user study with undergraduate 
students, they found that participants selected questions that lead to guessable answers. 
When they evaluated the memorability of the multiple question approach after a 23 day 
delay they found that 18% of participants encountered a problem with at least one 
question. These results indicate that challenge questions do not provide an adequate 
level of security as a primary authentication system and they are also plagued by the 
memorability issues that have been associated with passwords.  
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In summary, the problem with knowledge-based systems lies in the fact that users are 
required to remember many complex pieces of information and they are unable to cope 
with this load. Therefore they engage in insecure behaviours that expose the system to 
other attacks, such as reusing codes across various accounts, writing the codes down, or 
creating simple codes. These practices compromise the security of the system, raising 
the question whether the efforts of security experts in making the systems more robust 
to attacks are in fact debilitating the systems by forcing users to circumvent these 
measures. 
 
2.3. GRAPHICAL AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
 
Graphical authentication systems (GAS), also known as ‘graphical passwords’, are 
systems that rely on the user remembering visual stimuli instead of traditional text. 
When the user enrols with a graphical system, s/he is either given various images or is 
allowed to select various images that have to be remembered for logging in later – the 
‘target’ images. Usually systems require the user to remember four or five target images 
that form a ‘code’. In order to authenticate the user is required to select the target 
images from amongst foil images in a series of challenge screens. If the user selects all 
four or five target images correctly then s/he has authenticated. Four key graphical 
systems are described below followed by the psychology literature detailing their 
advantages. For a more detailed overview of graphical systems and an evaluation of the 
methods used see subsection 2.3.2.  
 
Graphical authentication systems have been tested extensively over the past decade and 
have been proposed as alternatives to traditional alphanumeric passwords due to 
excellent memorability results (see 2.3.1). The main implementation strategy behind 
GAS is the hope that by reducing the memory burden of multiple passwords, the 
resulting fewer passwords will be strong (e.g. Jermyn, Mayer, & Monrose, 1999; Suo, 
Zhu, & Owen, 2005). The idea of a graphical password was first explored by Blonder 
(1996) who developed a click-based system and since then a number of graphical 
systems have been developed and evaluated with the aim of improving the 
authentication user experience.  
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Figure 2.1: The Passfaces graphical authentication system (Rose, n.d.). 
 
Passfaces (Valentine, 1998) is an example of a recognition-based GAS that utilises 
images of human faces for authentication (see Figure 2.1). Users are required to learn 
and remember five faces that they will then have to select from amongst foil faces in 
order to authenticate. During authentication, the user will see five challenge grids 
consisting of nine faces each, with one of the nine being a target face. The user is 
expected to select the five target face from each of the challenge grids with no other 
restrictions.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Déjà vu graphical authentication system (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). 
 
Déjà vu (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000) is similar to Passfaces in that it allows users to select 
five images during enrolment that they are then required to recognise to authenticate 
(see Figure 2.2). Unlike Passfaces, Déjà vu uses images of random art with the aim of 
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limiting sharing and writing down of the codes. Also unlike Passfaces the system 
presents only one challenge grid during the authentication stage and all target images 
are present in that grid. The user is then required to select their five images from the 
single grid, regardless of order. 
 
 
Figure 2.3:The VIP 1/2 graphical authentication system (De Angeli et al., 2005). 
 
VIP (De Angeli et al., 2002) employs a similar setup to Passfaces, with the chief 
difference being the use of detailed pictures instead of faces (see Figure 2.3). Another 
difference is the enforcement of order in the selection process – participants must select 
the pictures in the same order they were chosen or given during enrolment. Three 
versions of the VIP system have been evaluated, one with the location of the images on 
the grids varying with each trial and another with the location of the images being fixed 
for every trial. A third VIP portfolio-based system was tested where users were given 
eight pictures to learn, but during authentication they were only required to select four 
random targets from the original eight.  
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Figure 2.4: The PassPoints graphical authentication system (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). 
 
PassPoints (Susan Wiedenbeck, Waters, Birget, Brodskiy, & Memon, 2005) implements 
the graphical element in a different way to the previous three systems (see Figure 2.4). 
Instead of assigning whole images to participants and requiring them to recognise them 
to authenticate, PassPoints uses the image as a cue to aid the user in selecting five 
points within the screen – or within the image. In order to authenticate, the user is 
required to select those five points in the same order as during enrolment. 
 
Many varieties of graphical system have been designed and evaluated, but the majority 
are based on the principles from the four systems covered above – face-based 
(Passfaces) or picture-based (Déjà vu, VIP), multiple challenge grids (Passfaces, VIP) 
or single challenge grid (Déjà vu), fixed (VIP) or random (Passfaces) image position, 
full recognition (Passfaces), portfolio (VIP 3), or cued-recall (PassPoints). 
 
 
2.3.1. WHY DO THEY WORK? 
 
Graphical authentication systems are based on three main principles that elicit high 
memorability in humans. These are the use of recognition or cued-recall over pure 
recall, the use of the picture superiority effect for picture systems and the use of face 
recognition.  
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2.3.1.1. RECOGNITION OVER RECALL 
 
Graphical Authentication Systems typically rely on either cued-recall or recognition 
unlike passwords or PINs which rely on pure recall. It is well known that humans are 
much more accurate when asked to recognise a previously seen item than when asked to 
recall that item – with or without a cue (Baddeley, 1997; Parkin, 1993). A theory for the 
superior performance of participants with recognition tasks over recall tasks is the two-
process theory supported by Kinisch (1970) amongst others (e.g. Watkins, 1979). This 
theory states that recall and recognition are part of the same process but recognition is a 
step before recall. When a participant is asked to recall an item, that item first has to be 
retrieved from memory using a search process – step 1 – and is then tested using 
recognition to determine whether the item is correct –step 2. Hence recognition avoids 
the additional memory load associated with the 1st step. 
 
Another theory, the encoding specificity principle, states that memory is most effective 
when information that was present during the encoding process is also present during 
the retrieval process (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This theory explains the superiority 
of recognition over pure recall by the fact that the focal item is presented during 
recognition and the participant is required to recover the context of that item. For recall, 
however, the context is given and the participant is required to recover the focal item – a 
process that requires more effort. Tulving and Watkins (1973) further clarify this theory 
by stating that both recall and recognition rely on the same processes, but during 
recognition more accurate cues are presented to the participant – i.e. all the information 
that was present during encoding is present during retrieval and the participant has to 
make a yes/no judgement – while for recall there are less relevant or no cues resulting in 
the participant having to generate the item.  
 
In the context of GAS, the use of recall or cued-recall – shown to elicit a better 
performance than pure recall (Baddeley, 1997; Parkin, 1993) – suggests that they should 
encourage a better memory performance than existing knowledge-based systems that 
generally rely on pure recall.  
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2.3.1.2. VISUAL SUPERIORITY  
 
Graphical authentication systems are based on the well-known phenomenon of the 
picture superiority effect. This pictorial advantage indicates that people are able to 
recognise a very large number of pictures even after limited exposure to these pictures. 
Nickerson (1965) was one of the first to research short-term memory for pictures by 
using a seen/not seen approach where participants observed a set of pictures and were 
then shown a larger set containing all of the initial pictures in addition to some new 
pictures. They were required to respond whether the picture being shown had been seen 
or not during the initial phase of the study. Results were very good with the majority of 
participants achieving over a 90% success rate, although a statistically significant decay 
in performance was observed with larger time lags. These results were later reinforced 
by Shepard (1967) who carried out a comparison of pictures with words and sentences 
concluding that short-term memory for pictures was much more accurate than for other 
stimuli. Despite similar results, the method was marginally different with pairs of 
pictures being shown to the participant rather than a single picture. Therefore, the 
response for Shepard was a choice response (a or b) rather than a match like 
Nickerson’s (yes or no). Shepard’s testing method – requiring the participant to 
discriminate between two or more images – is most relevant to GAS as challenge grids 
present users with a number of choices, rather than asking the user whether a single 
image has been assigned. However, both types of methodology have yielded the same 
results: pictures were more easily recognised than verbal stimuli.   
 
Standing, Conezio, and Haber, (1970) further backed the idea of a picture superiority 
effect with a series of four experiments that found accuracy rates around 90% for a 
variety of configurations. In these experiments the time gap between exposure and 
identification varied between 30 minutes and 60 minutes, indicating retention for a 
longer period of time. Standing (1973) demonstrated memory for pictures after an even 
longer time delay, with very positive results even after delays of two days between 
learning and identification. The reported studies used detailed pictures which are 
thought to contribute to the strength of the effect. This series of studies demonstrated 
that the superior memory for pictures that was initially observed for a short time delay 
also applied to extended delays of more than a day. These results are very important for 
GAS given that a large number of authentication attempts will take place after extended 
intervals – it is unlikely for a person to continuously authenticate with all of their 
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accounts or to authenticate after only 5 minutes. More likely, users will authenticate 
once per day or a few times per week, although there will also be accounts that will be 
used much less often. 
 
The picture superiority effect has been shown to extend to associative recognition, i.e. 
remembering pairs of items. In a series of studies by Hockley (2008), participants were 
shown to have a higher hit rate with picture pairs (line drawings) than with word pairs 
demonstrating that not only are people able to take advantage of the effect with single 
pictures, but also when associating multiple pictures. This finding is encouraging in the 
context of GAS given the associations that will need to be made between the individual 
items and their respective accounts. However, care must be taken when implementing 
systems that utilise the picture superiority effect as evidence suggests that it can be 
reversed – for example by presenting very similar stimuli in cued-recall scenario 
(Nelson, Reed, & Walling, 1976) or by presenting semantic verbal priming along with 
the image (Intraub & Nicklos, 1985). Additionally, the presentation of the images can 
also play a part in the effectiveness of the system, as demonstrated by Weldon (1987) 
who reported that a cued-recall word fragment completion test yields more accurate 
responses than a free-recall of pictures. However, participants were clearly superior in 
the picture identification test – essentially a recognition task – than in any other 
condition, demonstrating the power of recognition. 
 
2.3.1.3. FACE RECOGNITION 
 
The visual advantage does not appear to be exclusive to pictures as memory for human 
faces has been shown to be very strong. This is not the same effect as the picture 
superiority effect, however, as work by Bruce and Young (1986) claimed that the face 
recognition unit is separate from the picture recognition mechanism. Nonetheless, a 
clear advantage is present when it comes to recognising faces that people are familiar 
with. For example, Bruce (1982) demonstrates that known faces are identified faster and 
more accurately than unknown faces, even when expression and angulation of the face 
were changed. Additionally, Burton and Wilson (1999) found that familiar faces could 
be identified accurately even with very poor quality video, a result that was later 
supported by Bruce, Henderson, Newman, and Burton (2001). Bruce et al. (2001) also 
found, however, the recognition for unfamiliar faces was not as successful. This finding 
was consistent with previous work demonstrating the inefficacy in recognising 
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unknown faces (Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000). These findings are very important 
for face-based GAS due to the differences in performance that have been observed. 
While it is obvious that using familiar faces would benefit the users, security 
implications have to be taken into consideration. Hence, unfamiliar faces should be used 
for authentication systems despite the potential deficit, but this design decision should 
be balanced with training to aid the users. 
 
Distinctive faces have been found to be easier to recognise than non-distinctive faces 
(Bruce, Burton, & Dench, 1994), yet the term ‘distinctive’ has not been accurately 
defined. There are currently at least two methods for determining the distinctiveness of 
a face – by the ease of picking that face out of a crowd and the deviation from an 
average face (Wickham & Morris, 2003). Depending on the method used, the ease of 
recognition could vary. Previously it was thought that attractiveness played a part in 
making a face recognisable (Shepherd & Ellis, 1973), but more recent work fails to 
support this notion and once again suggests that distinctiveness is the more important 
characteristic for ease of recognition (Sarno & Alley, 1997; Wickham & Morris, 2003). 
Therefore, distinctive faces are the obvious choice to be used in face-based graphical 
systems although the implementation is not as straightforward given that if all faces 
used for the system are distinctive – including the foils – then no advantage will be 
present. Similarly, if only the target faces are distinctive, then this will aid the attacker 
in guessing the correct code. 
 
2.3.2. GRAPHICAL AUTHENTICATION: THE STORY SO FAR 
 
Graphical authentication systems have been categorised into two main categories within 
the computing literature: recall-based and recognition-based (Dirik, Memon, & Birget, 
2007; Suo et al., 2005). Recall-based graphical authentication systems require the user 
to replicate an action – e.g. a drawing or a selection of clicks – that they had previously 
performed during enrolment. The best examples of recall-based GAS are Draw-a-Secret 
(DAS) and PassPoint. In DAS, a user is expected to draw a shape using a grid as a 
guideline (Jermyn et al., 1999). For better security, the shape should cross as many cells 
in the grid as possible, but should be simple enough to be redrawn later during login. 
Dunphy and Yan (2007) developed an improved version of the system called 
Background Draw-a-Secret (BDAS) that presented users with a background photograph 
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in order to reduce the predictability of the drawings. Participants using BDAS produced 
more complex drawings without sacrificing the memorability of the system. 
 
The PassPoints system presents the user with an image and the user is required to click 
on five distinct areas within the image. In order to authenticate the user selects the same 
five points in order (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). While the system obtained favourable 
comments from users, a problem specific to PassPoints is that the choice of the clicks 
are strongly influenced by the background image that is selected or given. These 
popular click areas are known as ‘hotspots’ and they lead to a certain predictability 
which diminishes the security of the system (Dirik et al, 2007). Simply, every image has 
a number of areas of interest that draw users’ attention and these can be used by 
attackers to guess the clicks of the users (e.g. van Oorschot, Salehi-Abari, & Thorpe, 
2010).  
 
With the issue of hotspots in mind, an improved system called Cued Click Points was 
developed and evaluated by Chiasson, Van Oorschot, and Biddle (2007) where five 
images were used and users were required to select one point per image rather than 
having to select multiple points in a single image. Results were promising, with 
accuracy being very high and user satisfaction being higher than that of the original 
PassPoints system. Additionally, the user study found that the points selected by 
participants using Cued Click Points were less predictable than those using PassPoints 
while also yielding good point-selection accuracy. These results were based on a thirty 
second delay which may have been a very short time delay. The system was further 
improved to aid users in selecting their points by the use of a ‘viewport’ that focuses 
their attention on a random section of the image with the ability to shuffle that viewport 
if necessary (Chiasson, Forget, Biddle, & Van Oorschot, 2008). This iteration of the 
system, called Persuasive Cued Click Points, was aimed at further reducing the 
predictability of point selections and the results found that the memorability of the 
system after 30 seconds was not significantly different from that of Cued Click Points 
(Chiasson et al., 2007). As hoped, the number of hotspots were significantly reduced 
with the new version of the system. However, the studies evaluating PassPoints, Cued 
Click Points and Persuasive Cued Click Points only evaluate a single code, diminishing 
the applicability of the results in the real world where users are likely to have more than 
one code. Chiasson, Forget, Stobert, Van Oorschot, and Biddle (2009) addressed this 
issue by running a study where participants were asked to learn and remember six codes 
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– either passwords or PassPoints. Participants were asked to recall their codes after a 
‘short break’ and following a two-week delay. Results differed from those reported 
using single codes, with the most striking finding being that login success rates between 
passwords and PassPoints did not differ significantly after a two week delay, although 
PassPoints were more successful after a short break. The results from this study 
demonstrate the flawed methodology that had been employed with cued-recall based 
GAS and suggests that although an advantage still exists with graphical systems over 
traditional text-based systems, that advantage may disappear after an extended delay 
when multiple codes have to be remembered. However, there are some issues with the 
methodology that was used. The exact time delay for the first retention phase (short-
term recall) is not specified as participants were asked to carry out untimed tasks – i.e. 
answer two questions. It is unknown whether these tasks were controlled in some way 
to make sure all participants experienced the same time delay between confirmation and 
login. Additionally, all six codes were assigned during the same session, potentially 
overloading participants. 
 
Results with recall-based graphical authentication systems have been generally positive 
(e.g. Chiasson et al., 2007; Chiasson et al., 2008; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005), but a 
consideration for these systems is that a successful authentication requires the user to 
recreate an action to a very accurate degree and therefore mistakes should be expected. 
The tolerance of the area where the click or selections are to be made plays a big part in 
the success of the systems, as a margin that is too small will cause errors while a margin 
that is too big will be exploited by guess attacks (Susan Wiedenbeck & Waters, 2005).  
 
On the other hand, recognition-based GAS require users to learn and remember a 
number of images and then select them from amongst foils during authentication. 
Examples of recognition-based graphical systems include Déjà vu, the Visual 
Identification Protocol (VIP), and Passfaces. In Déjà vu a user selects five different 
random art images from a large portfolio and is then required to select those five images 
from a set on the screen. Déjà vu uses random art images due to the abstract nature of 
the images which aims make it more difficult to both share and write down, features 
that are perceived to make the system stronger (Dhamija & Perrig, 2000). A user study 
found that participants encountered less failed logins when using Déjà vu than when 
using PINs or passwords. However, unlimited attempts at selecting the codes were 
allowed which influenced misleading results – users are generally not allowed unlimited 
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attempts to enter their codes in the real world due to security concerns and instead are 
usually given three attempts before the account is locked (e.g. Brostoff & Sasse, 2003). 
The most likely reason for the performance found in the study was the testing of a 
single code which made the task much easier but also less ecologically valid – it is 
unlikely that only two failed attempts overall would occur if participants had been asked 
to remember four codes. No statistics were used to compare the results of the GAS to 
PINs and passwords, so although GAS appear to be superior when comparing the 
percentages it is not known whether the difference is statistically significant. The lack 
of inferential statistics is particularly missed in the results after a week’s delay where 
the percentages are close between PIN and passwords and between Déjà vu and Photo. 
It would have been interesting, and helpful, to determine whether any differences in 
performance existed between those groups. 
  
VIP is a graphical authentication system that relies on image recognition for 
authentication (De Angeli et al., 2002). The premise of the system is that users are given 
four target pictures of detailed and colourful objects to learn and they are expected to 
select the four target pictures from four challenge grids to log into the system. Each 
challenge grid consists of ten pictures, but only one is a target picture. In order to 
authenticate, the user needs to select the target picture from each challenge grid. A 
number of different configurations of the system were tested: four target pictures with 
their position in the challenge grids always being the same (VIP 1), four target pictures 
with their position in the challenge grids being random (VIP 2) and a portfolio-based 
system where eight target pictures were given to participants but only four were shown 
in the challenge grids in random order (VIP 3). A PIN system was also evaluated for 
comparison purposes. The general results found that participants were less prone to 
making errors when using VIP than when using PIN after a one-week delay. However, 
the portfolio-based configuration, VIP 3 led to significantly worse accuracy when 
compared with the other three systems. These results are very important for GAS as 
they demonstrate that graphical systems can be designed poorly and that in those cases 
the picture superiority effect can be eliminated. A problem with the study, however, is 
the lack of detail regarding the assignment of codes. It is clear that participants were 
given a single graphical code or PIN, but no further details are given regarding how the 
codes were chosen. Additionally, the use of single codes once again yields unreliable 
results, as demonstrated by the differences in performance between single and multiple 
graphical cued-based codes (Chiasson et al., 2009). Moncur and LePlâtre (2007) 
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evaluated the performance of participants with five codes, all of which were either PINs 
or VIP 2. The study found that participants were more successful when remembering 
multiple pictures over a four-week period, although retention rates were relatively poor 
for both conditions with VIP having about a 25% retention rate. As with the original 
VIP study (De Angeli et al., 2002) the codes were assigned to participants, but once 
again no details are provided on how this was done. Another issue lies in the fact that all 
five codes were assigned to participants in the same session, possibly taxing their 
concentration and affecting their performance. The researchers attempted to address this 
by requiring participants to practice their codes only two times before moving on, rather 
than the ten times employed by De Angeli et al. (2002), but this might have led to poor 
encoding of the codes due to lack of practice. 
 
Passfaces is a commercial GAS that works in a similar way to VIP 2 – where users are 
given four target face images to remember and then have to select those faces from a set 
of foil face images over the course of four challenge grids (Rose, N.D.). The chief 
difference between the systems lies in the stimuli – Passfaces utilises images of human 
faces while VIP uses detailed pictures of objects. Additionally, the challenge grids 
contain nine images rather than VIP’s ten. The basis for this system is humans’ 
exceptional ability to recognise known faces (see 2.3.1.3). As the system uses a 
database of stock face images, the user is guided through a ‘familiarisation’ process 
where they have to answer a number of questions about each face with the aim of 
turning that unknown face into a known face (Rose, N.D.).  
 
In a lab-based study, Valentine (1998) tested frequent and infrequent users of Passfaces 
with undergraduate students and university staff and found that although frequent users 
remembered their Passfaces better—with 99.98% of users logging in successfully first 
time—infrequent users still fared very well, with over 80% of users logging in 
successfully first-time and 100% logging in within three attempts. It must be noted that 
in Valentine’s study (1998) participants were allowed to select their faces and this 
resulted in predictable choices, especially for males who chose female faces over 80 
percent of the time (Valentine, 1998). The predictability of users’ choice of faces was 
later confirmed by Davis, Monrose, and Reiter (2004) who found that 10% of males’ 
codes could be guessed by just two guesses. 
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Despite the findings of studies suggesting user-chosen Passfaces codes were insecure, a 
field trial was run to evaluate the performance of undergraduate students with the 
system over a period of five months where participants were allowed to select their 
faces (Brostoff & Sasse, 2000). The study found that participants using Passfaces 
experienced significantly less problems logging in than when they used passwords. This 
improvement was offset by longer login times and fewer logins in total with Passfaces. 
The researchers argue that participants were put off by the long login times, but this 
may not be a problem with current implementations of the systems running on faster 
hardware and faster internet connections. A problem with the methodology, however, 
was the use of a single code and therefore ignoring the problems that are associated with 
multiple codes, as demonstrated by the other multiple code studies. 
 
Everitt, Bragin, Fogarty, and Kohno (2009) conducted a study where undergraduate 
students were asked to learn one, two or four Passfaces codes to authenticate with over 
four weeks. The codes in this study were assigned for security reasons, as detailed 
above. The purpose of the study was to explore problems that might arise when multiple 
codes are assigned to participants and to determine whether the training that is used – 
i.e. when the codes are assigned – affects recognition. The results demonstrate that the 
addition of codes significantly affected the number of attempts that participants needed 
to log in as well as an increased failure rate. However, no comparisons were made with 
existing authentication systems such as passwords or PINs so it is unknown how the 
performance with multiple Passfaces compares with that of multiple passwords. Due to 
the differing methodologies and the various measurements that were recorded, it is not 
possible to accurately compare the performance with other studies that have evaluated 
multiple codes. 
 
2.3.3. TESTING PARADIGMS 
An important observation about all studies that were conducted to evaluate the 
performance of GAS is the use of different methodologies where the individual 
differences, system, and intervals varied (see Table 2.1 for a summary of methodologies 
used).  
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Table 2.1: Methodologies used for evaluating graphical authentication systems. L/F = Lab-based or Field-
based study. Interval = delay between learning and recalling/recognising. Measure = dependent variable. 
Analysis = method of analysis for the dependent variable. Codes = number of different codes participants had 
to remember and whether they were assigned or chosen. 
Study n= L/F Interval Measure Analysis Codes Finding 
Passfaces 
(Brostoff & 
Sasse, 2000) 
36 
(UG) 
F Varying Error Rate Percentage Single 
Chosen 
PF 
remembered 
better than PW 
but time 
expense 
Déjà vu  
(Dhamija & 
Perrig, 2000) 
20 
(N/A) 
L ~10 mins 
1 week 
Time 
Failed 
attempts 
(from 
unlimited) 
Percentage Single (per 
system) 
Chosen 
Users liked 
system and 
compares well 
with existing 
systems 
 VIP 
(De Angeli et 
al, 2002) 
61 
(mix) 
L 40 mins 
1 week 
Effectiveness 
(forgetting 
code or wrong 
entries) 
Time 
Chi Square 
(Effectiveness) 
ANOVA (time) 
Single (per 
system) 
Given 
Pictures less 
error prone and 
more liked. 
VIP 3 
(portfolio) not 
successful 
Never Forget 
(Weinshall & 
Kirkpatrick, 
2004) 
N/A L 1-3 months Successful 
attempts? 
Percentage Single? 
Given? 
Pictures are 
better  
User Choice 
(Davis et al., 
2004) 
154 
(UG) 
F Varying (~ 5 
months) 
Successful 
attempts 
Percentage Single 
Chosen 
Users cannot 
be trusted to 
select images 
(security) 
PassPoints 
(Wiedenbeck 
et al., 2005) 
40 
(mix) 
L ~10 mins 
1Week 
4 Weeks 
Attempts 
Time 
t-tests Single (per 
system) 
Chosen 
Same 
memorability 
as password 
over extended 
period but PP 
takes longer 
Personal 
Photos 
(Tullis & 
Tedesco, 
2005) 
14 
(N/A) 
L Immediate 
30 days 
Accuracy 
(errors) 
Percentage Single (per 
system) 
Chosen + 
Given 
Personal 
photos very 
memorable 
over time 
CHC 
(Wiedenbeck 
et al, 2006) 
15 
(mix) 
L Immediate 
‘1 week’ 
(just recog.) 
Correct 
attempts 
Time 
Percentage 
(attempts) 
ANOVA (time) 
Single 
Given? 
Good 
memorability 
over time but 
at expense of 
time 
Handwing 
(Renaud & 
Ramsay, 
2007) 
28 
(mostly 
old) 
F Varied over 
2 years 
Successful 
attempts 
Percentage Single 
Chosen 
Better than 
PIN 
BDAS  
(Dunphy & 
46 
(UG) 
L 5 mins 
1 week 
Success Rate Percentage Single 
Chosen 
Complexity of 
code increases 
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Yan, 2007) and mem. does 
not decrease 
VIP  
(Moncur & Le 
Plâtre, 2007) 
172 
(mostly 
young) 
L Immediate 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
Successful 
logins 
Chi Square Multiple (5) 
Given 
Drop in 
performance 
after delays, 
but 
performance 
better than text 
passwords 
CCP 
(Chiasson et 
al., 2007) 
24 
(young) 
L ~2 mins Accuracy 
(pixels from 
original) 
Percentage Single 
independent 
Chosen 
Users found 
CCP easier to 
use than PP 
PCCP 
(Chiasson et 
al, 2008) 
37 
(young) 
L ~2 mins Success rate Percentage 
CHI Square 
Single 
independent 
Chosen 
Better 
selection 
(security) 
without 
impacting 
usability 
ColorLogin 
(Gao et al, 
2008) 
30 
(N/A) 
L None - 
consecutive 
Time Means Single 
Given? 
Faster than 
other graphical 
systems 
PassPoints 
(Chiasson et 
al. ,2009) 
65/26 
(N/A) 
L Short Break 
~2 weeks 
 
Success Rate Chi Square Multiple (6) 
Chosen 
Performance 
affected after 
long delay to 
same extent as 
text passwords 
Passfaces 
(Everitt et al., 
2009) 
110 
(UG) 
L/F Varying 
over 4 
weeks 
Failure 
Successful 
Attempts 
Chi Square Multiple (1, 
2 or 4) 
Given 
4 week delay 
flawless for 
single system, 
significantly 
more difficult 
for multiple 
Graphical PIN  
(Brostoff et 
al., 2010) 
51/54 
(6 old  
total) 
F Varying (1-
75 days) 
Errors (and 
types) 
Percentage Single 
Chosen 
Easy to use 
Faces vs. 
Pictures 
(Hiywa et al, 
2011) 
20 
(N/A) 
F Varying Time t-tests Single (per 
system) 
Given 
Pictures 
(objects) 
preferred to 
faces 
ImagePass 
(Mihajlov & 
Blazic, 2011) 
211 
(UG) 
L/F Var: 
A: ~1 week 
B: ~1 month 
Login Failure ANOVA Single Frequency of 
use improves 
performance 
Study n= L/F Interval Measure Analysis Codes Finding 
 
Individual differences refers to the demographics of the participants that were tested. 
The majority of GAS studies focus on mixed ages or a sample of undergraduate 
students. The selection of undergraduate students has been an opportunity sample, 
rather than a strategic sample. Due to these recruitment methods, no studies have looked 
at comparisions of age-specific performance with graphical systems, or gender-specific 
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performances meaning that GAS performance results can only be applied to younger 
users. Few studies have evaluated systems with specific age groups and these studies 
will be covered in the following chapter.  
 
System differences refers to the system being tested. Studies so far have greatly varied 
in their approach, with some studies comparing the new GAS to existing systems (e.g. 
Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005), others only reporting the results 
from that single system (e.g. Brostoff & Sasse, 2000; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), or 
testing variations of the same system (e.g. De Angeli et al., 2002; Chiasson et al., 2008). 
Due to the different approaches researchers take with the testing of systems, it is 
sometimes not possible to compare the different systems with each other – e.g. Déjà vu 
with VIP. Additionally, the administration of the codes has varied across different 
studies, with some researchers assigning the codes to participants and other researchers 
allowing the participant to select their codes. 
 
Intervals refers to the time delay(s) that participants have to endure between the 
encoding of the codes to the recalling of the codes. Studies have evaluated systems in 
short-term memorability, long-term memorability, or both. Yet, even when evaluating 
short-term memorability the intervals used vary significantly between immediate recall 
(Tullis, Tedesco, & McCaffrey, 2011; Wiedenbeck, Waters, Sobrado, & Birget, 2006) 
and over thirty minutes (De Angeli et al., 2002). Similarly, the intervals for long-term 
memorability vary greatly from one day (Brostoff, Inglesant, & Sasse, 2010) to four 
weeks (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). These varying time intervals contribute to the 
confusion between systems as the memorability of a system after a week cannot be 
compared to that of another systems’ after two weeks. 
 
Moving forwards, it is imperative to control these three factors to make testing more 
consistent and easier to compare. In this thesis, the focus is also on evaluating how well 
older adults are able to deal with existing authentication methods and whether the 
introduction of GAS would improve their current performance. The following chapter 
will discuss the authentication literature in the context of older adults as well as 
covering the memory literature for older adults. 
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2.4. SUMMARY 
 
This chapter presented an overall discussion on the existing authentication literature and 
the shortcomings of existing systems. An important conclusion from the literature is the 
problem that users face when remembering multiple passwords, and the fact that this 
well-studied problem has not deterred providers from a.) implementing passwords or b.) 
attempting to improve the mechanisms associated with password allocation. 
Additionally, graphical authentication systems (GAS) were covered due to their 
potential to improve the authentication experience for users, but a review of the 
literature demonstrated the lack of consistency in evaluation methods which results in 
difficulty when comparing results from different graphical systems. 
 
Of more relevance to this thesis, it has been shown that older adults have not been 
included in the development or evaluation of password mechanisms. There are reasons 
to believe that older adults would be disadvantaged by existing knowledge-based 
authentication (KBA) systems, and these reasons will be covered by the ageing 
literature in the following chapter. 
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3. AGE LITERATURE 
 
Authentication methods have been developed and tested extensively over the past few 
years, yet not much is known about the state of authentication in the context of older 
adults. For years designers have argued that older adults accounted for a very small 
proportion of users and therefore it did not make sense to cater for them. However, 
older adults are the fastest-growing group of Internet users in developed nations (Hart et 
al., 2008), meaning that computer uptake amongst older users is on the increase. There 
are a number of well known age-associated memory declines (see 3.1 below) that can 
affect the use of current authentication systems and these will have to be addressed to 
improve the experience for this user group. While both cognitive and physiological 
declines are expected with the ageing process, this chapter will focus on cognitive 
declines. Physiological declines will play a role in the usability of authentication 
systems, e.g. decline in motor skills making it harder to operate a computer mouse (N. 
Walker, Philbin, & Fisk, 1997), but the true challenge lies with the cognitive declines, 
specifically in memory, given the emphasis on learning and recalling codes. 
 
3.1. AGE-ASSOCIATED MEMORY DECLINES RELEVANT TO 
AUTHENTICATION  
 
It has been well documented that declines in cognitive ability occur as people age (Fisk, 
Rogers, Charness, & Czaja, 2004). However, it is important to note that the rate of 
cognitive decline is variable amongst the ageing population and can be very different 
even within adults of the same age (Fisk et al., 2004). It is generally accepted that these 
age-associated declines become more apparent in adults aged over 50 (Arbor, 2001) and 
noticeably so after the age of 60 (Salthouse, 1991). 
 
Perhaps the most prevalent age-associated decline to affect KBA systems is memory. 
Memory has been traditionally divided into four processes: sensory memory, short-term 
memory, working memory and long-term memory. Sensory memory relates to the 
initial process after an item has been perceived – approximately the first 200-500 
miliseconds – and is subject to fast degradation and as a consequence information 
cannot be stored for later retrieval. As such, sensory memory is not relevant for 
authentication. Short-term memory refers to the limited capacity process that can lead to 
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information storage with adequate rehearsal and can be relevant to authentication 
regarding the learning process. Working memory is a system that holds multiple pieces 
of information with the purpose of further manipulation. Finally, long-term memory 
provides the storage facility for information and is thought to be infinite in capacity. 
However, certain memories may become difficult to retrieve and as such they can be 
‘forgotten’. It is this process – long-term memory – that is arguably the most relevant to 
authentication. 
 
Short-term memory has been shown to become less reliable with age (e.g. Akatsu & 
Miki, 2004). The decrement is even more pronounced in older adults when they are 
required to remember the order of the items. Maylor, Vousden, and Brown (1999) 
demonstrated this problem when participants were asked to learn letters in the order 
they were given and then recall the list immediately after the presentation of the last 
letter. Older participants scored significantly lower than younger participants and made 
more errors of every type, such as missing out a letter, recalling the letters in the wrong 
order and simply just forgetting the sequence. Kay (1951) suggested that the reason 
older adults struggle with serial order recall is due to their inability to adapt their 
approach when they make an error while recalling. This results in the older participants 
learning the wrong sequence rather than amending the sequence. Younger adults, on the 
other hand, are able to recognise when they have made a mistake and take steps to try a 
new sequence. 
 
Perhaps more importantly in the context of authentication, non-semantic long-term 
memory has also been shown to be affected (Fisk et al., 2004). Kausler, Salthouse and 
Saults (1988) demonstrated this long-term memory deficit by testing younger and older 
adults with memory for single words and word pairs. Results show that older 
participants struggled significantly more than younger adults in recalling the words over 
a period of one week. A meta-analysis by Verhaeghen, Marcoen, and Goossens (1993) 
confirmed the long-term memory problem when they concluded that long-term episodic 
memory was generally more affected by ageing than short-term memory. The exact 
reasons for long-term retention decrements are not known, but there are a number of 
explanations. The first possible explanation for the age-related deficits in long-term 
memory that have been observed relates to encoding strategies. Mitchell (1986) found 
that older participants performed on par with younger participants when asked to recall 
and recognise previously seen objects only when no instructions were given to learn 
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those items. When participants were told that there would be a test following the 
presentation of the items younger participants outperformed the older ones. This deficit 
in expected recall suggests that older adults may employ faulty learning strategies, or at 
least they are not as effective as those used by younger adults. A study by Grady, 
McIntosh, Horwitz, and Maisog (1995) found that cerebral blood flow was less 
prevalent in appropriate areas of the brain in older adults when compared with younger 
adults. This was not the case during recognition, when cerebral blood flow was equal 
for both age groups, which again suggests that the encoding strategy that older adults 
employ is at fault. Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) found that older adults relied on 
general conceptual or perceptual similarity in picture (object) recognition – e.g. they 
made a very broad and unspecific association with the object when they were asked to 
remember it. This strategy led to poorer recognition when similar pictures were used as 
foils. On the other hand, younger adults did not seem to suffer as much with the task, 
further supporting the idea that older adults employ a faulty strategy at encoding. 
Naveh-Benjamin, Brav, and Levy (2007) further reinforced the notion of poor encoding 
strategies when they found that when older participants were required to use an 
association strategy to learn word pairs they performed significantly better than when 
they were allowed to encode the pairs on their own. These findings are very important 
in the context of authentication as they suggest that older adults need assistance when 
learning their codes – graphical or otherwise.  
 
Another explanation for the long-term memory decrement found in older adults is that 
the encoding process is hindered by distractions. A theoretical model by Hasher and 
Zacks (1988) suggested that older adults were more distracted than younger adults by 
irrelevant information when encoding items and these distractions were then encoded 
along with the central information, causing more information than was necessary to be 
encoded and as a consequence affecting the recall of that information at a later time. An 
EEG study found that indeed older adults appeared to pay excessive attention to 
distracting information (Gazzaley et al., 2008). These findings are also important for the 
design of authentication systems – older adults need to be in a quiet environment where 
they can learn their codes, but there are also design implications. Codes should be 
presented using a minimalistic approach to minimise any distractions on screen and 
direct their attention to the items. 
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Working memory is another process that is affected by the ageing process. Older adults 
have been shown to have more difficulties with tasks that require manipulation of 
information than with those that do not (Dobbs & Rule, 1989). The problems with 
working memory are likely to lead to the item binding deficit that has been observed in 
older adults. Short-term memory for individual items is fairly intact, but when older 
adults are asked to associate two or more items the accuracy of recall declines. A meta-
analysis by Old and Naveh-Benjamin (2008) confirmed the strong decrement in item 
association and old age. This decrement has been observed with face pairs (Bastin & 
Van der Linden, 2006) object drawings and location (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996), word 
pairs (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000) and picture (objects) pairs (Naveh-Benjamin, Hussain, 
Guez, & Bar-On, 2003). Associations were thought to be easier when they were 
different types of pairs, such as pictures and words (e.g. Wheeler & Treisman, 2002) but 
this was countered by Bastin and Van der Linden (2006) who found that performance in 
associative memory for older adults was equally poor for all types of associations. The 
binding deficit notion was backed up by an fMRI study (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & 
D’Esposito, 2000) that found greater activation in appropriate brain regions in younger 
adults when compared to older adults when asked to remember two items – e.g. binding 
the two items. No difference in activation was observed between the younger and the 
older participants when a single item was remembered. The binding decrement is very 
relevant to authentication as users are generally required to remember a number of items 
together – numbers, letters, or even pictures.  
 
Remembering the location of stimuli is also a problem for older adults, with item 
memory being negatively affected when location is required to be encoded (Park, 
Puglisi, & Sovacool, 1983). Similarly, Chalfonte and Johnson (1996) found that 
memory for object location was significantly poorer in older adults than that for the 
item itself and the colour of the item. A possible explanation for Chalfonte and 
Johnsons’s (1996) results is that participants were being asked to recall an item and the 
location, therefore they were required to bind the two items together. As discussed 
previously, older adults are known to have problems with the binding process, a 
problem that was also addressed by Chalfonte and Johnson (1996). Nonetheless, it is 
important to keep this weakness in mind as GAS present images in locations throughout 
challenge grids. Although it is usually not necessary to remember the location of the 
image – even though it is meant to help in such systems as VIP 1 (De Angeli et al., 
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2002) – it would be interesting to determine whether the presentation of images in set 
grid positions affects participants’ performance. 
 
When taking into account all the declines detailed above it becomes clear that current 
computer users have every chance of being excluded from the digital world when they 
age. Given that current authentication systems—most notably passwords—rely heavily 
on the users’ memory, the inevitable decline of memory with ageing will affect the 
usability of the systems.  
 
3.2. AUTHENTICATION AND OLDER ADULTS 
 
The number of age-related memory declines implies that older users may find it 
increasingly difficult to deal with systems that require them to remember information—
passwords for example (Sayago & Blat, 2009). Despite this evident observation, very 
little research has been done to evaluate the performance of older adults with 
authentication systems. 
 
Rasmussen and Rudmin (2010) conducted a survey regarding PIN use and habits and 
found that older adults self-reported more problems remembering their codes than did 
younger adults. However, the true extent of the problem is unproven as Rasmussen and 
Rudmin’s (2010) findings arise from self-reported measures and thus are subject to bias. 
Previous experimental evidence of older adults’ performance when remembering 
multiple four-digit numbers found a marked accuracy decline over time which tends to 
support the self-reports (Derwinger, Stigsdotter Neely, MacDonald, & Bäckman, 2005). 
The experimental study, however, was designed to investigate the effects of various 
training methods on forgetting of four-digit numerical codes, rather than evaluating the 
memorability of PINs. Additionally, the study was not designed or carried out with 
authentication in mind, despite the use of four-digit numbers (i.e. PINs). This study by 
Derwinger et al. (2005) is the only study to demonstrate the performance of older adults 
when learning and remembering multiple PINs, although no data was collected on 
younger adults making it impossible to determine the extent of the problem or whether 
it does exist. More importantly, however, is the fact that the time delays do not match 
those used by studies evaluating the performance of multiple graphical codes, making it 
impossible to compare the results of the existing system with the new systems. 
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3.2.1. GRAPHICAL AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
 
3.2.1.1. WHY USE GAS WITH OLDER ADULTS? 
 
Psychology literature documenting age-specific memory declines seems to suggest that 
older adults may benefit from using graphical systems for authentication. This literature 
is reviewed below. 
 
Older adults have been shown to benefit from the picture superiority effect. Winograd, 
Smith, and Simon (1982) found that when younger and older participants were asked to 
learn pictures and words over a short period of time there were no age effects present, 
meaning that older participants were able to match the accuracy of the younger 
participants. Park, Puglisi, and Smith (1986) demonstrated this effect when learning and 
recognising complex pictures both immediately after presentation and four weeks 
following the presentation. No age effects were found when the pictures were detailed – 
e.g. background as well as object – but a long-term decrement in older adults was 
observed when the pictures were not detailed. In a follow up study, older participants 
did not show any decline in recognition until after a one-week delay, further backing the 
picture superiority effect in older adults (Park, Royal, Dudley, & Morrell, 1988).  
Smith, Park, Cherry, & Berkovsky (1990) further support evidence for the picture 
superiority effect when using detailed/complex pictures, and add to the body of 
knowledge by concluding that abstract pictures elicit problems with recognition at a 
later time, suggesting that systems like Déjà vu that rely on abstract art may not be 
suitable for an older user group. However, GAS that utilise detailed pictures may 
encourage better memorability for older adults.  
 
Older adults have also been shown to be very apt at recognising faces that they are 
familiar with, but also very inaccurate when recalling faces they are unfamiliar with 
(Searcy, Bartlett, & Memon, 1999). Smith and Winograd (1978) carried out a study 
where younger and older participants were asked to learn and later recognise 30 faces 
and they found no significant difference in the number of faces that were recalled by 
young and old participants. Searcy et al. (1999) report that older adults are more prone 
to making mistakes when identifying faces they are unfamiliar with, as demonstrated by 
three studies in the area of eyewitness identification. The differences in methodology 
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between these two studies must be noted to explain the conflicting findings. In Smith 
and Winograd (1978), participants had to recognise the exact face images that they were 
shown at the beginning, making it a straightforward recognition task. On the other hand, 
Searcy et al. (1999) showed participants a video containing a number of people and 
were later asked participants to select a mugshot from a lineup that matched one of the 
people on the video – e.g. not a straight recognition task. In the context of GAS, Smith 
and Winograd (1978) is the more relevant methodology as users are given the face 
images to start with and are then required to select the exact face images from amongst 
foils – a straight recognition task. What Searcy et al.’s (1999) results show is that users 
would experience recognition problems if multiple poses would be used for each face. 
 
As with younger adults, older adults experience own-age effects (e.g. Fulton & Bartlett, 
1991; Lamont, Stewart-Williams, & Podd, 2005) as well as own-race effects (e.g. 
Brigham & Williamson, 1979) when recognising faces (see Chapter 7 for more details 
on these effects). 
 
The implementation of graphical systems that use either cued-recall or recognition for 
authentication instead of pure recall is likely to benefit older adults greatly (Merriam & 
Cunningham, 1989). Schonfield and Robertson (1966) present evidence of older adults’ 
memory advantage when asked to recognise word pairs than when asked to recall them. 
In fact, the older group were shown to be as accurate as the younger group in the 
recognition condition, but the accuracy dropped significantly with age in the recall 
condition. Craik and McDowd (1987) discuss how older adults perform better at 
recognition tasks than cued-recall tasks and suggest this is due to recognition requiring 
less processing resources than recall. Additionally it could be argued that recognition 
tasks provide the participant with contextual information and older adults have been 
shown to benefit from contextual integration when it comes to recalling pictures (Park, 
Smith, Morrell, Puglisi, & Dudley, 1990). 
 
3.2.1.2. HISTORY OF GAS WITH AN OLDER ADULT USER BASE 
 
Most graphical authentication systems have not been tested with older adults, but when 
thinking about the processes involved one has to think that the systems have got 
potential with an older user base. Renaud (2005) evaluated a GAS tailored to older 
adults called Handwing. Handwing, was aimed at low-security applications such as 
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forums where users were not protecting valuable information. Older adults were asked 
to draw a simple picture or write down personal information (e.g. postcode) and then 
upon login the user was presented with a number of hand-drawn images or bits of 
information. The user had to select their drawings in order to authenticate, essentially a 
combination of handwriting and drawing recognition with additional context. Field tests 
have demonstrated that the usability and memorability of the Handwing system are 
good, with the majority of older adults being able to authenticate without many issues 
(Renaud & Ramsay, 2007). Additionally, enthusiasm for the system was high, with all 
respondents ascertain they would rather use Handwing over a password. Table 3.1 
demonstrates the poor state of authentication evaluation with older adults. 
 
Table 3.1: Authentication systems tested with an older adults population. L/F = Lab-based or Field-based 
study. Interval = delay between learning and recalling/recognising. Measure = dependent variable. Analysis = 
method of analysis for the dependent variable. Codes = number of different codes participants had to 
remember and whether they were assigned or chosen. 
Study n= L/A Interval Measure Analysis Codes Finding 
Numbers in 
Old Age 
(Derwinger et 
al., 2005) 
60 
(Old) 
L Immediate 
30 min 
24 hr 
7 week 
8 month 
Items 
recalled 
ANOVA Six 
Given 
No 
mnemonic 
better for 
long-term 
recall 
Handwing 
(Renaud & 
Ramsay, 2007) 
28 
(mostly old) 
F Varied over 2 
years 
Successful 
attempts 
Percentage Single 
Chosen 
Better than 
PIN 
 
While the results are encouraging and suggest that GAS may be the way forward in this 
domain, the system is unlikely to be feasible for large-scale implementation due to 
security concerns such as guessability. 
 
3.2.1.3. OLDER ADULTS AND AUTHENTICATION 
 
There are a number of key aspects that should be highlighted for future design of 
authentication systems. First is the clear weakness that older adults exhibit when 
remembering information in the short-term and the long-term, although procedural 
long-term memory remains unaffected. Second, psychological literature shows that 
older adults appear to benefit from remembering visual stimuli more than verbal stimuli 
both short-term and long-term. Finally, limited evaluation of older adults with graphical 
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authentication systems shows that this age group does appear to take advantage of the 
visual nature of the systems. 
 
3.2.1.4. LOOKING FORWARD 
 
Generally, graphical authentication systems have not been tested with older adults with 
the exception of Renaud’s Handwing (2005). Although evidence is weak, the 
psychology literature suggests that older adults should not suffer a strong performance 
decrement when using graphical authentication codes (Brown & Park, 2003; A. Smith 
& Winograd, 1978). Therefore, the age-related performance decay associated with text 
password systems could be attenuated by the introduction of graphical systems. In order 
to validate this theory first it is imperative to benchmark existing authentication systems 
to determine what the extent of the problem is. Following these results other 
authentication systems should be evaluated using the same methodology in order to 
allow comparisons between the systems.  
 
First, PINs will be evaluated with younger and older adults over the course of three 
weeks. The following study will evaluate a novel GAS which aims to use context to aid 
users in the recognition of segments from one image. Two GAS will then be tested, one 
picture-based system that utilise full images that are contextually grouped, and a face-
based system. Finally, an improvement upon the face-based system will be evaluated.  
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4.  BENCHMARKING EXISTING AUTHENTICATION: PINS 
 
4.1. RATIONALE 
 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are a knowledge-based authentication system 
that require users to remember several digits – usually four – and enter those digits in 
the correct order to gain access to an account. PINs are one of the most ubiquitous 
authentication systems in use today (Weiss & De Luca, 2008). Millions of people use 
them every day to withdraw cash at Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) or to pay for 
purchases using credit and debit cards. Additionally, many other everyday systems 
require PINs for protection – e.g. mobile phones, library cards and house alarms. 
 
Despite their nearly ubiquitous use, PINs have a negative reputation for memorability 
amongst both the general population and the older population (Sasse et al., 2001; Vines, 
Blythe, Dunphy, & Monk, 2011). Rasmussen and Rudmin (2010) found through a 
large-scale survey that older adults reported more difficulty in remembering their PINs 
than younger adults, although the results were based on self-reporting. In terms of 
experimental findings, only studies evaluating new authentication systems have utilised 
PIN as a control system (e.g. Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; De Angeli et al, 2002; Moncur & 
LePlâtre, 2007; Weiss & De Luca, 2008; De Luca et al., 2010) and none of them have 
tested the recall of multiple codes. While some limited information can be collated by 
these studies in relation to PIN memorability, the different goals of the studies and the 
range of methodologies employed make it very difficult to obtain a reliable benchmark 
measure. Additionally, PINs – and authentication methods as a whole – have generally 
been evaluated with single codes thus ignoring the main problem associated with 
authentication codes – multiple codes for multiple accounts. Therefore, despite a 
negative reputation associated with PINs, there appears to be little objective evidence to 
confirm the assumption. 
 
The most relevant empirical research of older adults’ memory for PINs comes from the 
psychology literature, where Derwinger et al. (2005) evaluated three different training 
programmes for learning and remembering six 4-digit numbers. The study found that 
participants using a self-generated strategy were more successful recalling the numbers 
after an extended delay than those either not using a strategy or those using a 
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mnemonic. Additionally, participants were not required to associate the numbers with 
accounts which would have added an additional burden to the task, but would have 
made the results more ecologically valid. Finally, no younger adults were tested 
therefore it is not possible to say if the results are representative across the lifespan. One 
can assume the superior performance of younger adults over older adults based on the 
results of Macdonald, Stigsdotter-Neely, Derwinger, and Bäckman (2006) who 
predicted an accelerated rate of forgetting for older adults based on remembering 
multiple numbers over different time intervals.  
 
The purpose of the following study was to produce experimental evidence on the 
performance of two age groups – a young group and an older group – when learning 
and remembering multiple PIN codes over the course of three weeks. The aim was to 
ascertain whether the memorability of PINs was as problematic as depicted, and to 
explore how older users coped when asked to remember multiple PINs associated with 
multiple accounts. Additionally, this study would establish a benchmark measurement 
for performance with authentication systems to be referenced by future authentication 
studies in this thesis. Participants were asked to learn and remember either 4 PINs (low 
load) or 6 PINs (high load) consisting of four digits each over the course of three weeks. 
Half of the PINs were assigned during the first week and the second half of the PINs 
were assigned during the second week. Participants were evaluated based on the 
average number of successful recalls and based on the average time taken to recall the 
PINs. This was the first study to directly evaluate performance of younger and older 
adults when remembering multiple PIN codes and the first to be interested in multiple 
codes, hence the introduction of a high load/low load condition.  
 
It is expected that younger adults will be more accurate than older adults when 
remembering multiple PIN codes, based on the self-reported findings from Rasmussen 
& Rudmin (2010). It is also expected that participants remembering a low load will be 
more accurate recalling their codes than those remembering a high load. Finally, it is 
predicted that accuracy will decline over an extended delay period with the older group 
being more affected due to cognitive declines associated with the ageing process (e.g. 
Fisk et al., 2004). 
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4.2. METHOD 
 
4.2.1. DESIGN 
The study consisted of two factorial designs as the codes were separated into ‘original’ 
accounts (SET 1) assigned to participants during the first week and tested in weeks 1, 2 
and 3, and ‘new’ accounts (SET 2) assigned to participants during the second week and 
tested in weeks 2 and 3. The first set of PIN codes were tested in a 2 (participant age: 
young; old) x2 (cognitive load: high; low) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) factorial 
mixed design. The second set of PIN codes were tested in a 2 (participant age: young; 
old) x2 (cognitive load: high; low) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 3) factorial mixed 
design. There were therefore two independent factors – the participants’ age (young 
group, old group) and the cognitive load (four PINs – low – and six PINs – high) – and 
one repeated factor – the testing week (weeks 1, 2, 3). 
 
Dependent factors comprised the average number of successful code entries (maximum 
of five per account) and the average time (in seconds) taken to select the four digits in a 
code. 
 
4.2.2. PARTICIPANTS 
 
36 participants were recruited into one of two age groups, the younger group (18-30 
years old, n=18) or the older group (65-75 years old, n=18). 
 
Younger participants (mean age: 21, SD: 3.07) were recruited from the student 
population in the university using an online participation pool maintained by the 
university. Given the cultural diversity of the student population this sample was 
considered adequate. 
 
Older participants (mean age: 70, SD: 3.83) were recruited using the lab’s participant 
database as well as through an advert on the Elders’ Council of Newcastle newsletter 
and various regional charities. All older participants were given £20 to cover travel 
expenses to and from the university.  
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Participants were screened for age and computer experience—they were required to 
have used a computer prior to taking part in the study. Additionally, participants were 
screened for experience using PINs.  
 
4.2.3. MATERIALS 
 
The materials of the study were designed to reproduce a real life authentication system 
and the experience of logging into multiple accounts. Six account names were created 
for the study. The names used were alarm, credit card, debit card, library, telephone and 
television. Each account was assigned a four-digit code that participants would be 
required to learn and remember over the course of the study (see Table 4.1). The six 
PIN codes were generated randomly using a random number generator and were 
randomly assigned to an account. 
 
Table 4.1: Accounts and codes used throughout the study. 
Account Code 
Alarm 1929 
Credit Card 8360 
Debit Card 2040 
Library 3126 
Phone 9984 
TV 5088 
 
A PIN system was mocked up on the computer using Experiment Builder v1.5.201. 
Initially, the program displayed a set of simplified instructions for the participants along 
with an initial image depicting the account (e.g. picture of a TV for the TV account). 
Participants were required to press the space bar to start the experiment. After entering 
the four digits comprising the PIN code on the computer number pad, the system 
informed participants whether they had entered the code correctly or incorrectly, no 
feedback on individual digits was given. The system carried out the cycle four more 
iterations, meaning participants entered their codes five times in total. 
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Figure 4.1: Simplified instructions for participants along with image of account. 
 
4.2.4. PROCEDURE 
 
The procedure for this study consisted of two stages: the enrolment and the 
authentication stage. During enrolment, participants learned their PINs. During 
authentication, participants attempted to access their ‘accounts’ by entering the correct 
PIN for each account. 
 
4.2.4.1. ENROLMENT STAGE 
 
During the enrolment stage participants were given codes to learn in turn and were 
allowed 60 seconds to learn them using the method of their choice. Participants were 
allowed to use their own learning method as previous research (Rasmussen & Rudmin, 
2010) suggested that older adults are not as successful in remembering PINs if they are 
required to use a specific learning method. 
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The PIN codes were given to participants on a sheet of paper which they were allowed 
to look at for the duration of the 60 seconds. Before handing over the sheet of paper 
with the PIN, participants were told orally what account the PIN belonged to – “the PIN 
that you are about to be given will be for your [account name] account”. After the 
allocated time to learn the code, the participants were taken through a mock 
authentication attempt to make sure they had learned the PIN and to serve as practice. 
The mock authentication attempt required participants to enter their four digits correctly 
five times. If participants failed to enter their PIN correctly in at least three consecutive 
attempts they were required to perform the practice trials once again. They were also 
given the option of being shown the PIN code again.  
 
4.2.4.2. AUTHENTICATION STAGE 
 
During the authentication stage, participants were required to enter their digits correctly 
five times, regardless of whether it was correct or incorrect. At first they were presented 
with simplified instructions (see Figure 4.1) and they were given the full instructions 
orally. Once they pressed the spacebar to start they were shown an image of the account 
and were required to enter the four digits using the computer’s number pad. After the 
selection of four digits, participants were told whether they selected correctly or 
incorrectly. If they selected incorrectly they were not told which one(s) they selected 
wrong. Participants were then required to enter their codes four more times. 
 
4.2.4.3. PROCEDURE FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were asked to attend the lab on three separate occasions (see Table 4.2 for 
procedure overview). During the first session, participants were given their first set of 
codes (SET 1) consisting of either two or three PINs depending on the condition (low or 
high load). The order of the accounts was randomised to eliminate any order effects. 
Participants were taken through the enrolment stage with the first account and were then 
taken through the enrolment stage once more with their second account. This was done 
a third time for the high load condition. After enrolling with the systems, participants 
were distracted from the encoding task by taking part in a short discussion with the 
investigator. The discussion focused on their experience of current authentication 
systems such as passwords and smartcards and lasted approximately 10 minutes.  
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Following the discussion, participants were taken through the authentication stage with 
the order of the accounts randomised. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Overview of procedure. 
Session Activity 
1 1. Enrolment with set 1 
2. Discussion (distractor) 
3. Authentication with set 1 
2 
(+1 week) 
1. Authentication with set 1 
2. Enrolment with set 2 
3. Discussion (distractor) 
4. Authentication with set 2 
3 
(+1 week) 
• Authentication with set 2 
• Authentication with set 1 
3.   Discussion 
 
Participants were asked to return to the lab a week after the first session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to once again authenticate using the codes 
they were assigned in the first session in the first week (SET 1) and once again the order 
of the accounts were randomised. Once participants finished authenticating, they were 
enrolled with the remaining accounts (SET 2). Following the enrolment with their 
second set, participants were asked to describe a series of images for approximately 10 
minutes. Upon the completion of the description task, participants were asked to 
authenticate with the new set of codes (SET 2). They were not asked to authenticate 
with their first set of codes. 
 
Participants visited the lab for a final time one week after the second session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to authenticate with the codes they were 
assigned in the previous two sessions. The order of the sets was randomised, as well as 
the order of the accounts in each set. Once they had authenticated with both sets of 
codes, participants were asked questions about their experience and about their 
strategies for remembering the PINs.  
 
 58 
The total amount of time taken to complete the study when taking into account the three 
sessions was approximately 95 minutes for older participants and 70 minutes for the 
younger participants. 
 
4.3. RESULTS 
 
A 3-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor (Week) and two independent 
factors – age and load – was carried out on both Set 1 and Set 2. Variables measured 
were the number of successful attempts and the average time taken to enter the codes. 
For a table of means see Appendix B. 
 
The average number of successful attempts measured the number of times participants 
entered all four digits correctly for a code – to a maximum of five times (per account) – 
averaged across the total number of accounts per week. The average time to 
authenticate, recorded in seconds, measured the average duration of an attempt, 
described as the time needed to enter the four digits constituting a code – from the press 
of the space bar to the entry of the final digit. 
 
4.3.1. SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS – ACCURACY  
 
4.3.1.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (max=5) for SET 1 codes were collated for each of the three weeks. 
A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 (cognitive load: high, low) x3 (week of testing: 
week 1, 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 1, a main effect of age was present (F(1,32)=4.759, p<.05), with younger 
participants (mean: 3.96) being significantly more accurate than the older participants 
(mean: 2.61). No main effect of load was present (F(1,32)=1.405, p>.05) and no main 
effect of week was found (F(2,31)=0.999, p>.05). 
 
No interaction effects were found for the first set of codes. There was no two-way 
interaction between age and load (F(1,32)=0.151, p>.05), age and week (F(2,31)=1.553, 
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p>.05), or load and week (F(2,31)=0.285, p>.05). Additionally, no three-way interaction 
was found between age, load and week (F(2,31)=0.942, p>.05). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Overview of Average Successful Attempts in SET 1. 
 
4.3.1.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (max=5) for SET 2 codes were collated for each of the two weeks. 
A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 (cognitive load: high, low) x2 (week of testing: 
week 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 2, a main effect of age was present (F(1,32)=6.150, p<.05) where younger 
participants (mean: 3.88) were more accurate than the older participants (mean: 2.51) 
when recalling the SET 2 PINs over the course of three weeks. No main effect of load 
was found (F(1,32)=0.068, p>.05). A main effect of week was found (F(1,32)=5.681, 
p<.05), with pairwise comparisons showing that participants were significantly more 
accurate during the second week (mean: 3.48) than during the third week (mean: 2.91) 
(p<.05). 
 
No interaction effects were found for the second set of codes. There was no two-way 
interaction between age and load (F(1,32)=2.970, p>.05), age and week (F(1,32)=1.055, 
p>.05), or load and week (F(1,32)=1.220, p>.05). Additionally, no three-way interaction 
was found between age, load and week (F(1,32)=0.235, p>.05). 
 
 60 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Overview of Average Successful Attempts in SET 2. 
 
4.3.1.3. OVERALL ACCURACY 
 
Overall the results show that for both sets of PINs, a main effect of age was present 
showing that younger participants were significantly more accurate than older 
participants when remembering PINs. The number of PINs asked to learn and remember 
did not affect the performance of either age group in terms of accuracy. The most 
interesting finding is the lack of an age by week interaction in either code set. The lack 
of this interaction seems to suggest that the younger and older group were equally 
affected by the task of remembering multiple PIN codes whereas previous research 
suggests older adults would be more affected. Note, however, that a main effect of week 
(i.e. performance decrement over time) was only shown for the second set of codes 
learned. Figure 4.4 below illustrates the overall performance of younger and older 
participants with SET 1 and SET 2 codes. 
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Figure 4.4: Overview of accuracy for all PIN codes. 
Examination of the SET 1 results highlights a performance benchmark of 2.6 average 
successful attempts for older adults remembering a low load (i.e. four codes) and a 
benchmark of 2.1 average successful attempts when remembering a high load (i.e. six 
codes). For SET 2, the benchmark for the low load condition was 2.7 average successful 
attempts while the performance benchmark for a high load was 1.5. 
 
4.3.2. AVERAGE TIME - SPEED 
 
4.3.2.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ average time taken  (in seconds) to enter the digits making up the codes for 
SET 1 were collated for each of the three weeks. A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 
(cognitive load: high, low) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA 
was carried out. 
 
For SET 1 codes, a main effect of age was present (F(1,32)=40.918, p<.001), with 
younger participants (mean: 2.10 seconds) entering their codes significantly faster than 
the older participants (mean: 4.82 seconds). No main effect of load was present 
(F(1,32)=0.260, p>.05) and no main effect of week was found (F(2,31)=1.551, p>.05).  
 
No interaction effects were found for the first set of codes. There was no two-way 
interaction between age and load (F(1,32)=0.094, p>.05), age and week (F(2,31)=0.531, 
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p>.05), or load and week (F(2,31)=0.134, p>.05). Additionally, no three-way interaction 
was found between age, load and week (F(2,31)=2.769, p>.05). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Overview of average time taken to enter PINs in SET 1. 
 
4.3.2.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ average time taken  (in seconds) to enter the digits making up the codes for 
SET 2 were collated for each of the two weeks. A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 
(cognitive load: high, low) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was 
carried out. 
 
For SET 2, a main effect of age was present (F(1,32)=51.181, p<.001), with younger 
participants (mean: 2.14 seconds) entering their codes significantly faster than the older 
participants (mean: 5.21 seconds). No main effect of load was present (F(1,32)=0.321, 
p>.05) and no main effect of week was found (F(1,32)=0.217, p>.05).  
 
No interaction effects were found for the second set of codes. There was no two-way 
interaction between age and load (F(1,32)=2.813, p>.05), age and week (F(1,32)=0.860, 
p>.05), or load and week (F(1,32)=1.146, p>.05). Additionally, no three-way interaction 
was found between age, load and week (F(1,32)=0.082, p>.05). 
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Figure 4.6: Overview of average time taken to enter PINs in SET 2. 
In summary, no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off was found with the speed data 
showing the same overall pattern as the accuracy data. 
 
4.3.3. ORDER OF ACQUISITION 
Forgotten codes were further explored – i.e. those codes that participants were totally 
unable to recall after 5 attempts – as a function of order of acquisition. The underlying 
question was whether the order of acquisition of the code was reflected in the rate of 
forgetting. This was mapped out as a function of load. 
 
4.3.3.1. LOW LOAD 
In the low load condition the effect of age emerges clearly irrespective of order of 
acquisition – i.e. older participants were consistently more likely to forget PINs – 
although there was no sense that memorability was more fragile with those PINs 
acquired later (see Figure 4.7).  
 
Figure 4.7: Frequency of forgetting PINs for younger and older participants – Low Load condition. 
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A chi square test using participant age and codes forgotten as factors found a significant 
association between participant age and forgetting of codes was found when 
remembering four codes, !2 (1)=13.750, p<.001. This seems to represent the fact that 
older participants were more likely to forget codes than younger participants. Separate 
chi square tests were run on the younger and older participants with order of acquisition 
and forgetting as factors and both results found that order of acquisition was not 
associated with the forgetting of codes. 
 
4.3.3.2. HIGH LOAD 
In the high load condition there was also an effect of age across all PINS – i.e. older 
participants were consistently more likely to forget PINs – although there was a sense 
that they started to struggle with those PINs acquired later – i.e. they showed 
particularly poor performance with 5th and 6th PINs (see Figure 4.8).  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Frequency of forgetting for PINs for younger and older participants – High Load condition. 
A chi square test found a significant association between participant age and forgetting 
of codes was found when remembering six codes, ! 2(1)=25.412, p<.001. This seems to 
represent the fact that older participants were more likely to forget codes than younger 
participants. Separate chi square tests were run on the younger and older participants 
with order of acquisition and forgetting. The test for younger participants found that 
order of acquisition was not associated with the forgetting of codes, however, the test 
for older participants revealed a significant association between order of acquisition and 
forgetting of codes, ! 2(5)=11.423, p<.05. This seems to suggest that the fifth and sixth 
codes were more challenging to retain, with 77.8% and 61.1% of older participants 
forgetting the codes respectively. 
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4.4. DISCUSSION 
 
It was predicted that younger participants would outperform older participants in terms 
of accuracy and time with multiple PIN codes. As expected, the younger group 
performed significantly better at recalling the PINs than the older group for both sets of 
codes therefore the prediction was supported by the results: for both SET 1 and SET 2 
codes older adults were less accurate and slower to authenticate. The predictions were 
based on self-reported studies (e.g. Rasmussen & Rudmin, 2010; Vines et al., 2011) and 
were supported by this experimental study. In the past cued-recall and free recall have 
been shown to require more cognitive resources than recognition (Baddeley, 1997) and 
it has been shown that older adults, who do not have as many resources available, will 
be disadvantaged when asked to recall information (Craik & McDowd, 1987). Most 
knowledge-based authentication systems, including PINs, rely on free recall – or 
arguable cued- recall if the code was associated with the account – and thus older adults 
are expected to be disadvantaged by existing KBA systems. 
 
It is well known that age negatively affects the performance of serial order recall, and 
research has suggested that older adults are more likely to adhere to a learned sequence, 
even if incorrect, than younger adults (Kay, 1951). Simply, older participants are unable 
to learn from their mistakes and instead learn their errors. Maylor et al. (1999) found 
that older adults are more prone than younger adults to suffer from intrusion errors 
(forgetting one or more items) and movement errors (remembering the correct digits but 
in the incorrect order) in serial recall both in terms of volume and proportion, 
supporting the fact that older adults are consistent with their selections even when they 
are incorrect. Remembering a PIN code is a form of serial number recall and as 
predicted older adults’ performance in terms of both accuracy and time was poorer than 
that of younger adults. 
 
Hasher and Zacks (1988) contend that older adults can be more distracted by irrelevant 
information during the encoding phase and this can affect later performance either by 
not learning the information in enough detail or learning the unrelated information. This 
would suggest that older adults must be particularly careful when learning new PINs in 
real life to ensure they have distraction free time to encode the new PIN. However, 
having a distraction-free environment in the real world is very difficult to control. In 
this study it was possible to control for this issue by giving participants quiet time 
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dedicated to learning the codes yet the results show that older participants were still 
affected by task. Hence, it could be possible that in the real world the problem of 
distractions plays a bigger role in the performance decrement. 
 
Naveh-Benjamin (2000) proposed an Associative-Deficit Hypothesis (ADH) where 
older adults show significant impairment when having to associate multiple items. Part 
of impairment is explained by using poor strategic behaviour when creating 
associations, an observation later supported by Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2007). This 
deficit in associative memory likely plays a role in the binding of the digits together into 
a code, and in the binding of the code to the account. In the case of PINs, the binding 
issues could be twofold: binding the individual digits into a code and binding a code to 
a specific account. From the results it is not possible to determine which, if either, was 
the cause for the performance decrement. However, it is important to note once again 
that the older group are being disadvantaged from the outset and it was once again 
shown to be true by the experimental study. 
 
It was also predicted that participants in the Low Load condition would have more 
successful attempts at recalling the codes than participants in the High Load condition. 
This prediction was partly supported by the results, with the main analysis finding no 
significant difference in accuracy with the two loads but a subsequent chi square 
analysis suggesting possible load problems with codes acquired last. While this finding 
initially appears to be confusing, upon further inspection it can be seen that, at least for 
the older group, accuracy of recall was poor. This means that although the additional 
two codes did not increase the memorability problem for the older group, the 
memorability was not good to start with. In other words, a performance decrement was 
already present with the low load. It is possible that for the younger group the added 
two codes were not enough to induce a decrement and it would be interesting to 
establish when this breaking point occurs. Similarly, it would be interesting to establish 
at what point the recall accuracy for older adults significantly dips again.  
 
Finally, it was predicted that the performance of both age groups – in terms of accuracy 
and speed – would decline over the course of the three weeks. This prediction was 
based on previous memory studies which establish that long-term memory for items is 
sensitive to time (e.g. Verhaeghen et al., 1993). This prediction was partially met, with 
the accuracy of participants significantly declining with the second set of codes. This 
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effect was not present with the first set of codes, indicating that participants were able to 
maintain the accuracy of their code recall for their SET 1 codes. This is not entirely 
surprising as in reality it should be possible for people to remember two or three four-
digit numbers over the course of a week without many problems. However, the 
accuracy of SET 2 codes was affected – as shown by the main effect of week –
suggesting that newer codes are more difficult to retain over a period of one week than 
original codes.  
 
With regards to the time taken to recall the PINs, younger participants were 
significantly faster than the older participants as expected and showed no evidence of a 
speed-accuracy trade-off. This was not a surprise as younger participants were expected 
to be faster than the older group. 
 
4.4.1. IMPLICATIONS 
 
The implications from the theoretical literature and the empirical findings are 
discouraging for older adults. Theory implied older adults should perform worse than 
younger adults when remembering multiple PINs and in practice that was the case. 
Despite this, PINs are still one of the most common authentication systems. 
 
A main effect of week was found with the SET 2 codes. This effect shows that accuracy 
of recall is significantly impaired after an extended delay of one week when new PINs 
are learned on top of existing ones. This was the case when learning a second set of 
codes and it remains to be seen what the effect is when a third or fourth set is added. 
This finding demonstrating a decline in accuracy over time with the addition of further 
codes to an extent validates the common insecure practices of reusing and writing down 
codes (e.g. Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011) and indicates that providers must do more to 
aid users if they do not wish for them to circumvent the security measures.  
 
Although the absence of a statistically significant age-specific performance decrement 
over time appears to suggest an encouraging result, the overall performance of the older 
group is far from acceptable. The performance benchmark for the older group with a 
low load was 2.6 average successful attempts for SET 1 and 2.7 average successful 
attempts for SET 2. In other words older adults generally would authenticate on their 
fourth attempt – meaning that the possibility of being locked out of their accounts that 
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implement the traditional ‘three strikes’ policy becomes a real threat. Perhaps a solution 
could be to amend the popular ‘three strikes and you are out’ rule that is regularly 
implemented with PINs and passwords in favour of a higher limit as proposed by 
Brostoff and Sasse (2003), although this approach would leave accounts vulnerable to 
attacks. 
 
It should be noted that participants were assigned the codes in this study and they were 
not able to change those codes. In the real world users are allowed to customise their 
PINs which allows them to select combinations of digits that may be more memorable 
than a randomly generated PIN – a generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). It is 
understandable that users may choose to re-use their PINs if they are able to choose 
them – given the fragile nature of new PINs stored in memory on top of a set of old 
PINs. However, the implications of allowing users to choose their own codes are weak 
PINs that can be easily guessed (e.g. Bonneau et al., 2012) or the reuse of existing codes 
(Ives et al., 2004). It should be made clear that the two behaviours are not mutually 
exclusive and that it is possible – even probable – that users reuse existing weak codes. 
The reason for assigning the participants with randomly generated codes was to prevent 
participants from choosing PINs they currently used as this could have artificially aided 
the learning and recall of the codes. A secondary reason was to evaluate participants in 
the context of a secure environment where PINs are unique and randomly generated. 
While this might not reflect the real state of PIN usage, it represents a view of security 
that will be upheld for the following studies in this thesis (i.e. memorability results 
where the security of the system is not compromised). 
 
4.4.2. FUTURE WORK 
 
Based on the results from this study highlighting the problems older adults experienced 
remembering multiple PIN codes, it is imperative to think about what other 
authentication methods can be tested with older users in order to improve their 
performance. The key is to find a system that is inclusive of older adults, rather than a 
system aimed solely at older adults. A system aimed exclusively at improving the 
performance of older adults risks being rejected by the older adult community for 
singling them out and being rejected by the younger adult community for potentially 
penalising younger adults. 
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Graphical authentication systems may hold the key to inclusive KB authentication. 
Much of the work regarding these systems is based on the premise that the picture 
superiority effect (e.g. Standing, 1973) and recognition (e.g. Baddeley, 1997) make the 
systems more memorable than traditional text-based systems that rely on verbal recall. 
Older adults have been shown to take advantage of the picture superiority effect at least 
to a similar extent as younger adults (e.g. Winograd & Smith, 1982) so it would be 
interesting to evaluate their performance and that of younger adults over the course of 
multiple weeks with multiple graphical codes to see if the relative gap in performance is 
actually reduced and/or the absolute performance of older adults is improved.  
 
4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter set out to investigate how older adults performed using Personal 
Identification Numbers (PINs) and to establish a benchmark performance for future 
authentication systems. It was thought that younger participants would outperform the 
older participants in terms of successful PIN selections. It was also predicted that 
participants with a lower PIN load would outperform participants with a higher PIN 
load. As predicted younger participants outperformed older participants in accuracy and 
time. A performance decrement was observed over the course of a one week delay, 
although this decrement was only present for the second set of PIN codes (the new 
numbers) Finally, there was no difference in performance between participants with a 
high PIN load and participants with a low PIN load. 
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5. A NEW APPROACH TO AUTHENTICATION WITH PICTURES: 
TILES GRAPHICAL AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 
 
5.1. RATIONALE 
 
PIN-based authentication methods are not well suited for older users as demonstrated in 
Chapter 4. This finding presents a significant problem due to the ubiquity of PIN-based 
authentication methods and is likely to extend to other KBA such as passwords. A 
possible alternative approach to authentication is using GAS.  
 
Graphical authentication systems have been extensively tested on younger adults, but 
we do not know much about their performance with a population of older adults. 
Previous research suggests that older users may not be penalised as harshly with 
graphical systems compared to alphanumeric passwords, as recognition has been shown 
to be less affected by ageing than recall (Brown & Park, 2003; Craik & McDowd, 
1987), most likely due to the extra effort and resources that are required for pure recall 
(Raaijmakers & Schiffrin, 1992). Additionally, previous research also shows that visual 
memory appears to be less affected by ageing than knowledge-based recall (Brown & 
Park, 2003), meaning that memory for pictures is likely to be superior than memory for 
words, and therefore remembering a graphical combination would be less work than 
remembering an alphanumeric password. Older adults have been shown to benefit from 
the Picture Superiority Effect (Park et al., 1986; Winograd et al., 1982) to the same 
extent as younger adults. Moreover, older adults have been shown to be able to 
remember images after a one-week delay without a significant drop in recognition 
performance, although a longer delay appears to negatively impact their performance 
(Park et al., 1988). 
 
When taking all the literature into account, it is evident that GAS should be tested with 
older adults to determine whether their performance can be improved from the PIN 
benchmark. Recognition-based systems would be expected to yield better performance 
than cued-recall systems due to the reduced need for cognitive resources (e.g. Baddeley, 
1997). However, recognition-based GAS have the potential to tax cognitive resources in 
a different way: item load. Users are required to remember multiple items for security 
purposes as all items are displayed on the screen. This means that for every account a 
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user has they need to remember at least four items, which can quickly add up if there 
are multiple accounts to authenticate for. This can be problematic for older adults 
specifically because of their reduced cognitive resources (e.g. Fisk et al., 2004). 
Additionally, they are known to experience item binding issues which could complicate 
the recognition of the codes further – i.e. remembering two features together despite not 
necessarily struggling with either feature individually (Chalfonte et al., 1996). This item 
binding problem can be potentially solved with graphical authentication where users are 
not required to remember four images that form a code, and also remember what 
account the code is associated with. The Associative-Deficit Disorder (Naveh-
Benjamin, 2003) further predicts that older adults will experience more problems when 
remembering multiple images together.  
 
In order to minimise the item load associated with recognition-based GAS while also 
taking advantage of the visual aspect, a new GAS was developed. The Tiles system was 
designed with the aim of facilitating the binding of the codes and reducing the cognitive 
load of having to remember multiple items per account. These issues were addressed by 
having participants remember a single image for authentication instead of the traditional 
four or five (e.g. Valentine, 1998; Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; De Angeli et al., 2002). By 
cutting down on the number of images that users need to remember per account it is 
expected that the acquisition of further codes will be easier. For example, remembering 
four Tiles codes would be equivalent to remembering one Déjà vu (De Angeli et al., 
2002) – users would need to remember four images in total. The advantage is clear: 
while both scenarios require the same cognitive resources, with Tiles the user is able to 
authenticate with five separate accounts while the Déjà vu user can only authenticate 
with a single account. 
 
The binding of the code is also facilitated by the Tiles system. Traditional GAS require 
users to remember four or five different items per account. The user then needs to bind 
the four items with each other and associate the bound items with their respective 
account. Tiles addresses the initial item binding problem by adding context to the 
individual items. The user is required to learn one image per account. That one image is 
then divided into nine segments. The user needs to identify the correct segment that 
belongs to his/her image from amongst other image segments. It is expected that the 
identification of the segments will be aided by the user’s knowledge of the overall 
image. In essence, the user has to associate the image with the account and then identify 
 72 
the segments that belong to that image during authentication, rather than having to 
remember four independent images for the account. 
 
The nature of the system means that cognitive load should decrease – with participants 
only having to remember one image per account rather than four. Tiles aims to address 
the binding problem by providing context to the individual ‘images’ (or segments) as all 
images are linked together as being part of the whole. Park et al. (1990) found that 
context aids older adults significantly, even if not entirely related. A possible problem 
with this approach is that some of the segments might result in abstract images which 
can be problematic for older adults (e.g. Smith et al., 1990), but it is hoped that the 
addition of context will override this problem. 
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the proposed GAS, Tiles, in the context of 
younger and older adults. This was done by requiring both groups of participants to 
learn and remember multiple Tiles codes over the course of three weeks. Two different 
grid types – similar foils and dissimilar foils – were tested with the aim of potentially 
improving security: while dissimilar images on a grid should make the task easier for 
the user (i.e. faster to discard incorrect images) it will also make it easier for an attacker 
to guess the code based on an observation of the authentication attempt. On the other 
hand, similar images on a grid could increase the difficulty of the task for the user, but 
will also protect the user from attackers. This security-usability trade-off will be 
investigated by the inclusion of the two grid types. 
 
It is expected that younger adults will be more accurate than older adults when 
remembering multiple Tiles codes. It is expected that the gap in performance will be 
reduced when compared with the PIN benchmark. It is also expected that participants 
will be more accurate when selecting the segments from dissimilar grids when 
compared with similar grids as dissimilar grids should reduce the search load and 
reduce speeds while increasing accuracy (Fisk & Rogers, 1991); It is also predicted that 
the speed will generally follow the accuracy data (i.e. no speed-accuracy trade-off).  
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5.2. METHOD 
 
5.2.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The study consisted of two factorial designs as the codes were separated into ‘original’ 
accounts (SET 1) assigned to participants during the first week and tested in weeks 1, 2 
and 3, and ‘new’ accounts (SET 2) assigned to participants during the second week and 
tested in weeks 2 and 3. The first set of images consisted of a 2 (age: young, old) x2 
(grid type: similar foils, dissimilar foils) x3 (time of testing: week 1, 2, 3) factorial 
mixed design. The second set of images consisted of a 2 (age: young, old) x2 (grid type: 
similar foils, dissimilar foils) x2 (time of testing: week 2, 3) factorial mixed design. The 
factors comprised of one independent – the participants’ age (young group, old group) – 
and two repeated – the grid configuration tested (similar foils, dissimilar foils) and the 
time period (weeks 1, 2, 3). 
 
Dependent measures comprised the number of successful authentication attempts 
(maximum of 5 per account) and the average time (in seconds) taken to authenticate. 
 
5.2.2. PARTICIPANTS 
 
36 participants were recruited to fit into one of the two age groups, the young group 
(18-30 years old, n=18) or the old group (65-75 years old, n=18).   
 
Younger participants (mean age: 19, SD: 1.44) were recruited from the student 
population in the university using an online participation pool maintained by the 
university. Given the diversity of the student population this sample was considered 
adequate. 
 
Older participants (mean age: 71, SD: 3.51), with a mean age of 71 years (SD: 3.51), 
were recruited using the lab’s participant database as well as through an advert on the 
Elders’ Council of Newcastle newsletter. All participants were given £30 to cover travel 
expenses to and from the university. 
 
 74 
Participants were screened for age and for computer experience—they were required to 
have used a computer prior to taking part in the study. Participants were also screened 
for adequate vision. 
 
5.2.3. MATERIALS 
 
The materials of the study were designed to reproduce a real life authentication system 
and the experience of logging into multiple accounts. Four account names were created 
for the study. The names used were Bank, NHS, Shop, and Email. Each account was 
allocated a target image that the participants would be required to learn. They would 
then select segments from that target image in order to authenticate over the course of 
the study. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Demonstration of the Tiles system. Participants have to select their segment amongst foils in 4 
individual challenges. 
The main material used was the graphical authentication system, Tiles, that was built for 
this study (see Figure 5.1). The system was built using Experiment Builder v1.5.201. 
All participants were tested in the same room and same computer to guarantee the same 
experience. Two grid compositions were tested: similar grids and dissimilar grids. The 
aim of testing these two configurations was to determine whether the use of segments 
that in theory should be more easily dismissed as incorrect could improve the accuracy 
of participants. Fisk and Rodgers (1991) found that the speed of a visual search can be 
significantly decreased and the accuracy increased when the search space is reduced. In 
other words, the lower the number of items the participant has to scan through the faster 
and the better they can perform the task – both younger and older adults. Based on these 
findings, participants – both young and old – should benefit from the dissimilar grids as 
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they should be able to write off a number of segments at first glance and therefore 
reduce the search space.  
 
In this version of the system, the segments remained in their original position as on the 
base image – i.e. the upper right segment of the base image was presented on the top 
right position on the challenge grid (see Figure 5.1). This was done to aid younger and 
older adults to quickly discriminate foil segments when the target segment is not 
immediately obvious. For example, if the base image consists of a building with a door 
on the bottom left and the top right segment on a challenge grid depicts a door, the user 
can safely exclude that segment from further consideration. Additionally, the fixed 
location of the target segments makes the familiarisation process a constant mapping 
(CM) task. Constant mapping instructions have been shown to lead to improved 
performance in both younger and older adults over varied mapping (VM) instructions 
(e.g. Fisk & Rodgers, 1991) and therefore a further benefit for using fixed segments.  
 
Initially, the program displayed a set of simplified instructions for the participants and 
they were required to press the spacebar to start. Four sequential challenge grids were 
displayed upon the participants’ selection. Once four selections were made using the 
mouse, the system informed participants whether they had selected correctly or 
incorrectly, no feedback on individual selections was given. The system carried out the 
cycle four more iterations, meaning participants selected their codes five times in total. 
 
5.2.3.1. GRID COMPOSITION 
 
A collection of 1000 images was obtained from a publicly available image database, 
purposed for image processing operations (http://wang.ist.psu.edu/docs/related.shtml). 
The database consisted of 10 natural categories consisting of 100 images each. Example 
categories include: beach, Rome, buses, elephants, and mountains.  
 
The four base images used for the accounts were chosen from two random categories. 
Initially two categories were randomly chosen from the database, and from each of the 
two categories one image chosen at random. The two images that were chosen during 
this process were used as the base images for the study.  
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Twelve foil images were chosen for each base image based on visual similarity. The 
similarity condition (e.g. similar or dissimilar foils) for the base images was determined 
randomly. An algorithm (Dunphy & Olivier, 2012) was used to select the thirteen most 
visually similar images from the database (within the base images’ categories) or the 
thirteen least visually similar images – again within the base images’ categories. The 
algorithm compared image signatures in the form of 3D image histograms (in the 
CIELAB colour space) using Earth Movers Distance and produced a list ranking 
images from most similar to least similar. The least similar image from the list was 
chosen as the other base image, leaving twelve images as foils for each of the four base 
images. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Example Tiles grid. 
Sixteen unique grids were created for each of the two categories. In other words, the 
two base images from the same category shared the same grids – i.e. images A and B 
from the same category used the same set of sixteen grids, and images C and D from a 
different category to image A and B shared the other set of sixteen grids. This setup 
guaranteed the presence of two possible target segments in each grid, although only one 
was correct depending on the account. A random number generator was used to 
construct the grids. Sixteen integer sets were generated with each set containing nine 
integers. Each integer was mapped onto the corresponding foil (foils were numbered 1-
12) and the segment of the image was chosen in accordance with the mapping of a 
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telephone keyboard. For example, in the list [x,x,4,x,x,x,x,x,x] foil image number four 
would be placed on the top right corner of the grid. As segments remained in their 
original locations, the top right segment of the foil image (number four) was used (see 
Appendix A for sample grids). 
 
A digital voice recorder was also used to record the discussion during the first session. 
 
5.2.3.2. IMAGE OVERLAP 
 
An image overlap was introduced where a target segment for one base image could 
appear as a foil segment for another target segment. In essence, this meant that a 
participant had to associate the base image with the account. At any given time after the 
introduction of SET 2 – i.e. all accounts have been assigned – a participant would be 
presented with a grid consisting of two possible targets. Only one target would be 
correct, depending on the account they were being asked to authenticate for.  
 
The overlap was introduced in order to test the system in a more ecologically valid 
configuration. In the real world it will not always be possible to guarantee separate sets 
of images per provider, so users may be faced with a situation where a target segment 
appears as a foil segment for an account. It is acknowledged that this design makes the 
task harder for participants, but an analysis of the segments chosen by the participants 
showed that only a small number were affected by the image overlap. 
 
5.2.4. PROCEDURE 
 
The procedure for this study consisted of two stages: the enrolment stage and the 
authentication stage. During enrolment, participants learned their images. During 
authentication, participants attempted to access their ‘accounts’ by identifying the four 
correct account segments. 
 
5.2.4.1. Enrolment Stage 
 
During the enrolment stage participants were given base images to learn and were 
guided through a familiarisation process consisting of four questions to encourage the 
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participant to deeply process the image (see Table 5.1). In total, the familiarisation 
process lasted for approximately five minutes per image. During the first two questions 
participants were able to view the whole image. The final two questions were asked for 
each of the nine segments, with only one segment being shown on the screen. 
Participants were given each image individually and after having 15 seconds to study 
the image they were asked the respective questions by the experimenter. The participant 
was required to reply to the questions out loud.  
 
Table 5.1: List of questions used each of the four base images. 
Questions for Complete Image 
Could you please tell me a story to go with this picture? 
Does this picture remind you of any past experience or some event 
in your life? 
Questions for Individual Segments 
How does this segment link with the rest of the image? 
What stands out the most in that segment? 
 
Once participants had been through the familiarisation process for the base image, they 
were asked to select the segments that belong to their base image from amongst foil 
segments to confirm they had learned them, essentially a mock authentication attempt 
(see 5.2.4.2 below). If the participant failed to select their segments correctly at least 
three attempts in a row they were asked to repeat the mock authentication. They were 
also shown the image again if necessary. Participants were then taken through the same 
process for their next account.  
 
5.2.4.2. AUTHENTICATION STAGE 
 
During the authentication stage participants were presented with a login screen and 
asked to authenticate. The login screen contained nine segments in a 3 x 3 grid and 
participants were required to select the segment belonging to their base image from the 
nine in four successive screens using the mouse. Once the participant selected four 
segments, the program told them whether they selected correctly or incorrectly—if 
incorrectly they were not told which images they got wrong. Participants were required 
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to do this for a total of five times per set regardless of whether they selected correctly or 
incorrectly. 
 
5.2.4.3. PROCEDURE FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were asked to attend the lab on three separate occasions (see Table 5.2 for 
procedure overview). During the first session, participants were given their first set of 
images consisting of one similar grid account and one dissimilar grid account. The order 
of the accounts was randomised in order to eliminate any order effects. Participants 
were taken through the enrolment stage with the first account and were then taken 
through the enrolment stage once more with their second account. After enrolling with 
both accounts, participants were distracted from the encoding task by taking part in a 
short discussion with the investigator. This discussion focused on their experience of 
current authentication systems such as passwords and smartcards and lasted 
approximately 10 minutes. The discussion was recorded for later analysis.  
 
Following the discussion, participants taken through the authentication stage with the 
order of the accounts randomised, meaning that it did not necessarily follow the same 
order as the enrolment.  
 
Table 5.2: Overview of procedure. 
Session Activity 
1 1. Enrolment with SET 1 
2. Discussion (distractor) 
3. Authentication with SET 1 
2 
(+1 week) 
1. Authentication with SET 1 
2. Enrolment with SET 2 
3. Discussion (distractor) 
4. Authentication with SET 2 
3 
(+2 weeks) 
• Authentication with SET 2 
• Authentication with SET 1 
3.   Discussion 
 
 80 
Participants were asked to return to the lab a week after the first session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to once again authenticate using the base 
images they were assigned in the first session a week ago (SET 1) and once again the 
order of the accounts were randomised. Once participants finished authenticating, they 
were enrolled with two new accounts, again one from each grid type. Following the 
enrolment with their second set (SET 2), participants were engaged in another 
discussion, this time regarding their ideal authentication system. This discussion lasted 
for approximately 10 minutes. Upon the completion of the discussion, participants were 
asked to authenticate with the new set of images. They were not asked to authenticate 
with their first set of images. 
 
Participants visited the lab for a final time one week after the second session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to authenticate with the accounts they were 
assigned in the previous two sessions. The order of the sets was randomised, as well as 
the order of the accounts in each set. Once they had authenticated with both sets of 
images, participants were asked questions about their experience and about their 
strategies for remembering the images. 
 
The total amount of time taken to complete the study when taking into account the three 
sessions was approximately 120 minutes for older participants and 80 minutes for the 
younger participants. 
 
5.3. RESULTS 
 
A 3-way ANOVA with repeated measures on two factors (Grid Type and Delay) and 
age as an independent factor was carried out on both SET 1 and SET 2. Variables 
measured were number of successful attempts and average time taken to select the four 
segments. For a table of means see Appendix B. 
 
The number of successful attempts measured the number of times participants selected 
all four segments correctly in an attempt, to a maximum of five times (per account). The 
average time to authenticate, recorded in seconds, measured the average duration of an 
attempt between the presentation of the first segment and the selection of the fourth 
segment. 
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5.3.1. SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS – ACCURACY  
 
 
5.3.1.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (max=5) for SET 1 codes were collated for each of the three weeks. 
A 2 (age: young, old) x2 (grid type: similar foils, dissimilar foils) x3 (week of testing: 
week 1, 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 1, a main effect of age was found (F(1,34)=11.485, p<.01) with younger 
participants (mean: 4.55) achieving more successful attempts than older participants 
(mean: 3.42). No main effect of grid type was found (F(2, 33)=.977, p>.05). A main 
effect of week was present (F(2,33)=12.042, p<.001). Pairwise comparisons show 
participants achieved significantly more successful attempts in the first week (mean: 
4.74) compared to both the second week (mean: 3.90) (p<.010) and the third week 
(mean: 3.31) (p<.001). There was no significant difference in accuracy was present 
between week 2 and week 3. 
 
No interactions were found between age and grid type (F(1, 34)=0.040, p>.05), age and 
week (F(2,33)=3.168, p>.05), or grid type and week (F(2, 33)=0.787, p>.05). There was 
no 3-way interaction between age, grid type, and week (F(2,33)=0.256, p>.05). 
 
5.3.1.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (max=5) for SET 2 codes were collated for each of the two weeks. 
A 2 (age: young, old) x2 (grid type: similar foils, dissimilar foils) x2 (week of testing: 
week 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For the number of successful attempts on the second set of images, a main effect of age 
was found (F(1,34)=5.762, p<.05) with younger participants (mean: 3.92) achieving 
more successful attempts than older participants (mean: 2.94). No main effect of grid 
type was found (F(1, 34)=1.156, p>.05). A main effect of week was present 
(F(1,34)=41.570, p<.001) with participants achieving more successful attempts in the 
second week (mean: 4.38) compared the third week (mean: 2.49) (p<.001).  
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No interactions were found between age and grid type (F(1, 34)=3.541, p>.05), age and 
week (F(1,34)=1.295, p>.05), or grid type and week (F(1, 34)=0.158, p>.05).  
 
There was a 3-way interaction between age, grid type, and week (F(1,34)=14.739, 
p=.001). Looking at Figure 5.3, this would seem to reflect the relatively strong 
performance in week 3 by younger adults presented with dissimilar grids. In other 
words, the younger group seem able to take advantage of the dissimilar grids while the 
older group could not. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Three-way interaction between Age, Grid Type and Week for SET 2. 
A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference in accuracy during week 2 
between grids for younger participants (F(1,35)=1.029, p>.05) while a significant 
difference in accuracy between grids was found during week 3 (F(1,35)=4.356, p<.05) 
where younger participants were more accurate with dissimilar foils (mean: 3.89) than 
with similar foils (mean: 2.39). Another one-way ANOVA showed no significant 
difference in accuracy during week 2 or week 3 between grids for older participants 
(week 2: F(1,35)=1.496, p>.05; week 3: F(1,35)=1.440, p>.05). This is supported by 
subsequent statistical tests, with an independent samples t-tests showing no significant 
differences in accuracy between similar and dissimilar grids for the older group in week 
3 (t(34)=1.200, p>.05. However, a significant difference in accuracy was observed 
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between similar and dissimilar grids for the younger group in week 3 (t(34)=-2.087, 
p<.05). 
 
5.3.1.3. OVERALL ACCURACY 
 
 
The study overview (Figure 5.4) suggests that the rate of decay in SET 1 codes from 
week 1 to week 2 differs from that between week 2 and week 3. The rates of decay 
between weeks does not appear to follow a fixed pattern, however – memorability 
appears to decrease less for older participants and for younger participants using 
dissimilar foils while memorability appears to decrease more for younger participants 
using similar grids. These trends appear to suggest that additional load does have an 
effect on memorability, although the effect is variable. A look at SET 2 suggests that 
accuracy drops off sharply for all but younger participants using dissimilar grids. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Overview of successful attempts for images in both SET 1 and SET 2. 
 
If we consider the performance benchmark established with PIN for the older group of 
2.6 average successful attempts for SET 1 and 2.7 average successful attempts for SET 
2, the Tiles accuracy results of 2.5/2.7 with SET 1 codes and an accuracy of 1.5/2.4 with 
SET 2 codes show a similar performance with SET 1 codes but a worse performance 
with SET 2 codes.  
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5.3.2. AVERAGE TIME 
 
5.3.2.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
 
For the average time taken to select the segments for SET 1 codes, a main effect of age 
was found (F(1,34)=67.773, p<.001) with younger participants (mean: 9.82 seconds) 
selecting their segments faster than older participants (mean: 20.90 seconds). No main 
effect of grid type was found (F(1, 34)=0.100, p > .05). A main effect of week was 
present (F(2,33)=16.820, p<.001). Pairwise comparisons show that participants selected 
their segments significantly faster in the first week (mean: 12.25) compared to both the 
second week (mean: 15.65) and the third week (mean: 18.18). There was no significant 
difference in speed between week 2 and week 3. These findings reflect those found 
earlier (i.e. no sign of a speed-accuracy trade-off). 
 
No interaction was found between age and grid type (F(1, 34)=0.181, p>.05). An 
interaction effect between age and week was found (F(2,33)=4.367, p<.05) (see Figure 
5.5). A one-way ANOVA showed a significant difference in time for younger 
participants (F(2,107)=4.070, p<.05) with a significant difference between week 1 and 
week 3, but not between week 1 and week 2 or week 2 and week 3. Another one-way 
ANOVA showed a significant difference in time for older participants (F(2,107)=9.332, 
p<.001) with a significant difference between week 1 and week 3, but not between week 
1 and week 2 or week 2 and week 3. It should be noted that the difference between 
week 2 and week 3 for the older group was borderline non-significant (p=.053). 
Independent samples t-tests show significant age-related differences in time taken to 
select the segments in weeks 1, 2 and 3. No interaction was found between grid type 
and week (F(2, 33)=0.357, p>.05).  
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Figure 5.5: Interaction between Age and Week for SET 1. 
 
There was no 3-way interaction between age, grid type, and week (F(2,33)=0.011, 
p>.05). 
 
5.3.2.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
For the average time taken to select the segments for SET 2 codes, a main effect of age 
was found (F(1,34)=23.724, p<.001) with younger participants (mean: 11.92 seconds) 
selecting their segments faster than older participants (mean: 22.75 seconds). No main 
effect of grid type was found (F(1, 34)=0.071, p>.05). A main effect of week was 
present (F(1,34)=14.513, p=.001) with participants selecting their segments faster in the 
second week (mean: 14.06) compared to the third week (mean: 20.61). Once again these 
findings reflect those found earlier for accuracy (i.e. no sign of a speed-accuracy trade-
off). 
 
No interactions were found between grid type and age (F(1, 34)=0.127, p >.05), age and 
week (F(1,34)=0.487, p>.05), or grid type and week (F(1, 34)=0.137, p>.05). There was 
no three-way interaction between age, grid type, and week (F(1,34)=2.313, p>.05). 
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5.3.3. ORDER OF ACQUISITION EFFECTS 
 
A chi square test using participant age and forgotten codes as factors was carried out on 
the data. A significant association between participant age and forgetting of codes was 
found when remembering 4 codes, !2(1)=21.043, p<.001. This seems to represent the 
fact that older participants were more likely to forget codes than younger participants 
(see Figure 5.6).  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Frequency of forgetting for Tiles codes for both younger and older participants. 
Separate chi square tests were run on the younger and older participants with order of 
acquisition and forgetting. The test for younger participants found that order of 
acquisition was significantly associated with the forgetting of codes, !2(5)=16.803, 
p=.001. This seems to suggest that the third code was the most challenging to retain, 
with 61.5% of younger participants forgetting the third code. The test for older 
participants revealed no association between order of acquisition and forgetting of 
codes. The poorer retention of the third code appears to be an anomaly due to code 
number four not being affected. 
 
5.4. DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, a main effect of age was present for both similar and dissimilar grids where the 
younger group performed both more accurately and faster than the older group. This age 
effect was in accordance with the prediction that was made prior to the study. However, 
the performance for older adults was poor and lower than the PIN benchmark. These 
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findings are in contrast to what was expected, with the psychology literature suggesting 
that older adults are able to take advantage of the visual nature of the system to at least a 
similar extent as younger adults (e.g. Winograd et al., 1982) for concrete images (Smith 
et al., 1990).  
 
Older adults have been shown to use poor strategies when learning information (e.g. 
Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2007) and when learning pictures specifically they have been 
shown to encode the picture as a ‘gist’ – relying on a general impression of the concept 
of the picture rather than any specific detail (Koutstaal, 1997). In the context of this 
study participants were told to study the whole image and that every detail was relevant. 
In theory this should have resulted in the whole image being classed as primary 
information for encoding but it was not possible to enforce this on the participants. The 
second stage of the familiarisation process presented participants with the individual 
segments, thus emphasizing the different areas of the image and should have further 
encouraged a more detailed encoding of the picture. In the future perhaps it may be 
suitable to allow participants more time to observe the whole image to guarantee that 
the whole picture is being taken into consideration. The implications of the extra time 
needed to register for an account under this configuration should also be considered.   
 
A possible explanation for the relatively poor performance overall (experienced by the 
older group – and to some extent the younger group with SET 2 codes) is the image 
content. The base images that were selected for this study consisted of picturesque 
scenes utilising the whole picture frame. However, it is possible that the segmentation 
of the images resulted in segments that did not portray enough detail regarding the 
original image – or in other words the segment resulted in an abstract image. Work by 
Smith et al. (1990) has found that older adults’ memory for abstract images was not as 
accurate as that for concrete images, therefore it could be that any resulting abstract 
target segments were not recognised by the older group. In effect, the segmentation of 
the images could have removed the meaningfulness of the image. In addition, the 
resulting segments may have been treated as individual images due to the lack of 
meaningfulness, leading participants having to remember nine target images instead of 
the intended single target image – considerably more than the standard four targets for 
existing GAS.   
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A further explanation for the insensitivity of the older group to the grid types could be 
the well-documented problems that older adults experience with the binding of objects 
and location (e.g. Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Park et al., 1983). The purpose for 
keeping the location of the target segments fixed when mapped onto the base image was 
to help participants by adding further context to the segment – e.g. if the door was 
supposed to be on the bottom left of the image and a segment showed a door on the top 
right of the grid then it could be discarded. While it is apparent that younger adults were 
able to do this, older adults may not have benefitted from location consistency. Work by 
Chalfonte et al. (1996) demonstrated that older adults are disadvantaged when having to 
recall the location of objects on a screen which may partially explain their problems 
with the Tiles system. Although Tiles did not require participants to remember the 
location of the segments explicitly, being able to remember the location would have 
aided the recognition and discrimination of segments. Older participants did not appear 
to be able to use this feature of the system and as a consequence their performance with 
both grid types was the same. 
 
A decline in accuracy over time was observed for all participants with both sets of 
codes. The time-based performance decrement observed for both age groups was 
supported by previous research into multiple graphical authentication systems. In 
accordance with Moncur and Le Plâtre (2007) and Chiasson et al. (2009), a performance 
decrement was observed after a one-week delay when participants had multiple 
graphical systems to remember. The 3-way interaction found between age grid type and 
week with the new codes showed a disadvantage for the older group when using 
dissimilar grids where their accuracy declined at a significant rate from week 2 to week 
3 while the younger group demonstrated the same effect but with similar grids. The 
most important finding from this 3-way interaction is the drastic decline in accuracy for 
both age groups with SET2 codes, making it clear that the addition of multiple codes 
causes participants of both ages – albeit with different grid types – to become 
significantly less accurate after a one week delay. 
 
5.4.1.1. SPEED 
 
As expected, younger participants were significantly faster than older participants in 
selecting their segments. This was the case across all conditions and presents no 
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surprises. The speed results demonstrate that there was no accuracy-speed tradeoff and 
that younger participants were clearly superior to older participants. 
 
5.4.2. IMPLICATIONS 
 
A main effect of age was found where the younger participants were more accurate and 
faster than older participants. This finding was not a surprise and simply reflects the 
reality of knowledge-based user authentication, where older adults will always be at a 
disadvantage when compared with younger adults. However, the lack of a main effect 
of grid type was surprising. When looking at the third week more carefully, however, it 
emerges that younger participants were able to take advantage of the dissimilar grids but 
the older group showed no difference in performance between the two grid types – and 
generally performed very poorly with both. In other words, older adults underperformed 
with Tiles regardless of the grid type, while younger participants were able to take 
advantage of the ‘easier’ grid configuration as was expected, but their performance with 
the ‘harder’ grid configuration was comparable to that of the older adults. 
 
This evaluation of Tiles followed a comparable methodology to that used to evaluate 
PINs, and as such some comparison can be made between the two studies. In the case of 
PIN, the benchmark for the older group was 2.6 average successful attempts with SET 1 
codes and 2.7 average successful attempts with SET 2 codes. Older adults showed a 
similar performance using Tiles with SET 1 codes, but noticeably worse performance 
with SET 2 codes. As such, the accuracy results from the Tiles system were worse than 
expected. Participants using this graphical system were not able to improve on the 
accuracy shown with the PIN system. In fact, the accuracy results for the second set of 
codes shows a significant decline from week 2 to week 3 which was not observed for 
PIN, making the Tiles system more vulnerable to problems when multiple codes are 
introduced. It should be noted that short-term performance with Tiles exceeded that of 
PIN, for both SET 1 codes and SET 2 codes (i.e. week 2). These results imply that Tiles 
could feasibly be used if the user is guaranteed to authenticate consistently throughout 
the day – e.g. smartphone authentication. However, it could be argued that PINs serve 
this purpose already – remembering a PIN that is used regularly should not a problem 
due to repetition. It is possible to use Tiles as an alternative system to frequently used 
PINs or passwords in order to prevent the reuse of codes, but the repercussions of 
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delaying a login beyond a week – especially if multiple codes are used – could be 
severe. Simply, Tiles does not provide the inclusive authentication that was hoped for.  
 
The results bare some resemblance to those of Chiasson et al. (2009) where GAS 
showed a marked improvement over existing KBA systems in the short term but long-
term recall of the graphical system did not exceed that of the KB system. The similar 
result shows that the paradigm developed and used in this thesis produces realistic 
results. This is encouraging for the later evaluations that will be used for comparisons.  
 
The results from the Tiles GAS demonstrate important design considerations for 
graphical systems. The picture superiority effect has been shown to be present for older 
adults (e.g. Winograd et al., 1982) but this benefit can be nullified if the graphical 
system is not implemented correctly. In this case the segmentation of the images is 
believed to have affected the ability of older adults to recognise the segments. This 
performance drop experienced by the older group – and the younger group to an extent 
– suggest that inclusive GAS should only implement full images and not partial or 
segmented images.  
 
5.4.3. DESIGN IMPLICATIONS 
 
In order to improve the memorability of the Tiles system it is recommended that the 
base images be selected on the basis that little or no ‘dead space’ is present. Dead space 
refers to areas of an image that may contain repetitive similar elements (e.g. water or 
sky) that could be easily confused by the participant. The screening process would 
benefit both younger and older adults on the basis that the segmentation process would 
yield less abstract segments.  
 
A longer and more extensive familiarisation process would also benefit the older group. 
More time focusing on the base image, with relevant questions that force participants to 
engage with the whole image rather than select specific details that may not be present 
in a number of segments. A final stage could also be added where all the segments are 
shown together and the participant is asked to identify the segments they believe will be 
the most problematic and explain how those segments fit in with the rest of the image. 
Additionally, the practice phase should require participants to select every segment 
from amongst foils, rather than four random segments in order to identify any 
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problematic segments. The one problem with this approach would be the added time to 
the familiarisation processes, and as a consequence to the whole registration stage. 
Whether the added time is acceptable to the users remains to be seen. 
 
A potential modification to improve the system is to utilise base images that contain a 
number of detailed objects – at least four – and then require participants to select the 
correct objects from amongst other objects to authenticate. In essence, the base image 
would not be segmented in the way it was for this study – i.e. absolute segmentation – 
but instead some of the objects would be extracted from that image and presented to the 
user in a grid along with other similar objects – similar to traditional recognition-based 
GAS, e.g. VIP. This approach would benefit older adults as no image segmentation 
would take place, and they would benefit from the context of the base image – i.e. they 
should be able to imagine the base image and extrapolate the correct objects.  
 
5.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter evaluated a new GAS that was designed to reduce the cognitive load 
associated with recognition-based GAS. Younger and older adults were tested with 
multiple Tiles codes over the course of three weeks. In comparison to study 1 (Chapter 
4), it was predicted that the performance of the older group, relative to the younger 
group, would be relatively strong (i.e. Tiles would work to benefit older adults). 
However, the study found that older participants were less accurate and slower than 
younger participants when selecting their target segments. Only younger participants 
were able to take advantage of the dissimilar grid configuration while the older 
participants did not show a difference between the two grid configurations. Finally, the 
accuracy of both younger and older participants significantly declined after a week with 
SET 2 codes and most importantly the long-term performance with Tiles was not an 
improvement to that of PIN for either the younger or the older group. 
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6. GRAPHICAL AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS RE-ENGINEERED: 
FACES AND PICTURES 
 
6.1. RATIONALE 
 
The previous chapter found that a GAS with partial images (Tiles) was not effective as 
an authentication system for older adults – i.e. it was not effective in improving the 
performance of older adults when compared to the earlier PIN study. This chapter will 
explore GAS that utilise whole images as inclusive systems for older adults based on a 
literature that suggests performance gains for this group. The argument in favour of the 
graphical systems is that humans are much better at remembering and recognising 
images than they are at remembering strings of text (De Angeli et al., 2002; Dhamija & 
Perrig, 2000). A number of studies looking at the memorability of these graphical 
authentication systems have found that over a time delay the graphical systems are 
indeed more memorable than alphanumeric passwords (e.g. Dhamija & Perrig 2000; De 
Angeli et al. 2002). A reason for the apparent superiority of the graphical systems is that 
while users rely on pure recall when authenticating with passwords, graphical 
authentication systems allow users to rely either cued-recall or recognition, both better 
than pure recall for remembering (Baddeley, 1997). 
 
These relatively new systems have been extensively tested on younger adults, but we do 
not know much about their performance with a population of older adults. Previous 
memory research suggests that older users may not be penalised as harshly with 
graphical systems than with alphanumeric passwords, as recognition has been shown to 
be less affected by ageing than recall (Brown & Park, 2003; Craik & McDowd, 1987), 
most likely due to the extra effort and resources required for pure recall (Raaijmakers & 
Schiffrin, 1992). 
 
Additionally, previous research also shows that visual memory appears to be less 
affected by ageing than verbal memory (Brown & Park, 2003), meaning that memory 
for pictures is likely to be superior than memory for words, and therefore remembering 
a graphical combination would be less work than remembering an alphanumeric 
password. Older adults have been shown to benefit from the Picture Superiority Effect 
(Park et al., 1986; Winograd et al., 1982) to the same extent as younger adults. 
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Moreover, older adults have been shown to be able to remember images after a one-
week delay without a significant drop in recognition performance, although a longer 
delay appears to negatively impact their performance (Park et al., 1988).  
 
With regards to graphical authentication systems using faces, research has shown that 
older adults are very adept at recognising known faces, albeit not as accurately as 
younger adults (Ng, Hon, & Lee, 2007; Smith & Winograd, 1978). The accuracy of 
recognition depends on the familiarity of the target faces (Searcy et al., 1999) which can 
potentially be problematic for a security system where the use of known faces may 
compromise the system. Hence, the use of known faces is not acceptable from a security 
perspective. 
 
Younger and older adults were tested with two different GAS, a face-based system 
called Faces and a picture-based system called Pictures, over a three week period. These 
GAS were based on existing traditional recognition-based systems with a few 
modifications to enhance the security of the systems. 
 
It is expected that the performance of older adults, in terms of accuracy and speed, will 
improve when compared with the PIN benchmark when using GAS. Based on previous 
work (e.g. Everitt et al., 2009) it is predicted that accuracy will drop over time but the 
rate of decline for the older group is expected to follow that of the younger group. 
 
6.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
6.2.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The study consisted of two factorial designs as the codes were separated into ‘original’ 
accounts (SET 1) assigned to participants during the first week and tested in weeks 1, 2 
and 3, and ‘new’ accounts (SET 2) assigned to participants during the second week and 
tested in weeks 2 and 3. The first set of images consisted of a 2 (participant age: young, 
old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) factorial mixed 
design. The second set of images consisted of a 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 
(system: Faces, Pictures) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 3) factorial mixed design. The 
factors comprised of one independent – the participants’ age (young group, old group) – 
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and two repeated –the graphical system tested (face-based ‘Faces’, picture-based 
‘Pictures’) and the time period (weeks 1, 2, 3). 
 
Dependent factors comprised the number of successful authentication attempts 
(maximum of 5 per account), the average time to authenticate (in seconds) and the 
number of correct image selections made regardless of account (Image Interference). 
 
6.2.2. PARTICIPANTS 
 
36 participants were recruited in total to fit into one of the two age groups, the younger 
group (18-30 years old, n=18) or the older group (65-75 years old, n=18).   
 
Younger participants (mean age: 23, SD: 2.78) were recruited from the student 
population in the university using an online participation pool maintained by the 
university. Given the diversity of the student population this sample was considered 
adequate.  
 
Older participants (mean age: 69, SD: 3.56) were recruited using the lab’s participant 
database as well as through an advert on the Elders’ Council of Newcastle newsletter. 
All participants were given £30 to cover travel expenses to and from the university. 
 
Participants were screened for age and for computer experience—they were required to 
have used a computer prior to taking part in the study. Participants were also screened 
for adequate vision and for previous extended contact with Caucasian people. The 
reason for the latter requirement was due to the use of Caucasian faces for the Faces 
system, and previous research has shown that people are much better at remembering 
faces of their own ethnic origin or of ethnicities that they have had extended contact 
with (e.g. Walker & Tanaka, 2003). Finally, participants were excluded if they suffered 
from prosopagnosia, a face recognition disorder.  
 
6.2.3. MATERIALS  
 
The materials were designed to reproduce a real authentication system and the 
experience of logging into multiple accounts. Four account names were created for the 
study. The names used were Bank, ATM, NHS and Email. Each account was allocated 
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four target images that the participants would be required to learn and remember over 
the course of the study. 
 
The face-based system, Faces, was modelled on the commercial GAS Passfaces 
(Valentine, 1998).  The foil faces on each grid were controlled for visual similarity in 
order to improve the security of the system with regards to observation attacks. In other 
aspects the Faces system resembled Passfaces with four challenge grids being presented 
to the participant, each containing nine faces – one of which was correct. 
The picture-based system, Pictures, was loosely modelled on the original VIP system 
(De Angeli et al., 2002). The foil pictures on each grid were controlled in terms of 
similarity by belonging to the same semantic category. This approach was taken to 
improve the security of the system in terms of description so that the pictures cannot 
simply be accessed by knowing the label – i.e. cannot say “the boat” – or by observation 
– by observing that it is a boat an attacker cannot necessarily replicate a selection. The 
pictures used differed from those used in VIP as concrete everyday objects were chosen 
to form the categories – e.g. bollards, lamp posts, etc.   
 
The main material used was the graphical authentication system that was created for this 
study using Experiment Builder v 1.5.201. Both Faces and Pictures used the same 
underlying program, with the difference being the stimulus that was used – faces for 
Faces and pictures for Pictures. The graphical authentication systems used on the same 
computer for all participants in order to guarantee the same experience for all 
participants. 
 
Initially, the program displayed a set of simplified instructions for the participants and 
they were required to press the spacebar to start after the complete oral instructions 
were given. Four sequential challenge grids were displayed upon the participants’ 
selection. Once four selections were made using the mouse, the system informed 
participants whether they had selected correctly or incorrectly, no feedback on 
individual selections was given. The system carried out the cycle four more iterations, 
meaning participants selected their codes five times in total. 
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6.2.3.1. GRID COMPOSITION FOR FACES 
 
The faces were obtained from a university smartcard database and the face pool 
consisted of 321 males and 38 females, all numbered. The smartcard photos were taken 
to a constant specification, making the presentation of all the faces in the database very 
uniform – i.e. same background and similar poses. All faces were in full colour. 
 
The database consisted predominantly of young white male faces, therefore in order to 
preserve similar levels of grid strength and avoid any complications regarding race, 
gender, etc. only Caucasian male faces were used. Female faces and non-Caucasian 
male faces were removed from the pool and resulted in 280 faces, all numbered 1-280. 
Faces with neutral or positive expressions were selected to make them more memorable 
for the older participants. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Example grids for Faces (left) and Pictures (right). 
The target faces were randomly chosen from the face bank using a random number 
generator and were assigned to all participants. This meant all participants received the 
same 8 faces (Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 showcase the target images used for the study). 
The pool of remaining faces was then renumbered from 1 to 272.  Each of the target 
faces was assigned 12 foil faces that would appear on the challenge grids. The foil faces 
were chosen to be similar to the target images in order to avoid the target images from 
standing out due to any outstanding features – i.e. distinctiveness – and ensure that all 
grids were similar in difficulty. This was done by grouping the faces in terms of visual 
similarity. The similarity of the faces was obtained by asking 16 random people across 
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the university to rate the bank of images on the basis of visual similarity—how likely 
the faces are to be confused. For every target face, the person rating was asked to select 
the 12 most similar faces to each target face from the bank and write the numbers down 
on a sheet of paper. Research by  Dunphy, Nicholson, and Olivier (2008) shows that it 
is significantly easier to guess a target face using a description from a randomly 
generated grid than when the grid is built using similar faces. Based on these findings it 
was decided to use visually similar groupings for the grids. Once all target faces had 
been rated, the 12 most similar faces—classed as the 12 most recurring chosen faces—
were chosen as the foils. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Target faces used for ATM account. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Target faces used for Bank account. 
Sixteen sequences of nine numbers were generated using the random number generator. 
These sequences would form the challenge grids that would be displayed to participants. 
The position of the faces on the grid were determined by the order of the numbers in the 
sequences (where 1 was top left and 9 was bottom right). The sequences were inspected 
to make sure that an overlapping foil was present (see Image Overlap 6.2.2.3). The 
computer program randomised the presentation of the grids for each participant (see 
Appendix A for sample grids).  
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6.2.3.2. GRID COMPOSITION FOR PICTURES 
 
The images used for the Pictures system were collected by the researcher from around 
the city of Newcastle upon Tyne and consisted of 8 categories: bollards, light posts, 
drains, rubbish bins, recycling bins, benches, satellite dishes, and trees. From these 8 
categories, the 4 with the best quality pictures were selected (first 4 categories). Pictures 
of neutral objects were utilised in this study due to previous research from Charles et al. 
(2003) suggests that negative images are more difficult to recall for older adults. 
Although a number of the images were provided out of context (for example, a 
photograph of a drain without its surroundings), a familiarisation process was 
undertaken with each participant in order to help them put the pictures into context, 
something that should have benefitted the older group greatly (Park, Puglisi, & Smith, 
1986). 
 
The same procedure that was used for Faces was used to select the targets and foils for 
the Pictures system (Figure 6.4 and 6.5 showcase the target images used for the study).  
However, no similarity rating exercise was carried out as all pictures on the grid were 
from the same category (e.g. bollards) and it was thought that random selection of foils 
would be appropriate. To this end, 12 random foils were selected for each of the 8 target 
pictures from their respective categories.  
 
The same sixteen sequences of nine numbers were that were used for the Faces were 
also used for Pictures. The sequences would form the challenge grids that would be 
displayed to participants. The position of the pictures on the grid were determined by 
the order of the numbers in the sequence (where 1 was top left and 9 was bottom right). 
The sequences were inspected to make sure that an overlapping foil was present (see 
Image Overlap 6.2.2.3 below). The computer program randomised the presentation of 
the grids for each participant (see Appendix A for sample grids).  
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Figure 6.4: Target pictures used for Email account. 
 
Figure 6.5: Target pictures used for NHS account. 
 
6.2.3.3. IMAGE OVERLAP 
 
As mentioned previously, the grids were composed so that each grid contained one 
target image and eight foil images. Seven of the eight foil images were selected 
randomly from the foil set of 12 using the random number generator as detailed in the 
previous subsection (see 6.2.3.1). The final foil image was a target image from the other 
account. This meant that there was an overlap in the foils and targets, and each grid 
contained two images that had been assigned to the participant, although only one 
image was correct for each account (see Figure 6.6). 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Illustration of image overlap - each grid contains one target image and one foil image used as a 
target for another account. 
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The overlap used in constructing the grids was one of the aspects that differentiated this 
system from existing graphical authentication systems. Previous studies investigating 
interference effects amongst multiple graphical authentication systems have explicitly 
avoided using the same images more than once to prevent the participant from 
becoming confused (e.g. Everitt et al., 2009), while others have do not mention whether 
they avoided the use of overlapping image or not. 
 
This design was chosen to represent a realistic scenario where image databases are 
shared amongst providers and the possibility of one target appearing as a foil for 
another target becomes a reality. Previous evaluations of GAS have used optimal 
pictures for users – as recommended by Renaud (2009) – resulting in excellent 
performance by participants. However, these systems, other than Passfaces, are yet to be 
implemented in the real world. The aim of evaluating the systems with an image overlap 
– a more difficult task – is to obtain performance data of a viable system that could be 
implemented in the wild. 
 
6.2.4. PROCEDURE 
 
The procedure for this study consisted of two stages: the enrolment and the 
authentication stage. During enrolment, participants learned their images. During 
authentication, participants attempted to access their ‘accounts’ by identifying the four 
correct images that belonged to the account. 
 
6.2.4.1. ENROLMENT STAGE & FAMILIARISATION 
 
During the enrolment stage participants were given account names and the target 
images to learn and were guided through a familiarisation process consisting of seven 
questions aimed at creating a lasting bond between the participant and the images and 5 
practice trials selecting their images (for a list of the questions see Table 6.1). The 
participant was given each image of an account in turn, and after having 15 seconds to 
study the image they were asked the respective questions by the experimenter. The 
participant was required to reply to the questions out loud. The questions for the Faces 
and for the Pictures varied slightly but both had the aim of getting the participant to 
study the image in as much detail as possible, and think about the different attributes of 
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that image to make it easier to remember at a later time. Overall, the familiarisation 
process for an account took approximately five minutes.  
 
Table 6.1: List of questions used for both Faces and Pictures during the familiarisation process. 
Questions for Faces 
What do you think the name of this person is? 
How old do you think [name] is? 
Do you think [name] looks like a friendly person? 
Does [name] remind you of anyone you know? 
What do you think [name]’s job is? 
Where do you think [name] lives? 
What do you think about [name]’s family? 
Questions for Pictures 
What would you call this picture? 
Have you seen a similar scene to this picture before? 
Does this picture remind you of any particular experience or event 
in your life? 
What stands out the most in this picture? 
What is the smallest bit of detail or object that you can spot in this 
picture? 
What do you think is happening in this picture? 
What do you think the photographer was thinking when the picture 
was taken? 
 
Previous research has shown that older adults heavily rely on resemblance for 
recognising faces (Bartlett & Fulton, 1991), therefore it was imperative to ask questions 
that required the participants to compare the new faces to older faces.  
 
Once participants had been through the familiarisation process for the account code, 
they were asked to select their images from a set of foils to confirm that they had 
learned them, essentially a mock authentication attempt (see 6.2.4.2 below). The 
practice session also allowed participants further time to learn the images in context 
(e.g. discriminate from foils). If the participant failed to select their faces correctly at 
least three attempts in a row they were asked to repeat the mock authentication. They 
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were also given the option of being shown the faces again. Participants were then taken 
through the same process for their next account.  
 
6.2.4.2. AUTHENTICATION STAGE 
 
During the authentication stage participants were presented with a login screen and 
asked to authenticate. The login screen contained a 3x3 challenge grid where 
participants were required to point to their target image from the nine in four successive 
screens. The experimenter then clicked on the images using the mouse. The reason for 
not allowing participants to click for themselves was to account for the vast differences 
in mouse ability amongst the older participants. Following the selection of an image, 
participants were asked to fill in a confidence scale, requiring the participant to call out 
a number between 1 and 5 with 1 being not confident at all and 5 being very confident. 
Once they had called out a number they were then taken to the next selection screen. 
Once the participant selected four images, the program told them whether they selected 
correctly or incorrectly—if incorrect they were not told which images they got wrong. 
Participants were required to do this for a total of five times per set regardless of 
whether they selected correctly or incorrectly, a total of 20 image selections. 
 
6.2.4.3. PROCEDURE FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were asked to attend the lab on three separate occasions (see Table 6.2 for 
overview of procedure). During the first session, participants were given their first set of 
images (SET 1) consisting of one Faces account and one Pictures account. The order of 
the accounts was randomised in order to eliminate any order effects. Participants were 
taken through the enrolment stage with the first account and were then taken through 
the enrolment stage once more with their second account. After enrolling with both 
systems, participants were distracted from the encoding task by taking part in a short 
discussion with the investigator. This discussion focused on their experience of current 
authentication systems such as passwords and smartcards and lasted approximately 10 
minutes.  
 
Following the discussion, participants taken through the authentication stage with the 
order of the accounts randomised. 
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Table 6.2: Overview of procedure. 
Session Activity 
1 1. Enrolment with SET 1 
2. Discussion (distractor) 
3. Authentication with SET 1 
2 
(+1 week) 
1. Authentication with SET 1 
2. Enrolment with SET 2 
3. Discussion (distractor) 
4. Authentication with SET 2 
3 
(+1 week) 
• Authentication with SET 2 
• Authentication with SET 1 
3.   Discussion 
 
Participants were asked to return to the lab a week after the first session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to once again authenticate using the target 
images they were assigned in the first session a week ago (SET 1) and once again the 
order of the accounts were randomised. Once participants finished authenticating, they 
were enrolled with two new accounts, again one from each system (SET 2). Following 
the enrolment with their second set, participants were engaged in another discussion, 
this time regarding their experience of using the two systems.  This discussion lasted for 
approximately 10 minutes. Upon the completion of the discussion, participants were 
asked to authenticate with the new set of images (SET 2). They were not asked to 
authenticate with their first set of images. 
 
Participants visited the lab for a final time one week after the second session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to authenticate with the images they were 
assigned in the previous two sessions. The order of the sets was randomised, as well as 
the order of the accounts in each set. Once they had authenticated with both sets of 
images, participants were asked questions about their experience and about their 
strategies for remembering the images. 
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6.3. RESULTS 
 
A 3-way ANOVA with repeated measures on two factors (System and Week) and age 
as an independent factor was carried out on both SET 1 and SET 2. As before, accuracy 
(number of successful attempts) and time to authenticate were the main variables under 
investigation. In addition, a measure of pure image recognition was taking, comprising 
of correct image selected and incorrect images selected that belonged to another 
assigned account over total selections. This measure was important for determining the 
amount of interference that the image overlap caused. For a table of means see 
Appendix B. 
 
The number of successful attempts measured the number of times participants selected 
all four images correctly in an attempt, to a maximum of five times (per account). The 
average time to authenticate, recorded in seconds, measured the average duration of an 
attempt, described as the time needed to select the four images constituting a code – 
from the presentation of the first image to the selection of the final image. As an 
additional analysis, Image Interference measured the number of images that were 
selected correctly along with the false-positives that were selected—images that were 
assigned to the participant but that did not belong to the account being tested. 
 
6.3.1. SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS – ACCURACY  
 
6.3.1.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (out of five) for each of the two codes that made up SET 1 were 
collated for each of the three weeks. A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2(system: Faces, 
Pictures) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 1 codes, a main effect of age was found (F(1,34)=7.475, p=.01) with younger 
participants (mean: 4.91) achieving more successful attempts than older participants 
(mean: 4.56). No main effect of system was found (F(1,34)=1.602, p>.05). A main 
effect of week was present (F(2,33)=6.974, p<.01) with pairwise comparisons showing 
that participants achieved significantly more successful attempts in the first week 
(mean: 5.00) compared to the third week (mean: 4.33) (p<.010) and also achieved 
significantly more attempts in the second week (4.90) when compared with the third 
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week (mean: 4.33) (p<.05). No significant difference in accuracy was found between 
the first week and the second week. 
 
An interaction effect between age and system (F(1,34)=4.450, p<.05) was found (see 
Figure 6.7). An independent samples t-test on the Pictures data shows that the 
difference in accuracy between the younger group (mean: 4.94) and the older group 
(mean: 4.41) was significant (t(106)=3.215, p<.05) while the difference in accuracy 
between the younger group (mean: 4.90) and the older group (mean: 4.70) with Faces 
was not significant (t(70)=1.014, p>.05). This confirms that older participants could not 
be differentiated from the younger group when using Faces, but they were outperformed 
when using Pictures. 
 
No interactions were found between age and week (F(2, 33)=2.800, p>.05) or system 
and week (F(2, 33)=1.337, p > .05). 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Interaction between age and system for SET 1, showing the older group being more accurate with 
Faces than with Pictures, while the younger group were more less accurate with Faces than with Pictures. 
There was no 3-way interaction between age, system and week (F(2,33)=1.432, p>.05). 
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6.3.1.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (out of five) for the two codes that made up SET 2 were collated for 
each of the two weeks. A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x3 
(week of testing: week 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 2 codes, a main effect of age was found (F(1,34)=12.930, p=.001) with 
younger participants (mean: 4.90) achieving more successful attempts than older 
participants (mean: 4.13). No main effect of system was found (F(1, 34)=0.088, p>.05). 
A main effect of week was present (F(1,34)=18.604, p<.001) with participants 
achieving more successful attempts in the second week (mean: 4.90) compared to the 
third week (mean: 4.10) (p<.001).   
 
No interaction was found between age and system (F(1,34)=1.076, p>.05). An 
interaction was present between age and week (F(1,34)=10.707, p<.01) (see Figure 6.8). 
Independent samples t-tests confirm that the accuracy of younger participants did not 
significantly decline from week 2 (mean: 5.00) to week 3 (mean: 4.80) (t(70)=1.324, 
p>.05) while a performance dropoff was observed for the older participants with 
significant declines from week 2 (mean: 4.83) to week 3 (mean: 3.42) (t(70)=4.056, 
p<.001).  
 
 
Figure 6.8: Illustration of the interaction between age and week for SET 2, showing how the accuracy of the 
older group dropped significantly during the second week of the study. 
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No interaction effect was found for system and week (F(1,34)=0.217, p>.05). There was 
no 3-way interaction between age, system and week (F(1,34)=0.866, p>.05). 
 
6.3.1.3. OVERALL ACCURACY 
 
The first trend to stand out from the results is the decline in accuracy for the older group 
during week three. The interaction effect between age and week with SET 2 codes 
confirms that older participants struggled significantly more than younger participants 
when recognising their images during the final week.  Figure 6.9 below shows this 
performance drop off clearly. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Overview of successful attempts for both sets of images. 
Young participants were shown to be more accurate with Pictures than with Faces as 
captured by the age x system interaction with SET 1 but this effect was not present in 
SET 2. Older participants were shown to be more accurate with Faces than with Pictures 
as captured by the age by system interaction with SET 1 but this effect was masked by 
the addition of further codes (SET 2).  
 
It is apparent from the study overview (Figure 6.9) that the drop off for older adults is 
more pronounced than that for the younger group. The gradient is particularly striking 
for SET 2 codes – especially for the older group. Despite the decline of accuracy over 
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time for both age groups, overall accuracy is an improvement on the benchmark set by 
PIN earlier. 
 
6.3.2. AVERAGE TIME - SPEED 
 
6.3.2.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ average time taken (in seconds) to select their images making up the codes 
for SET 1 were collated for each of the three weeks. A 2 (participant age: young, old) 
x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA 
was carried out. 
 
For SET 1 codes, a main effect of age was found (F(1,34)=49.252, p<.05) where 
younger participants (mean: 12.89 seconds) were faster than older participants (mean: 
18.63 seconds) when selecting their images. No main effect of system was found 
(F(1,34)=0.017, p>.05). However, a main effect of week was present (F(2,33)=15.951, 
p<.05). Pairwise comparisions show that participants took less time to select their 
images in the first week (mean: 13.84 seconds) over the second week (mean: 14.94 
seconds) and the third week (mean: 18.49 seconds), as well as taking less time to select 
their images in the second week when compared with the third week. 
 
An interaction effect was found between age and system (F(1,34)=4.538, p<.05) (see 
Figure 6.10). Two independent samples t-tests show no significant difference in speed 
between Faces and Pictures for either younger participants (t(106)=1.730, p>.05) or 
older participants (t(106)=-.926, p>.05). Another independent samples t-test showed no 
significant difference in speed between younger and older participants with either Faces 
or Pictures. No interaction effect was found between age and week (F(2,33)=2.661, 
p>.05).  
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Figure 6.10: Illustration of the interaction between age and system for SET 1, showing how the older group 
took longer to select their Pictures, while the younger group were the other way around. 
An interaction was present between system and week (F(2,33)=11.624, p<.05) (see 
Figure 6.11). A one-way ANOVA showed that for Faces a significant difference of 
speed was present where the difference between week 1 and week 2 was not 
significant(F(2,107)=13.771, p<.001), but the difference between week 2 and week 3 
was significant (p<.001) as was the difference between week 1 and week 3 (p<.001). 
Another one-way ANOVA showed that for Pictures a significant difference of speed 
with Pictures was present (F(2, 107)=6.077, p<.01) where the difference between week 
1 and week 2 was not significant, the difference between week 2 and week 3 was not 
significant, but the difference between week 1 and week 3 was significant (p<.01).  
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Figure 6.11: Illustration of the interaction between system and week for SET 1. 
More interestingly, a 3-way interaction was found between system, time and age 
(F(2,33)=5.788, p<.05) (see Figure 6.12). Independent samples t-tests showed no 
significant difference between systems for either younger or older participants during 
week 1. Independent samples t-test showed no significant difference between systems 
for younger participants during week 2 (t(34)=-.915, p>.05) while a significant 
difference between systems was found for older participants during week 2 (t(34)=-
2.305, p<.05) where Faces took less time to select (mean: 16 seconds) than Pictures 
(mean: 18.70 seconds). Independent samples t-tests found a significant difference 
between systems for younger participants during week 3 (t(34)=2.427, p<.05) where 
they were significantly faster with Pictures (mean: 12.90 seconds) than with Faces 
(mean: 15.91 seconds), while older participants did not show a significant difference 
between the systems in the third week (t(34)=-.706, p>.05). 
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Figure 6.12: Illustration of the 3-way interaction between age, system and week for SET 1, showing how the 
younger group took significantly longer to select their faces during week 3 while the older group took 
significantly less time to select their Faces during week 2. 
 
6.3.2.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ average time taken (in seconds) to select their images making up the codes 
for SET 2 were collated for each of the three weeks. A 2 (participant age: young, old) 
x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA 
was carried out. 
 
For SET 2 codes, a main effect of age was found (F(1,34)=52.003, p<.05) where the 
younger group (mean: 14.51 seconds) were faster at identifying their images than the 
older group (mean: 20.90 seconds). No main effect of system was found 
(F(1,34)=1.661, p > .05). A main effect of week was also present (F(1,34)=29.694, 
p<.05) where participants took were quicker to select their images in the first week 
(mean: 15.90 seconds) over the second week (mean: 19.52 seconds).  
 
No interaction effect was found between age and system (F(1,34)=1.065, p>.05). An 
interaction effect between age and week was present (F(1,34)=7.058, p<.05) (see Figure 
6.13). Independent samples t-tests showed a significant difference in speed for both 
younger (t(70)=-2.895, p<.01) and older (t(70)=-4.277, p<.001) participants where 
images were selected faster during week 2 (mean young: 13.57 seconds; mean old: 
 112 
18.13 seconds) than during week 3 (mean young: 15.54 seconds; mean old: 23.60 
seconds).  
 
 
Figure 6.13: Illustration the interaction between age and week for SET 2, showing how the older group took 
longer to select their images in the second week of the study. 
An interaction effect was also present between system and week (F(1,34)=4.143, 
p=.050) with Faces taking significantly longer to select in the second week (mean: 
16.90 seconds) than Pictures (mean: 14.83 seconds: t(70)=2.193, p<.05) but no 
significant differences present in the third week (mean: 19.39 seconds; 19.70 seconds: 
t(70)=-.177, p>.05) (see Figure 6.14). In other words, the advantage of the Pictures 
system was lost by the final week. 
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Figure 6.14: Illustration the interaction between system and week for SET 2, showing how initially Faces took 
longer to select but during the second week the time taken to select both images evened out. 
There was no 3-way interaction between age, system and week (F(1,34)=2.208, p>.05). 
 
6.3.1. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS: IMAGE INTERFERENCE 
 
6.3.1.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Responses to the authentication task were re-scored to see if participants were able to 
recognise images independently of whether the images belonged to the correct codes – 
i.e. ‘merging’ of the binding between images and accounts. This analysis was used to 
demonstrate the extent to which the image overlap affected participants’ recognition of 
the target images, and to obtain an idea of whether the simplification of the task – i.e. 
pure recognition rather than image binding and recognition – improved the performance 
of the older group. The maximum score for a participant was 20 per week – 5 attempts 
of 4 images each.  A 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x3 
(week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
When looking at pure image recognition, no main effect of age was found 
(F(1,34)=2.909, p>.05) which suggest that the binding of codes and accounts is 
problematic. There was also no main effect of system (F(1,34)=1.280, p>.05). There 
was a main effect of week present (F(2,33)=4.615, p<.05). Pairwise comparisons found 
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no significant difference between week 1 (mean: 20.00) and week 2 (mean: 19.94), 
between week 2 and week 3 (mean: 19.86), or between week 1 and week 3.  
 
There were no interaction effects for age and system (F(1,34)=0.569, p>.05), age and 
week (F(2,33)=1.448, p>.05) or system and week (F(2,33)=2.129, p>.05). There was no 
3-way interaction between age, system and week (F(2,33)=0.558, p>.05). 
 
6.3.1.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (out of five) for each of the two codes that made up SET 2 were 
collated for each of the two weeks. Correct image selections and selections of other 
target images that did not belong to the specific account were counted as correct. A 2 
(participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 
3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
Again, when looking at the performance of partiipants without the binding require ment 
the age effect is gone (F(1,34)=2.210, p>.05), system (F(1,34)=0.577, p>.05), or week  
was present (F(1,34)=0.063, p<.05). 
 
There were no interaction effects for age and system (F(1,34)=0.064, p>.05), age and 
week (F(1,34)=0.063, p>.05) or system and week (F(1,34)=0.037, p>.05). There was no 
3-way interaction between age, system and week (F(1,34)=1.807, p>.05). 
 
6.3.1.3. OVERALL IMAGE INTERFERENCE 
 
The outcome from collating the selection of target images regardless of account is the 
elimination of the main effect of age. This suggests that the binding of code and account 
was more of an issue for the older group than for the younger group.  
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Figure 6.15: Overview of overall image interference for both sets of images (percentage correct). 
In fact, upon closer inspection of the study overview (Figure 6.15) it is clear that 
participants are generally performing at ceiling (max score = 20) – both younger and 
older adults. This resulted in no effects being present – more importantly a main effect 
of age was not found. The fact that older adults are performing at ceiling is a good 
indication that graphical systems have the potential to improve the authentication 
experience for this age group, but that the design of the systems needs to be reviewed 
carefully. 
 
6.3.2. ORDER OF ACQUISITION EFFECTS 
 
Forgotten codes were further explored – i.e. those codes that participants were totally 
unable to recall after 5 attempts – as a function of order of acquisition. The underlying 
question was whether the order of acquisition of the code was reflected in the rate of 
forgetting. This was mapped out as a function of load. 
 
A chi square test using participant age and forgotten codes as factors was carried out on 
the data. A significant association between participant age and forgetting of codes was 
found when remembering 4 codes, !2(1)=6.424, p<.05. This seems to represent the fact 
that older participants were more likely to forget codes than younger participants (see 
Figure 6.16).  
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Figure 6.16: Forgetting of image codes for both younger and older participants. 
Separate chi square tests were run on the younger and older participants with order of 
acquisition and forgetting. The test for younger participants found that order of 
acquisition was not significantly associated with the forgetting of codes, !2(3)=2.019, 
p>.05. The test for older participants also revealed no association between order of 
acquisition and forgetting of codes, !2(3)=3.353, p>.05.  
 
6.4. DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, a main effect of age was present for both Faces and Pictures where the younger 
group performed both more accurately and faster than the older group. This age effect 
was in accordance with the prediction that was made prior to the study. However, of 
more interest was the finding that older adults appeared to benefit from the Faces 
system more than with the Pictures system, even if no main effect of system was found. 
Older participants were more accurate with Faces with SET 1 codes, however, when 
further codes were added (SET 2) that advantage with Faces disappeared. Despite no 
main effect of system, there is some evidence to suggest that a face-based system could 
be the key to inclusive authentication after a number of improvements. It is possible that 
the older group were disadvantaged by the faces that were used as stimuli in this study 
which means the advantage of Faces could be even greater. There is evidence of an 
own-age effect when it comes to recognising faces, meaning that older adults tend to 
recognise older faces better than younger faces (e.g. Lamont et al., 2005). With this in 
mind, it was expected that if a difference in performance was to be found it would have 
been in favour of Pictures.  
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A possible explanation for the superiority of face-bases stimuli is that the participants 
processed the faces holistically (Bruce & Young, 1986), whereas Pictures were 
remembered by picking an odd detail from the main image. There is evidence that older 
adults adopt poor memorisation strategies when compared with younger adults (Naveh-
Benjamin et al., 2007) and it is possible that these subpar strategies led to confusion 
regarding the Pictures, but not the Faces which were encoded as a whole. Additionally, 
it is possible that the poor strategy adopted by some older participants led them to create 
a very basic representation of the image that was then confused by the similar foils 
(Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997). The familiarisation questions aimed to neutralise these 
possible effect by asking participants similar questions that required them to think about 
past experiences, but it is unknown how much this helped.  
 
Another possible explanation is that older users were confused by the similar images 
(Koustaal & Schacter, 1997). The Pictures were grouped in categories, and each grid 
consisted of images from the same category. Literature on categorical perception 
indicates that images from different categories appear more different than items from 
the same category (Harnad, 1987). Therefore, discriminations can be made faster 
between images that cross a category boundary than between two images that belong to 
the same category (Bornstein, 1987). In the case of Pictures, this discrimination was 
made more difficult due to the lack of category boundaries. Faces, on the other hand, 
were not grouped into categories, potentially making the choices less challenging. 
However, it could be argued that all faces belonged to the same category, with the 
images being of young males so this would indicate that older adults are more 
vulnerable to confusion of similar images than they are to confusion of similar faces. 
 
A decline in performance over time – both in successful attempts and time taken to 
select the images – was observed for all participants with both SET 1 and SET 2 codes. 
The time-based performance decrement observed for both age groups is supported by 
previous research into multiple graphical authentication systems. In accordance with 
Moncur and Le Plâtre (2007) and Chiasson et al. (2009), a performance decrement was 
observed after a one-week delay when participants had multiple graphical systems to 
remember. However, an age-specific performance decrement over time was present 
with the new codes, meaning that older participants’ accuracy declined significantly 
from week 2 to week 3 while that of younger participants did not. This interaction effect 
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makes it clear that the systems were not wholly inclusive of older adults. This finding 
which supports previous work once again adds credibility to the paradigm that was 
used. In fact, the use of the paradigm was the reason why the drop off experienced by 
the older group with the SET 2 codes could be observed, and the reason why the 
advantage older adults had with Faces – in the form of an age x system interaction with 
SET 1 – was discovered. 
 
As expected, younger participants were significantly faster than older participants in 
selecting their images. This was the case across all conditions and presents no surprises. 
The speed results demonstrate that there is no accuracy-speed tradeoff and that younger 
participants are clearly superior than older participants. 
 
6.4.1. IMPLICATIONS & IMPROVEMENTS 
 
The older group were penalised more than the younger group by the image overlap that 
was implemented in this study. This was highlighted with the Image Interference 
analysis which showed that in terms of seen/not seen recognition of the images, older 
participants performed comparably to the younger participants. This finding is not 
entirely surprising due to the Associative-Deficit Hypothesis (ADH) (Naveh-Benjamin, 
2000). ADH has shown that older adults are disadvantaged when creating associations 
between items. This problem has been shown to affect images as well (Naveh-
Benjamin, 2003) and it would not be far-fetched to think that faces would be vulnerable 
to this as well. What the ADH demonstrates is that when remembering a single item 
(e.g. a picture), older adults show no difference from younger adults when asked to 
recognise it at a later time. This is also the case with multiple single items. However, 
when items are paired (e.g. two pictures that must be remembered together) older adults 
are seen to perform significantly worse than younger adults.  
 
The ADH explains the main problem that older participants faced. The question remains 
as to whether the problem was with associating the four images to form a code, or 
associating a code with the right account. Based on the limited data available it seems 
the problem was in associating the four images and forming them into an account.  
 
The results from this study suggest that the two GAS designed for this study were not 
optimal for older users in their current state, penalising them over time and making it 
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difficult to remember multiple sets of images. When comparing participants’ 
performance with GAS to the PIN benchmark it becomes clear that Faces and Pictures 
present a marked improvement.  If we consider the performance benchmark established 
with PIN for the older group of 2.6 average successful attempts for SET 1 and 2.7 
average successful attempts for SET 2, the GAS accuracy results of 3.6/4.2 
(Pictures/Faces) with SET 1 codes and an accuracy of 3.2/3.6 with SET 2 codes show 
an improved performance for both SET 1 and SET 2. It should be noted that the loads 
presented here not identical: four PINs had to be remembered while two of each 
Pictures and Faces had to be remembered. However, by merging the two GAS to create 
a load of four it can be seen that the advantage over PIN is still present, although it is 
debatable whether a load of four consisting of two Faces and two Pictures is equivalent 
to a load of four PINs.  
 
In this study it would be expected that Caucasian participants would perform better than 
non-Caucasian participants (Shepherd, Deregowski, & Ellis, 1974). The participants 
that were recruited for this study were all Caucasian so no adverse effects regarding 
recognition were expected, but it does highlight the problems that individual differences 
incite. Females have been shown to benefit from an own-gender effect when 
recognising female faces (e.g. Cellerino, Borghetti, & Sartucci, 2004; Lovén, Herlitz, & 
Rehnman, 2011) but a similar effect has not been found for male participants. This 
means that the use of male faces could disadvantage female participants. As such, it is 
possible that the choice of faces that were used for the Faces system may have 
negatively impacted the performance of older participants, given the majority of the 
participant sample was female. Despite the possible disadvantage, the Faces system still 
presented the best overall performance for the older adult group. This further confirms 
that face-based systems have the potential to improve the authentication experience of 
older adults. A suggestion to improve the Faces system would be to use old faces as 
stimuli rather than young faces – previous research suggests that own-age effects are 
present for both younger and older adults (e.g. Lamont et al., 2003) meaning that older 
adults would be expected to recognise old faces more accurately than young faces. 
However, it is unknown what impact this would have on the younger group but it would 
be interesting to find out whether they can maintain their performance with the old 
faces. 
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Another suggestion to eliminate the interference of multiple graphical systems is to 
guarantee the absence of overlapping images and make the system a seen/not seen 
recognition task. Although this approach could have security implications, these will 
not be explored in this paper. However, such an approach would help both younger and 
older users take advantage of the Picture Superiority Effect. The feasibility of such an 
approach with current graphical systems is questionable, although potentially 
achievable if the images are distributed centrally (e.g. by an organisation). The 
distributor would then be able to assign specific sets for each provider (e.g. categories 
of boats and phone booths for NatWest Bank) and prevent other providers from using 
the same sets. This would eliminate the image overlap, unless users obtained multiple 
accounts with the same provider. 
 
6.4.2. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overall, it can be seen that interference is clearly present for both graphical systems. 
This interference appears to affect both sets of images equally and older adults are 
affected more for the second set of images. This suggests that older users do not cope as 
well as younger users with the added memory load of more images.  
 
Our results support previous research into multiple graphical authentication system 
interference showing that the memorability of the system drops off over time when 
more than one system has to be remembered. This effect was even more pronounced for 
the older group than for the younger group with SET 2 codes.  
 
The results suggest that face-based systems may be the best solution for older adults, 
although improvements are still required to design a fully inclusive system. 
 
6.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter set out to investigate how older adults performed using graphical 
authentication systems. It was thought that older users would match the performance of 
the younger users with the graphical authentications systems due to literature 
demonstrating that visual memory is not affected as much as other memory with age. 
Overall, the main effect of age was always present – i.e. older adults performed 
relatively poorly when compared to younger adults. However, after a more subtle 
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analysis taking system and week of testing into account showed that older adults’ 
performance with the face-based system was good in the early stages (week 1, SET 1) 
but became progressively worse as new sets of faces were added and as the delay 
between encoding and testing grew. The drop off effect was particularly striking for 
SET 2 codes, with a particular emphasis on the Pictures system for the older group. 
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7. IMPROVING FACE-BASED AUTHENTICATION FOR OLDER 
ADULTS: YOUNGFACES AND OLDFACES 
 
7.1. RATIONALE 
 
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that younger participants were significantly 
more accurate when selecting their graphical codes than their older counterparts. The 
face-based system proved to elicit better overall performance with the older group but 
design improvements could still be made to create an inclusive system. This chapter 
will look at what we know about face recognition and implement those facts and 
theories on a new system that will be evaluated with younger and older adults.  
 
The advantages of facial recognition with familiar faces are well known (e.g. Pike, 
Kemp, & Brace, 2000). This is an effect that is present for both younger and older 
adults (Smith & Winograd, 1978). Research has also found that adults appear to be 
more adept when recognising faces from their age group than when recognising faces 
from other ages. This phenomenon – present for younger adults, older adults and even 
children (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005) – is commonly referred to as the own-age effect. A 
large number of studies have reported results that support the existence of the own-age 
effect, but they have not always been successful in consistently finding the effects for 
all age groups. For example, Lamont et al. (2005) found that older adults could 
recognise old faces better than young faces, but younger adults did not benefit from the 
age of the face. Bäckman (1991) on the other hand found that younger adults recognised 
young faces better than old faces, and that young-older adults (>74 years old) 
recognised old faces better while old-older adults (75+ years old) appeared to have no 
preference about the age of the face. Fulton and Bartlett (1991) found that younger 
adults performed better with young faces, while older adults did not benefit from the 
age of the face. Wiese, Schweinberger, and Hansen (2008) conducted an ERP study that 
found that younger adults exhibited the effect, but not older adults. Harrison and Hole 
(2009) add further evidence to the own-age effect, but also found that exposure to the 
particular age range is a factor of the effect. In an experiment with primary school 
teachers and controls, they found that the own-age effect was present for the controls 
when asked to recognise faces of children but the effect was not present for the teachers, 
who have had extended contact with children.  
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Despite the discrepancies across the literature, a recent meta-analysis by Rhodes and 
Anastasi (2012) concluded that the own-age effect was a robust effect where people 
were more accurate at recognising faces of their own age. Additionally, they concluded 
that experience plays a role in the ability to recognise faces of other ages – similar to 
Harrison and Hole (2009) – but add that recency is an important factor. Simply, even 
though older adults have prior experience recognising young faces in the past, they still 
exhibit an own-age effect due to those experiences taking place a long time ago.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the performance of younger and older adults 
with two face-based systems with the aim of determining whether the use of an older 
face-based authentication system might improve the performance for older adults 
without sacrificing the performance of younger adults. Two factors are explored in this 
experiment: a.) the effect that face age has on participants’ memorability and b.) the 
consequence of eliminating the image interference. The literature suggests that older 
adults should be better at recognising old faces over young faces, while it is not certain 
what the impact might be on younger adults. The interference of the codes was removed 
based on the previous study to eliminate the need to bind the faces together, a problem 
that has been demonstrated amongst the older adult population (e.g. Naveh-Benjamin, 
2003). The overall number of codes to be assigned to participants was set to six to 
determine whether participants are able to remember a relatively high number of codes 
under the improved conditions. 
 
It was expected that younger adults would be more accurate than older adults when 
remembering multiple codes while the performance of the older group was expected to 
be better than the Faces benchmark when using OldFaces. This prediction was based on 
the own-age literature (e.g. Lamont et al., 2009). It was also expected that accuracy 
would decline over time based on past evaluations using multiple GAS codes (e.g. 
Everitt et al., 2009) but no age-specific effects were predicted. 
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7.2. METHOD 
 
7.2.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
The study consisted of two factorial designs as the codes were separated into ‘original’ 
accounts (SET 1) assigned to participants during the first week and tested in weeks 1, 2 
and 3, and ‘new’ accounts (SET 2) assigned to participants during the second week and 
tested in weeks 2 and 3. The first set of images were tested in a 2 (participant age: 
young, old) x2 (face age: young, old) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 2, 3) factorial mixed 
design. The second set of images were tested in a 2 (participant age: young, old) x2 
(face age: young, old) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 3) factorial mixed design. There 
were therefore two independent factors – the participants’ age (young group, old group) 
and the age of the faces (under 30 years old, over 50 years old) – and one repeated 
factor – the testing week (weeks 1, 2, 3). 
 
Dependent factors comprised the average number of successful authentication attempts 
(maximum of 5 per account) and the average time (in seconds) taken to select the four 
faces in a code. 
 
7.2.2. PARTICIPANTS 
 
72 participants were recruited in total to fit into four groups: older groups learning old 
faces (participant age ranging 65-75, n=18), older group learning young faces 
(participant age range 67-75, n=18), younger group learning old faces (participant age 
range 18-30, n=18) and younger group learning young faces (participant age range 18-
30, n=18). 
 
Younger participants were recruited from the student population in the university with 
mean age of 19 (SD: 1.29) years – mean age 19 (SD: 1.61) for younger faces and mean 
age 20 (SD: 0.86) for older faces. Given the diversity of the student population we 
considered this sample adequate. Younger participants were recruited using an online 
participation pool maintained by the university. 
 
Older participants, with a mean age of 70 years (SD: 3.79) – mean age 70 (SD: 3.60) for 
the younger faces and mean age 71 (SD: 3.68) for the older faces – were recruited using 
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the lab’s participant database as well as through an advert on the Elders’ Council of 
Newcastle newsletter. All participants were given £20 to cover travel expenses to and 
from the university. 
 
Participants were screened for age and for computer experience—they were required to 
have used a computer prior to taking part in the study. Participants were also screened 
for adequate vision and for prosopagnosia (a face recognition deficit). 
 
7.2.3. MATERIALS 
 
The materials of the study were designed to reproduce a real life authentication system 
and the experience of logging into multiple accounts. Six account names were created 
for the study. The names used were Bank, Library, TV, Phone, Shop and Email. Each 
account was allocated eight faces – four younger and four older –that participants would 
be required to learn and remember over the course of the study. Participants only had to 
learn four faces per account, all either young or old, depending on their assigned 
condition.  
 
The face-based graphical authentication system used for the study was built using 
Experiment Builder v 1.5.201. Initially the system displayed the simplified instructions 
for participants (see Figure 7.1) and once participants were ready they pressed the 
spacebar to start. Four sequential challenge grids were displayed upon the participants’ 
selection. Once four selections were made, the system informed participants whether 
they had selected correctly or incorrectly. The system carried out the cycle four more 
iterations, meaning participants selected their codes five times in total. All participants 
were tested in the same room and same computer to guarantee the same experience. 
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Figure 7.1: Simplified instructions to participants. 
 
7.2.3.1. GRID COMPOSITION FOR YOUNG FACES 
 
The young faces were obtained from a university smartcard database (same faces as 
Chapter 6) and the face pool consisted of 280 males, all numbered. 80 faces were 
randomly selected from the database using a random number generator and these would 
become the face bank for the study. Faces were renumbered 1 to 80. All young faces 
were in full colour and were converted to grey scale for consistency and for uniformity 
(see Older Faces, 7.2.3.2).   
 
The 24 target young faces were selected randomly from the bank using a random 
number generator. The bank was then renumbered once again from 1 to 56. Each of the 
target faces was assigned 12 foil faces that would appear on the challenge grids. The 
foils were assigned partially randomly, meaning that the twelve faces were chosen using 
a random number generator, but were then inspected by the team to make sure there 
were no outstanding faces.  
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Figure 7.2: Sample grid for young faces. 
Sixteen sequences of nine numbers were generated using the random number generator. 
These sequences would form the challenge grids that would be displayed to participants 
(for example see Figure 7.2). The position of the faces on the grid was determined by 
the order of the numbers in the sequence (where 1 is top left and 9 is bottom right). The 
computer program randomised the presentation of the grids for each participant (see 
Appendix A for sample grids). 
 
7.2.3.2. GRID COMPOSITION FOR OLD FACES 
 
Old faces were obtained from a number of online databases, including the Max Planck 
Institute (Ebner, Riediger & Lindenberger, 2010), Aberdeen, and Utrecht and consisted 
of 85 males. The Max Planck Institute database consisted of tagged faces of young 
adults, middle-aged adults, and old adults. Only the old faces were used for this study. 
The other databases were manually inspected for faces that appeared to be over 50 years 
old. The selected faces were then screened by a supervisor to confirm the perceived age 
of 50 or over. 80 faces formed the final old faces bank, and were all numbered from 1 to 
80. The majority of the old faces were in full colour and were converted to grey scale 
for consistency and in order to mask any outstanding colour features (e.g. yellow shirt) 
and to neutralise differing backgrounds. 
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The 24 target old faces were randomly selected from the bank using a random number 
generator. The bank was then renumbered once again from 1 to 56. Each of the target 
faces was assigned 12 foil faces that would appear on the challenge grids. The foils 
were assigned partially randomly, meaning that the twelve faces were chosen using a 
random number generator, but were then inspected by the team to make sure no faces 
drew a disproportionate amount of attention from participants.  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Sample grid for old faces. 
The grids were constructed using the same sixteen sequences that were used for the 
young faces (see Figure 7.3 for example grid). Once again the grids were randomised by 
the computer program (see Appendix A for sample grids). 
 
A digital voice recorder was also used to record the discussion during the first session. 
 
7.2.3.3. IMAGE OVERLAP 
 
It was apparent that one of the biggest issues for both the younger and older groups was 
the image overlap that was implemented for the Faces and Pictures systems for 
ecological validity (see Chapter 6). Closer analysis of the data revealed that when 
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participants were selecting incorrect faces, they generally belonged to one of the other 
assigned codes. Additionally, no age effects were found when the overlap was 
artificially removed. This was most likely due to age-related problems with binding 
items together, an effect known as the Associative-Deficit Hypothesis (Naveh-Benjamin 
et al., 2003). With this in mind, the image overlap was eliminated for this study. This 
meant that a target face for a code would not appear as a foil in any other code used in 
the study. The real world implementation implications are that a central organisation 
would be required to maintain and distribute the images in order to guarantee the 
absence of any overlapping images. While this may be difficult to achieve – especially 
as the system matures and becomes more widespread – it is a worthwhile approach if it 
is shown to improve the overall performance of older adults. 
 
7.2.4. PROCEDURE 
 
The procedure for this study consisted of two stages: the enrolment stage and the 
authentication stage. During enrolment, participants learned their faces. During 
authentication, participants attempted to access their ‘accounts’ by identifying the four 
correct faces that belonged to the account. 
 
7.2.4.1. ENROLMENT STAGE + FAMILIARISATION 
 
During the enrolment stage participants were given account names and target faces to 
learn. They were guided through a familiarisation process consisting of seven questions 
(see Table 7.1) to encourage the participant to associate the face with a person they 
knew, or to at least think of something memorable to do with that face. This was 
especially important for the older adults who rely on resemblance (Smith & Winograd, 
1978) and pleasantness (Bartlett & Fulton, 1991) for recognition of faces. In total, the 
familiarisation process lasted for approximately five minutes per account (i.e. the four 
faces consisting of a code). Participants were given each face individually and after 
having 5 seconds to study the face they were asked the respective questions by the 
experimenter. The participant was required to reply to the questions at loud.  
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Table 7.1: Familiarisation questions used for both young and old faces. 
Familiarisation Questions 
What is this person’s name? 
How old is [name]? 
Does [name] remind you of anyone you know? 
Does [name] look like a friendly person? 
What is [name]’s occupation? 
Where does [name] live? 
What can you tell me about [name]’s family? 
 
Once participants had been through the familiarisation process for the code, they were 
asked to select the segments that belong to their code from amongst foil faces to 
confirm they had learned them, essentially a mock authentication attempt (see 7.2.4.2 
below). The practice session also allowed participants further time to learn the images 
in context (e.g. discriminate from foils). If the participant failed to select their faces 
correctly at least three attempts in a row they were asked to repeat the mock 
authentication. They were also shown the faces again if necessary. Participants were 
then taken through the same process for their next account.  
 
7.2.4.2. AUTHENTICATION STAGE 
 
During the authentication stage participants were presented with a login screen and 
asked to log into their accounts using the authentication codes. The login screen 
contained nine faces in a 3 x 3 grid and participants were required to select the face 
belonging to their code from the nine in four successive screens using the mouse. Once 
the participant selected four faces, the program told them whether they selected 
correctly or incorrectly—if incorrectly they were not told which faces they got wrong. 
Participants were required to do this for a total of five times per code regardless of 
whether they selected correctly or incorrectly. 
 
7.2.4.3. PROCEDURE FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants were asked to attend the lab on three separate occasions (see Table 7.2 for 
procedure overview). During the first session, participants were given their first set of 
 131 
codes (SET 1) consisting of three random accounts. The order of the accounts was 
randomised in order to eliminate any order effects. Participants were taken through the 
enrolment stage with the three accounts. After enrolling with all accounts, participants 
were distracted from the encoding task by taking part in a short discussion with the 
investigator. This discussion focused on their experience of current authentication 
systems such as passwords and smartcards and lasted approximately 10 minutes.  
 
Following the discussion, participants taken through the authentication stage with the 
order of the accounts randomised, meaning that it did not necessarily follow the same 
order as the enrolment. 
 
Table 7.2: Overview of procedure for participants over the three-week period. 
Week Activity 
1 1. Learn half the codes  
            (SET 1) 
2. Discussion (distractor) 
3. Recall SET 1 codes 
2 
(+1 week) 
1. Recall SET 1 codes 
2. Learn other half of codes 
(SET 2) 
3. Discussion (distractor) 
4. Recall SET 2 codes 
3 
(+1 week) 
• Recall SET 2 codes 
• Recall SET 1 codes 
3.   Discussion 
 
Participants were asked to return to the lab a week after the first session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to once again log into their accounts using the 
authentication codes that were allocated in the previous week (SET 1). Once again the 
order of the accounts were randomised. Once participants finished logging in, they were 
enrolled with the remaining three codes (SET 2). Following the enrolment with their 
second set, participants were engaged in another discussion, this time regarding their 
thoughts about security threats. This discussion lasted for approximately 10 minutes. 
Upon the completion of the discussion, participants were asked to log into their 
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accounts using the new set of codes (SET 2). They were not asked to log into their first 
set of accounts. 
 
Participants visited the lab for a final time one week after the second session. Upon their 
arrival they were greeted and were asked to log into the accounts they were assigned in 
the previous two sessions. The order of the sets was randomised, as well as the order of 
the accounts in each set. Once they had logged in with both sets of codes, participants 
were asked questions about their experience and about their strategies for remembering 
the faces. 
 
The total amount of time taken to complete the study when taking into account the three 
sessions was approximately 120 minutes for older participants and 80 minutes for the 
younger participants. 
 
7.3. RESULTS 
 
A 3-way ANOVA with repeated measures on one factor (time of testing) and the 
independent factors of participant age and face age was carried out on both SET 1 and 
SET 2. Variables measured were number of successful attempts and average time taken 
to select the four faces making up a code. For a table of means see Appendix B. 
 
The average number of successful attempts measured the number of times participants 
selected all four faces correctly in an attempt – to a maximum of five times (per 
account) – averaged across the total number of codes per week. The accuracy results for 
Set 1 and Set 2 are presented separately below.  
 
The average time to authenticate, recorded in seconds, measured the average duration of 
an attempt between the presentation of the first face and the selection of the fourth face. 
The time results for Set 1 and Set 2 are presented separately below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 133 
7.3.1. SUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS- ACCURACY 
 
7.3.1.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (max=5) for each of the three codes that made up SET 1 were 
collated for each of the three weeks resulting in a mean score for each week. A 2 
(participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 
2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 1 codes, a main effect of participant age was found (F(1,68)=17.154, p<.001) 
with younger participants (mean: 4.84) achieving more successful attempts than older 
participants (mean: 3.91). No main effect of face age type was found (F(1,68)=.773, 
p>.05). A main effect of week was present (F(2,67)=8.059, p=.001). Pairwise 
comparisons showed that participants achieved significantly more successful attempts in 
the first week (mean: 4.60) compared to both the second week (mean: 4.36) (p<.05) and 
the third week (mean: 4.16) (p<.001). No significant difference in accuracy was present 
between week 2 and week 3.  
 
No interaction was found between participant age and face age (F(1, 68)=1.757, p>.05), 
but there was a significant interaction effect between participant age and week (F(2, 
67)=8.783, p<.001). No significant difference was found for the younger group in 
accuracy between weeks 1 (mean: 4.82), 2 (mean: 4.84), and 3 (mean: 4.84) 
(F(2,107)=0.031, p>.05). A significant difference was found for the older group in 
accuracy where older participants were significantly more accurate in week 1 (mean: 
4.40) when compared with week 3 (mean: 3.50) (F(2,107)=3.597, p>.05) (see Figure 
7.4). No significant difference was found between week 1 (mean: 4.39) and week 2 
(mean: 3.90) or between week 2 and week 3 (mean: 3.47), but a significant difference 
was found between week 1 and week 3 (p>.05).  
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Figure 7.4: Interaction between participant age and week for SET 1. 
There was no interaction effect found between face age and week (F(2,67)=0.538, 
p>.05). There was no significant 3-way interaction between participant age, face age 
and week (F(2,33)=0.026, p>.05). 
 
7.3.1.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
Participants’ scores (max=5) for each of the three codes that made up SET 2 were 
collated for each of the two weeks resulting in a mean score for each week. A 2 
(participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x2 (week of testing: week 2, 
3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out.  
 
For SET 2 codes, a main effect of participant age was found (F(1,68)=1092.447, 
p<.001) with younger participants (mean: 4.71) achieving more successful attempts than 
older participants (mean: 3.60). No main effect of face age type was found 
(F(1,68)=3.568, p>.05). A main effect of week was present (F(1,68)=14.216, p<.001) 
with participants achieving more successful attempts in the second week (mean: 4.38) 
compared to the third week (mean: 3.92) (p<.001). 
 
An interaction effect was found between participant age and face age (F(1,68)=12.642, 
p<.05) where the younger group showed no significant difference in accuracy between 
the young faces and the old faces (t(70)=1.749, p>.05) while the older group were 
significantly more accurate with the old faces (mean: 4.05) than the young faces (mean; 
3.14: t(70)=-2.455, p<.05) (see Figure 7.5).  
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Figure 7.5: Interaction between Participant Age and Face Age for SET 2. 
There were no interaction effects between participant age and week (F(1,68)=3.844, 
p>.05) or between face age and week (F(1,68)=0.688, p>.05).  
 
There was a 3-way interaction between participant age, face age and week 
(F(1,68)=4.146, p<.05) where the accuracy with young faces was both best for the 
younger group but worst for the older group (see Figure 7.6).  
 
 
Figure 7.6: Three-way interaction between Participant Age, Face Age and Week for SET 2. 
An independent samples t-test shows no significant difference in performance between 
the younger and older groups when using old faces in the second week (t(34)=1.844, 
p>.05), while another independent samples t-test shows no significant difference in 
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performance between young faces and old faces for the older group during week 2 
(t(34)=-215, p>.05). An independent samples t-test confirms no significant age effects 
in accuracy with old faces in week 3 (t(106)=1.758, p>.05). Another independent 
samples t-test shows no significant differences between young faces and old faces for 
the younger group in week three (t(34)=1.484, p>.05). A final independent samples t-
test shows a significant difference in accuracy between young faces and old faces for 
older participants (t(34)=-2.237, p<.05). 
 
7.3.1.3. OVERVIEW OF ACCURACY 
 
An important observation was the decline in accuracy over time, especially for the older 
group. An age-specific decline was present with the original codes where accuracy 
decreased at a faster rate for older participants. However, no age-specific declines were 
found for the new codes, although Figure 7.7 shows clearly that the performance of 
older adults by week 3 was markedly poorer than for younger adults.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Overview of average successful attempts for both the younger and older groups using old and 
young faces. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding was not the presence of a significant difference, but 
the lack of one: An independent samples t-test carried out on the accuracy of younger 
and older participants with OldFaces during week three revealed no significant 
difference. The non-significant result suggests that OldFaces may be a step in the right 
direction for inclusive authentication systems and will be addressed in the discussion. 
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7.3.2. AVERAGE TIME - SPEED 
 
7.3.2.1. SET 1 – ORIGINAL CODES 
 
Participants’ average selection time for each of the three codes that made up SET 1 
were collated for each of the three weeks resulting in a mean score for each week. A 2 
(participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x3 (week of testing: week 1, 
2, 3) mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 1 codes, a main effect of participant age was found (F(1,68)=56.184, p<.001) 
with younger participants (mean: 9.53 seconds) selecting their faces faster than older 
participants (mean: 18.14 seconds). No main effect of face age was found (F(1, 
68)=0.320, p>.05). No main effect of week was present (F(2,67)=0.991, p>.05). 
 
No interaction was found between participant age and face age (F(1, 68)=0.011, p>.05), 
but there was an interaction effect present between participant age and week 
(F(2,67)=5.539, p<.05). A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference in speed 
for the younger group between weeks 1, 2, and 3 while another one-way ANOVA 
showed no significant difference in speed for the older group between weeks 1, 2, and 3 
(see Figure 7.8). There was no interaction between week and face age (F(2, 67)=0.484, 
p>.05). In other words, no speed-accuracy trade-off was observed for SET 1 codes. 
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Figure 7.8: Interaction between Participant Age and Week for SET 1. 
There was no 3-way interaction between participant age, face age and week 
(F(2,67)=1.563, p>.05). 
 
7.3.2.2. SET 2 – NEW CODES 
 
 
Participants’ average selection time for each of the three codes that made up SET 2 
were collated for each of the two weeks resulting in a mean score for each week. A 2 
(participant age: young, old) x2 (system: Faces, Pictures) x2 (week of testing: 2, 3) 
mixed factorial ANOVA was carried out. 
 
For SET 2 codes, a main effect of participant age was found (F(1,68)=45.44, p<.001) 
with younger participants (mean: 10.97 seconds) selecting their faces faster than older 
participants (mean: 19.37 seconds). No main effect of face age was found (F(1, 
68)=0.000, p>.05). No main effect of week was present (F(2,67)=3.029, p>.05). 
 
No interactions were found between participant age and face age (F(1, 68)=0.443, 
p>.05), week and participant age (F(1,68)=2.796, p>.05), or week and face age (F(1, 
68)=0.392, p>.05). In other words, no speed-accuracy trade-off was observed for SET 2 
codes. 
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There was no 3-way interaction between participant age, face age and week 
(F(1,68)=1.217, p>.05). 
 
7.3.3. ORDER OF ACQUISITION EFFECTS 
 
Forgotten codes were further explored – i.e. those codes that participants were totally 
unable to recall after 5 attempts – as a function of order of acquisition. The underlying 
question was whether the order of acquisition of the code was reflected in the rate of 
forgetting. This was mapped out as a function of load. 
 
A chi square test using participant age and forgotten codes as factors was carried out on 
the data. A significant association between participant age and forgetting of codes was 
found when remembering both the young and old face (young: !2(1)=40.876, p<.001; 
old: !2(1)=7.920, p=.005). This seems to represent the fact that older participants were 
more likely to forget codes than younger participants.  
 
 
Figure 7.9: Forgetting of YoungFaces codes for both younger and older participants (NOTE: no codes 
forgotten by the younger group). 
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Figure 7.10: Forgetting of OldFaces codes for both younger and older participants. 
Separate chi square tests were run on the younger and older participants with order of 
acquisition and forgetting. All tests, for both young (see Figure 7.9) and old faces (see 
Figure 7.10), were not statistically significant suggesting that the subsequent addition of 
codes did not impact on their ability to remember those codes in the long term. 
 
7.4. DISCUSSION 
 
Overall, a main effect of age was present for both young and old faces where the 
younger group performed both more accurately and faster than the older group. This 
finding was in accordance to the predictions made. An interaction effect was found with 
SET 2 codes which demonstrated the own-age effect – the older group were able to take 
advantage of the old faces but the younger group did not show a preference for the age 
of the faces. When looking specifically at the accuracy of participants with the old faces 
during the final week the age effects were eliminated, meaning that no significant 
difference was found between the accuracy of the younger and older groups. The older 
group was observed to be more accurate with the old faces while the younger group did 
not appear to benefit from the age of the face. This finding supports the hypothesis 
based on the literature that age-specific faces would be easier to recognise for older 
adults. 
 
In the ageing literature it is common for older adults to underperform when having to 
learn and recognise new faces (e.g. Bartlett & Fulton, 1991). In this study older adults 
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were asked to learn and recognise a total of 24 faces that they had never seen before. 
Accuracy was good in comparison to the systems that were previously evaluated, with a 
low number of older adults forgetting the faces. This therefore contradicts previous 
research in the area and demonstrates that older adults are capable of learning new faces 
to a good standard. Participants were subjected to a familiarisation stage where they 
were encouraged to create associations with the faces and it is possible that this was the 
reason for the improved performance. Future research should look at the potential 
benefit of the familiarisation process as the older group did not excel with YoungFaces 
and as such the value of the process is unknown.  
 
Based on the face recognition literature, it was predicted that an own-age effect would 
be present where older adults would perform better with old faces when compared with 
young faces. The results support a number of studies (e.g. Anastasi and Rhodes, 2005; 
Backman, 1991; Lamont et al., 2005) that demonstrate the own-age effect where older 
adults are more adept at recognising faces that match their age range, and further 
develops the area by confirming that the effect is present in an authentication context. 
An own-age effect for younger adults that was predicted by part of the literature (e.g. 
Fulton & Bartlett, 1991; Wiese et al., 2008) was not found in this study, further dividing 
the area with regards to the consistency of results across the lifespan.  
 
Anastasi and Rhodes (2005) argue that extended exposure to own-age faces (Harrison & 
Hole, 2009) is unlikely to be the sole reason for the effect as if this was the case then 
older adults should be adept at recognising faces from any other age groups due to 
previous exposure. Instead they use the in-group/out-group model of face processing 
(IOM) developed by Sporer (1991) to justify the results. The model suggests that faces 
from the in-group – own age faces – are processed automatically, while those in the out-
group are generally classified as out-group faces and further processing is either omitted 
or dependent on additional processing resources which may always be available. This is 
a satisfactory explanation for the results when ratings of faces are taken into 
consideration. Research by Ebner (2008) found that old faces are universally rated as 
being less attractive and less distinctive than young faces. Given that distinctiveness is 
thought to play a chief role in face recognition (Bruce et al., 1994; Sarno & Alley, 1997; 
Wickham & Morris, 2003) it would be expected that participants, regardless of age, 
would perform more poorly with the old faces. This was not the case, further supporting 
the IOM. 
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A decline in accuracy over time was observed for all participants with both sets of 
codes. The time-based performance decrement observed for both age groups is 
supported by previous research into multiple graphical authentication systems. In 
accordance with Moncur and Le Plâtre (2007) and Chiasson et al. (2009), a performance 
decrement was observed after a one-week delay when participants had multiple 
graphical systems to remember. The interaction effect found between age and week 
with the SET 1 codes showed a disadvantage for the older group where their accuracy 
declined at a significant rate from week 1 to week 3 while the accuracy of the younger 
group did not. However, this effect was not present with SET 2 codes, suggesting that 
the addition of codes affects the existing codes but does not have any negative 
repercussions on SET 2 codes. With an ideal system no accuracy declines would be 
present with the addition of new codes – for either SET 1 or SET 2 – but this result is a 
step in the right direction. The additional finding of a non-significant difference in 
accuracy between younger and older participants with old faces in week 3 further 
demonstrates the potential of the OldFaces system. 
 
With regards to time taken to select the faces, it was interesting that younger 
participants appeared to be getting quicker at selecting their faces over time while older 
participants got slower – the same pattern that was observed in the accuracy data. While 
the overall finding – that the younger group selected their faces faster than the older 
group – was in accordance with the hypothesis, it was unexpected that the younger 
group improved their time-based performance.  
 
7.4.1. IMPLICATIONS 
 
The findings from this study have enormous implications for the future design of 
graphical authentication systems. This study has shown that an age-related performance 
decrement in older adults could be greatly reduced if the system is designed 
appropriately. Using old faces and eliminating the face binding between accounts 
helped in achieving this breakthrough. It is interesting that the elimination of the face 
binding by itself did not lead to comparative performances between both age groups as 
first thought based on the previous GAS experiment (see Chapter 6). The results from 
the older group using young faces demonstrate that an age effect was present for this 
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face type even with the removal of the overlap, therefore the use of old faces can be 
seen as a major contributing factor for the performance increase in the older group.  
 
The results suggest that as new codes are added, the accuracy between age groups with 
old faces is maintained over time for the new codes – i.e. no significant differences in 
accuracy are found between the two age groups. It would be interesting to see whether 
this comparable performance between age groups is maintained over extended delays, 
and whether this effect is also present with the original codes over an even longer delay. 
Even then, these results are very encouraging, demonstrating that bridging the 
performance gap between age groups is possible and highlighting the fact that 
authentication systems that are inclusive of older users can be designed. One must be 
careful as it appears that the younger group were getting quicker over time while the 
older group were getting slower, possibly showing the effects of the added cognitive 
load. However, this observed effect was not specific to the old faces, with the means 
showing a time increase for both age groups generally.  
 
The performance of the younger group has to be considered when thinking about this 
type of system as a solution to the older adults’ problems. Some might argue that 
younger adults are being penalised in order to improve the performance of older adults, 
therefore not making the system inclusive but rather targeted to older adults. However, 
it was found that the performance difference between young faces and old faces for the 
younger group for SET 2 codes was not statistically significant. When looking at the 
means, the difference in performance between the two types of faces was minimal, and 
it is appropriate to conclude that the difference was not practically significant either. 
Hence, although the younger group performed slightly better with the young faces, they 
were not significantly disadvantaged by the old faces. This suggests that the use of old 
faces for GAS is a step in the right direction to designing an inclusive solution to 
authentication. 
 
7.4.2. FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS 
 
A way to improve the system and the performance of users is to implement a larger face 
bank. A common concern during the debrief interviews, especially amongst older 
participants, was the recurrence of a large number of foils across accounts. It can be 
argued that regular exposure to the same foil faces – both within and across codes – 
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could lead to the encoding and future confusion with those faces. Participants 
mentioned that this was a concern when selecting the later codes during the final week 
as they would have been exposed continuously in a short period of time. This can 
perhaps explain the slowing down of the older group to an extent – older adults were 
having to discriminate foils while the younger group were able to select the face the 
stood out to them. Past work has suggested that foil faces are not learned after repeated 
exposure (Valentine, 1999). However, this research was carried out with younger adults, 
so it is possible that older adults are more vulnerable to this phenomenon. Madden 
(1983) demonstrated that older adults are more distracted by known stimuli when 
performing a visual search task after a day’s delay. In this case the stimuli used were 
letters rather than pictures or faces, but the possibility exists that this learning of foils 
can be extended to the visual domain. 
 
The inclusion of female faces should also be considered for future improvement to the 
system. Males were used in this study due to the unavailability of sufficient female 
faces, so it is possible that the incorporation of female faces could improve the 
performance of female users without necessarily affecting the performance of male 
users (Cellerino et al., 2004; Lovén et al., 2011). The inclusion of female faces would 
further help in increasing the size and variability of the face bank but gender-specific 
effects have to be considered. The literature in this area is relatively new, and as such it 
is possible that effects are present that we are currently not aware of.  
 
Researchers have also found a reliable own-race effect when it comes to face 
recognition as confirmed by a meta-analysis by Meissner and Brigham (2001). This 
means that people are better able to recognise a face from their own race later on than a 
face from another race. Valentine and Bruce (1986) first presented evidence of an own-
race effect by carrying out an experiment where participants were required to recognise 
inverted faces, both of their own race and other races. Recognition of the own race faces 
was superior as expected. Levin (2000) suggested that this effect is present due to 
participants encoding race-specific features at the expense of individualistic features 
and thus were penalised at the point of recognition. Walker and Tanaka (2003) then 
suggested that the effect occurs during the encoding of the faces. Michel, Rossion, Han, 
Chung, and Caldara (2006) support previous findings by proposing that own-race faces 
are encoded more holistically than other-race faces. Hence, it is important to consider 
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this limitation when designing face-based graphical systems as users could be easily 
disadvantaged. 
 
7.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter set out to evaluate a new face-based graphical authentication system, 
OldFaces, with the aim of bridging the performance gap between younger and older 
adults. It was predicted that the use of old faces as stimuli would improve the 
performance of the older group. In accordance with facial recognition literature, an 
own-age effect was found where younger participants performed better with young 
faces and older participants performed better with old faces. Younger participants 
outperformed older participants in both successful attempts and time with both 
YoungFaces and OldFaces – however, upon closer inspection, no age effects were 
found with SET 2 codes during the final week of the study, suggesting that OldFaces 
could be the key to inclusive user authentication. Finally, over the course of the three 
weeks, performance with SET 1 codes was subject to a performance decrement for both 
age groups. Meanwhile, SET 2 codes did not present any time-related performance 
decrements. 
 
The following chapter will discuss the findings from all four experiments and will 
compare the results from this study with the PIN benchmark.  
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8. FINAL DISCUSSION 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Four studies were carried out using a similar methodology to explore any age 
differences in accuracy and time between younger and older adults with various 
authentication systems. Two factors remained constant across all four studies: the 
individual differences of participants (age) and the testing time intervals. This chapter 
presents an overall discussion of the work that has been undertaken. First the two 
research questions are revisited and answered using the results from the empirical 
studies. Next all authentication systems that were evaluated are directly compared. The 
contributions made by the thesis are then listed and put in the context of what was 
learned. The limitations of the thesis follow. Future work is explored before the final 
conclusions are made.  
 
8.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
8.2.1. PERFORMANCE WITH CURRENT AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
 
The first research question that was posed was whether older adults were disadvantaged 
by existing authentication systems when compared with younger adults. The first study 
evaluated the performance of younger and older adults when learning and remembering 
multiple PINs over the course of three weeks. Two loads were implemented – a low 
load condition where participants were given four PIN codes to learn and a high load 
condition where participants were given six PIN codes to learn. Younger participants 
were shown to be significantly more accurate and quicker than older participants when 
entering their codes. The accuracy of the older participants was generally poor and at 
their best was borderline between logging in and getting locked out when using a 
traditional ‘three strikes’ policy.  
 
Based on the evidence detailed above, the answer to this first research question is that 
older adults are disadvantaged by existing authentication systems when compared with 
younger adults, as demonstrated by the main effect of age. The low number of 
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successful attempts older participants had when recalling their codes – the PIN 
benchmark – further supports this notion. These findings support the survey-based 
results of Rasmussen and Rudmin (2010) who concluded that older adults had more 
difficulties in remembering their PINs when compared to younger adults. This was the 
first study to empirically demonstrate this problem in the context of authentication and 
to present benchmark data on the performance of younger and older adults with PINs. It 
was also the first study to directly compare the performance of older adults and younger 
adults when learning and recalling multiple PIN codes. The results from this study, 
coupled with the self-reported problems of older adults, make it clear that alternative 
forms of authentication need to be explored to find a solution to the current poor state of 
authentication.  
 
8.2.2. PERFORMANCE WITH GRAPHICAL AUTHENTICATION SYSTEMS 
 
The second research question that was posed was whether graphical authentication 
systems could improve the performance of older adults in relation to existing systems 
with the aim of being a more inclusive form of authentication. It should be noted that 
younger participants were consistently more accurate and faster than older participants, 
and as such only the findings in relation to the older group will be discussed in this 
subsection. 
 
Three studies were carried out with the purpose of evaluating four distinct GAS with 
younger and older adult groups. The overall conclusion was that GAS have the potential 
to be used as inclusive authentication that do not overly penalise the accuracy of older 
adults over time. However, it is important to design the graphical systems carefully in 
order to avoid impacting the memorability of the systems, as witnessed in Study 2 (see 
Chapter 5). Tiles, the GAS designed using image segments yielded better accuracy than 
PIN for both younger and older participants during the first week of testing, but after a 
week’s delay the accuracy dropped off significantly to the point where it was inferior to 
PIN. 
 
The third study evaluated the performance of younger and older adults over three weeks 
with two GAS that were designed based on existing systems. A face-based system, 
Faces, was based on Passfaces (Valentine, 1998) and a picture-based system, Pictures, 
was based on VIP (De Angeli et al., 2002). Overall accuracy was better than with PIN, 
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but accuracy declined significantly between the second week and the third week 
suggesting a potential long-term memorability problem. Older participants showed an 
advantage with Faces, in terms accuracy and time taken to select the stimuli. The 
findings from this study demonstrated that overall performance could be improved by 
graphical systems that there was still room for improvement. 
 
The fourth and final study evaluated and compared two face-based systems with 
younger and older adults over three weeks. One system, YoungFaces resembled the 
young Faces system used in the previous study, while the other, OldFaces, used faces of 
older adults instead of younger adults. The image overlap between codes was removed 
for both systems which benefited older participants. An age specific drop-off in 
accuracy was observed for the older group with SET 1, but that effect was mitigated by 
the use of old faces by SET 2. Overall, younger participants were found to be more 
accurate and quicker than older participants when selecting their codes overall, but it 
was observed that during the final week with the new codes there was no significant 
difference in accuracy between the two groups when using old faces. This finding 
suggests that it is possible to design inclusive authentication systems if done correctly. 
 
Based on the evidence detailed above, GAS do have the potential to improve the 
performance of both younger and older adults when compared with existing 
authentication systems, but only if they are designed correctly. Study 2 demonstrated 
how the wrong design choice could result in the system being less memorable than PINs 
over time, but Study 4 also showed that with the right design choice the performance 
gap between age groups could be reduced. The challenge is in ascertaining what the 
correct design parameters are, but the final study goes some way to showing which 
factors play a part: the use of old faces along with a guaranteed image exclusivity 
between codes played a part in reducing the performance decrement observed in older 
adults with existing authentication systems and with other GAS. This design did not 
completely eradicate the decrement, but did improve upon the benchmark measure from 
the PIN system. Further work needs to be carried out to establish what other measures 
need to be taken into consideration to maximise the benefits of graphical systems for 
older adults.  
 
It is important to be clear about the definition of an inclusive system. An inclusive 
system is one that maximises the performance of a range of groups. In this case, an 
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inclusive system is one that does not penalise the accuracy of older adults over time 
when remembering their authentication codes. With regards to that definition, the goal 
of inclusive authentication was achieved by the design of OldFaces. During the final 
week when using the new codes the accuracy of older adults was not significantly 
different from that of younger adults. Younger adults were not disadvantaged by 
OldFaces despite the apparent accuracy drop in the final week, as demonstrated by an 
independent samples t-test that found no significance in accuracy between YoungFaces 
and OldFaces during the last week. Additionally, older participants performed at a 
noticeably higher level than the PIN benchmark. In terms of comparing the performance 
between younger and older adults, it is debateable whether this main effect of age can 
ever be overcome by KBA – after all memory does decline with age and the accuracy of 
older adults is always expected to be below that of their younger counterparts. 
Realistically the best that can be hoped for is for a system that does not induce any age-
specific declines in accuracy over time – in other words, the rate of the decline in 
accuracy is parallel between both age groups – and that does not produce high levels of 
forgetting resulting in large amounts of attempts for logging in (i.e. unlike PINs).  
 
8.3. SYSTEM COMPARISONS 
 
This section directly compares the accuracy results from all four studies. The studies 
were carried out separately and therefore the comparison does not contain inferential 
statistics. However, an analysis is attempted with the two most similar designs, although 
the limitations are acknowledged. Comparisons are made on a system-by-system basis 
(i.e. PIN vs. Tiles, PIN vs. GAS, etc.). For all graphs, the red line indicates the first set 
of codes (original) and the black line indicates the second set of codes (new). The solid 
lines indicate the accuracy of the younger group while the dashed lines indicate the 
accuracy of the older group. Only the trends for the older adult group are described 
below as younger adults were consistently more accurate than their older counterparts. 
 
8.3.1. LOADS OF 4 CODES 
 
This subsection compares the authentication systems that were evaluated using four 
codes over three weeks. These were PIN low load condition, Tiles, and the GAS 
consisting of Faces and Pictures. The dependent measure for this subset of systems was 
successful attempts. 
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8.3.1.1. PIN VS. TILES 
 
For the first set of codes, the accuracy of the older participants with Tiles during the 
first week was noticeably above the benchmark set by PIN. During the second week the 
accuracy dropped to similar standards as PIN, although still marginally higher. During 
the final week the accuracy of the older group was about the same as with PIN.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Comparison for PIN (left) and Tiles (right). 
With the second set of codes, the accuracy during the second week was clearly better 
with the Tiles system. However, during the third week accuracy dropped alarmingly to 
the point where it was noticeable lower than the PIN benchmark.  
 
This accuracy comparison between PIN and Tiles demonstrates how the graphical 
system improved the authentication process during a short ten-minute delay but after a 
long delay of one week that accuracy dropped to the same standards as PIN. These 
results suggest that Tiles may be a suitable authentication system for older adults if used 
consistently every day, as accuracy was noticeably higher after a ten-minute time delay. 
However, the potential dropoff after a week’s delay may not be worth risking given the 
poor performance observed (e.g. after going on holiday for a week).  
 
8.3.1.2. PIN VS. TRADITIONAL GAS 
 
The accuracy of the older participants during the first week with the first set of codes 
appeared to be noticeably better with the traditional GAS – Faces and Pictures. During 
the second week the accuracy was maintained and was once again better than PIN – 
which also maintained the accuracy of the first week. During the final week the 
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accuracy of the older group fell noticeably, although still remained above the PIN 
benchmark.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Comparison of PIN (left) and traditional GAS (right). 
With the second set of codes, the accuracy during the second week was clearly better 
with the traditional GAS. During the third week the accuracy of the older group dropped 
noticeably, although it was still better than the start point in the second week with PIN.  
 
This accuracy comparison between PIN and GAS demonstrates how the graphical 
system facilitated the authentication process for the older age group with both sets of 
codes. However, the age-specific decline in accuracy between weeks two and three with 
both sets of codes was very noticeable, even if accuracy remained better than with PIN. 
The question that arises is whether the rate of decline can be expected to continue at the 
same rate with more extended delays – e.g. two weeks – as if that proves to be the case 
then big problems can be anticipated for future code acquisitions with the graphical 
systems.  
 
8.3.2. LOADS OF 6 CODES 
 
This subsection compares the authentication systems that were evaluated using six 
codes over three weeks. These were PIN high load condition, YoungFaces, and 
OldFaces. The dependent measures for this subset of systems was average successful 
attempts. 
 
8.3.2.1. PIN VS. YOUNGFACES 
 
With the first set of codes, the accuracy of the older participants during the first week 
was better with the YoungFaces system than with PIN. During the second week there 
was a slight decline in accuracy, but once again accuracy was superior with 
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YoungFaces when compared with PIN for both age groups. During the final week the 
accuracy of the older group continued to decline steadily while remaining above the 
PIN benchmark. 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Comparison of PIN (left) and YoungFaees (right). 
With the second set of codes, the accuracy during the second week was better with 
YoungFaces. During the third week the accuracy of the older group dropped noticeably, 
although remained better than the start point in the second week with PIN.  
 
This accuracy comparison between PIN and YoungFaces demonstrates how the 
graphical system improved the authentication experience for the older adults with both 
the first and second sets of codes. However, the age-specific decline in accuracy 
between weeks two and three with the new codes for YoungFaces is noticeable, even if 
accuracy remains above the PIN benchmark. 
 
8.3.2.2. PIN VS. OLDFACES 
 
With the first set of codes, the accuracy of the older participants during the first week 
was better with the OldFaces system, to the extent where the older group were nearly as 
accurate as the younger group. During the second week there was a slight decline in 
accuracy for the older group, but once again performance remained above the PIN 
benchmark. During the final week the accuracy of the older group continued to decline 
steadily while remaining better than PIN. 
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Figure 8.4: Comparison of PIN (left) and OldFaces (right). 
With the second set of codes, the accuracy during the second week was better with 
OldFaces for the older group and once again nearly as accurate as the younger group. 
During the third week the accuracy of the older group dropped at a similar rate as that of 
the younger group while remaining noticeably higher than the PIN benchmark.  
 
This accuracy comparison between PIN and OldFaces demonstrates how the graphical 
system improved the authentication experience for both age groups with both SET 1 and 
SET 2 codes. The similar drop in accuracy over time for both age groups is encouraging 
and at all stages the accuracy with OldFaces was better than with PIN. OldFaces yielded 
the closest accuracy performance between both age groups and as a consequence 
resulted in the best overall accuracy for the older group. 
 
8.3.2.3. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF PIN VS. OLDFACES 
 
A 3-way mixed ANOVA was carried out on the data from PIN and OldFaces (8.3.2.2). 
Only the scores from the high load for PIN were used in the analysis, resulting in a 
comparison between system that required users to learn and remember six codes 
throughout the three weeks. Two independent factors were used – participant age 
(young and old) and system (PIN, OldFaces) – while one repeated factor was used – 
week of testing (week 1, week 2, week 3 [SET 1 only]). It is acknowledged that 
analyses across separate studies can result in increased error due to the differing times 
of the year, slightly different recruitment strategy and the use of some participants 
across multiple studies. However, the two studies used the exact methodology in terms 
of factors and procedure, therefore the analysis was carried out with a stricter alpha 
level of .01.   
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For SET 1 codes, the analysis found a main effect of age (F(1,50)=5.518, p<.001) where 
the younger group (mean: 4.13) was significantly more accurate than the older group 
(mean: 3.26). A main effect of system was also found (F(1,50)=17.625, p<.001) where 
participants were more accurate with OldFaces (mean: 4.47) than with PIN (mean: 
2.91). No main effect of week was also present (F(2,49)=3.655, p>.01.  
 
No interaction were found between age and system (F(1,50)=.422, p>.01), between 
system and week (F(2,49)=1.370, p>.01), or between age and week (F(2,49)=4.195, 
p>.01). No 3-way interaction between age, system and week was found (F(2,49)=.828, 
p>.01).  
 
For the SET 2 codes, the analysis found a main effect of age (F(1,50)=19.535, p<.001) 
where the younger group (mean: 4.42) was significantly more accurate than the older 
group (mean: 3.00). A main effect of system was also found (F(1,50)=13.690, p=.001) 
where participants were more accurate with OldFaces (mean: 4.31) than with PIN 
(mean: 3.12). A main effect of week was also present (F(1,50)=15.271, p<.001) with 
pairwise comparisons showing that participants were significantly less accurate during 
week 3 (mean: 3.42) than during week 2 (mean: 4.01) (p<.001).  
 
An interaction was found between age and system (F(1,50)=7.721, p<.01) where the 
difference in accuracy between the two systems was not significant for the younger 
group (PIN: 4.28, OldFaces: 4.57) (t(52)=-1.027, p>.01) while the older group were 
significantly more accurate with OldFaces (mean: 4.05) when compared with PIN 
(mean: 1.96) (t(52)=-4.987, p<.001). No interaction was found between system and 
week (F(1,50)=2.387, p>.01) or between age and week (F(1,50)=.155, p>.01). No 3-
way interaction between age, system and week was found (F(1, 50)=.208, p>.01).  
 
These results show that while an overall age effect was present where younger 
participants were more accurate than older participants – as expected – a main effect of 
system was also present with both sets of codes where participants were more 
successful with OldFaces. This advantage was particularly effective for the older group 
with the second set of codes as demonstrated by the interaction between age and system. 
In essence, the analysis further suggest that a face-based GAS utilising old faces is an 
improvement over existing authentication systems for both age groups, but the older 
group benefitted to a greater degree. 
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8.3.3. OBSERVED TRENDS 
 
Two important trends were observed that spanned the four studies. A main effect of age 
was present for all systems and a main effect of week was present for all but one 
system. These trends are discussed in more detail below. 
 
First, it should be noted that a main effect of age was observed throughout the testing of 
all systems. In every case, the younger group were shown to be superior to the older 
group. While it is not surprising to find that younger adults outperform older adults with 
memory-based authentication systems – both in terms of attempts and time – it is an 
important observation that demonstrates the magnitude of the challenge facing inclusive 
authentication for older adults. Age-related interactions have also been found in some of 
the studies, usually indicating a decline in accuracy over time for the older group when 
compared with the younger group. These interactions further disregard the inclusiveness 
of systems, observed for the GAS (see Chapter 6) with the second set of codes and for 
Faces (see Chapter 7) with the first set of codes.  
 
Secondly, it should be noted that a main effect of week was observed throughout all 
studies with the exception of PIN.  The drop in performance after a one-week delay 
does not come as a surprise, but it is important to note the consistency across systems. 
This main effect was not found for PIN where the overall performance was consistently 
poor. In summary, all graphical systems exhibited good performances in the first weeks 
that later decreased after a delay, while PIN exhibited poor performance from the start 
but it did not decrease with time. It is debateable what trend is most beneficial for an 
authentication system – one where performance is consistently below an acceptable 
threshold (i.e. PIN) or one where the initial performance is very good but after a delay it 
drops below an acceptable threshold (i.e. Tiles). In the context of authentication where 
the intervals between attempts cannot be anticipated a trend like Tiles is perhaps more 
desirable given the good short-term performance, while PIN consistently yields 
borderline – or worse – performance. However, neither trend is particularly desirable if 
avoidable. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that no main effect of system manipulation was found 
throughout any of the standalone four studies. A number of interactions involving the 
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system manipulation were observed, but the main effects were usually masked by 
differing performances by the age groups. For example, with Tiles the younger group 
were more accurate with dissimilar grids while the older group was more accurate with 
the similar group – hence the two interactions nullified the main effect. Similarly, in 
Study 4 younger adults were more accurate with younger faces while older adults were 
more accurate with older faces, resulting in no main effect of face age. In Study 3 a 
slight advantage was found with Faces for the older group, but this was masked by a 
slight advantage for Pictures by the younger group. The one exception was PIN where 
the lack of a main effect of load was not masked by an interaction. This observation 
further demonstrates the difficulties that designers face when creating inclusive systems 
– one solution is not likely to benefit all parties.  
 
8.4. CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This section lists the contributions that were made by this thesis and discusses what has 
been learned from each of the contributions.  
 
1. This thesis presents the first performance comparison between younger and older 
adults with existing authentication systems – in this case PINs. PINs are one of the most 
common forms of knowledge-based authentication in use today, despite a vast 
psychology literature that predicts a long-term memory decline in older adults (e.g. 
Grady & Craik, 2000). Additionally, a previous self-reporting study exploring different 
strategies for remembering codes suggested that a problem may be present with regards 
to older adults remembering PINs (e.g. Rasmussen & Rudmin, 2010). Despite these 
clear indicators, no experimental evidence was available to validate the assumptions 
that PINs may disadvantage older adults. This thesis has shown that indeed older adults 
are disadvantaged in terms of accuracy and time when they have to remember multiple 
PIN codes. We have also learned that a load of six codes is not enough to induce a 
significant difference in accuracy rates with either younger or older adults, but that the 
accuracy rate with four codes is not acceptable for older adults.  
 
2. This thesis includes the first performance comparison between younger and older 
adults with GAS. No other studies have used older adults as a factor when evaluating 
GAS. The majority of the authentication evaluation literature has utilised a restricted 
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population of students as participants who are not representative of older adults’ 
requirements. Renaud and Ramsay (2007) did use older adults as participants in a field 
trial evaluation of Handwing but no younger adults were recruited for comparison 
purposes. Study 4 has shown that GAS have the potential to improve the performance 
of both age groups if designed correctly, but that they do not completely eliminate age 
effects – younger adults are always more accurate and faster than older adults. 
However, there is hope that the performance of older adults can be improved to a level 
where the age effects are no longer of a noticeable magnitude for the older group.  
 
3. The thesis has contributed a testing methodology for evaluating the accuracy and 
time for authentication systems by controlling individual differences (age in this case), 
system differences, and time intervals (short and long). In the past various 
methodologies with inconsistent measurements have been used when evaluating 
authentication systems and as a consequence many of the findings from the studies 
cannot be compared. For example, some studies have compared new systems to existing 
systems (e.g. Dhamija & Perrig, 2000; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005), other have evaluated a 
single system (e.g. Brostoff & Sasse, 2000; Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), or tested 
variations of the same system (e.g. De Angeli et al., 2002; Chiasson et al., 2008). Other 
researchers have tested the short-term recall of systems (De Angeli et al., 2002; Tullis & 
Tedesco, 2005; Weidenbeck et al., 2006) while long-term memorability has also been 
evaluated (Brostoff et al., 2010; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). 
 
By using the proposed methodology it is possible to compare different systems, or 
variations of a system with various age groups – or possibly genders – and produce 
results that separate the codes in a way that can be examined for any specific 
performance declines.  
 
8.5. LIMITATIONS 
 
The methodology used throughout this thesis was designed to address the most 
important issues with other methodologies that have been used by researchers in the 
field – these included defined individual differences, constant time intervals and 
strategic comparison of systems. However, there are a number of limitations regarding 
the methodology used throughout the studies that will be discussed. 
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First of all the ecological validity of the administration of codes used throughout the 
studies can be debated. An effort was made in the design of the methodology to split the 
encoding of the codes to match the real life acquisition of codes. However, more than 
one code was assigned to participants in each ‘sitting’ which in itself is not usually 
representative of how users acquire codes – typically one at a time. The division of code 
sets makes the methodology more realistic than previous studies, but complete 
independence of the code assignment would have been ideal. This setup would be 
incredibly difficult to implement in a lab-based study due to the number of visits 
required by the participants. It has been shown to be possible in field studies, for 
example one of the conditions tested by Everitt et al. (2009), but then the lack of control 
that is associated with field studies has to be factored in – especially during the 
familiarisation process.  
 
Secondly, in the studies that are part of this thesis participants were assigned the codes 
to learn and remember. In real life users would have the opportunity to change the codes 
– at least for PIN codes. Although it is possible to view this as a limitation, research 
suggests that a large number of users do not change their PINs when they are assigned 
(Bonneau et al., 2012; Rasmussen & Rudmin, 2010). Additionally, research has shown 
that codes could be more vulnerable to guessing attacks when they are selected by the 
users rather than when they are randomly assigned. In the context of text and numeric 
codes, participants have a tendency to select meaningful numbers such as birthdays 
(Bonneau, et al., 2012), challenge questions that are common knowledge (Just, 2005) 
and phrases that are well known (Keith et al., 2007), while with GAS users can also be 
predictable – e.g. a male user selecting female faces (Davis et al., 2004). With this in 
mind it is possible that the only realistic implementation method for GAS, from a 
security perspective, is to assign the codes to participants rather than allowing them to 
select their own codes, with a best case scenario seeing a user assigned two images and 
allowing them to select the other two. Hence, it could be argued that the results from the 
studies using the proposed methodology demonstrate the memorability of codes if ‘best 
practice’ recommendations are applied.  
 
Another limitation with the design of this methodology lies in the use of absolute 
successful attempts (Chapter 5 and 6) as a measure of accuracy in lieu of average 
successful attempts as in study 1 (Chapter 4) and study 4 (Chapter 7). Absolute 
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successful attempts was used for the studies implementing a repeated measures design 
and testing participants with four codes overall – hence the week score for each set was 
based on a single code (single grid composition in Tiles, single Face/Picture in GAS) 
and susceptible to any issues associated with that specific code. On the other hand, 
average successful attempts relied on the data from more than one code per week, 
making the averaged score more reliable than the absolute score. Based on this 
observation, future studies implementing this methodology should be carried out 
evaluating different systems in an independent measures design rather than different 
configurations of the same system using a repeated measures design.  
 
Other standard limitations also apply to this methodology, such as participant 
motivation. First of all, participants may have lacked the motivation to remember the 
codes over an extended period of time. Participants were asked to try and remember all 
codes, but were not offered further incentive to engage with the task. Although 
participants appeared keen on completing the tasks successfully, it is possible that other 
activities could have taken priority over the memory task. In real life participants have a 
strong incentive for remembering their codes to not be locked out of accounts so it 
could be argued that the results here are on the low-end of the performance spectrum. 
This is a standard problem that is present with the majority of usability studies and one 
that is very difficult to address. Performance-based financial incentives could be offered 
– i.e. £1 for every code correctly recalled during each session – but this would be in 
conflict with the ethics regulation of the university. 
 
8.6. NEXT STEPS 
 
The imperative question to be asked is whether GAS are the future for inclusive 
authentication. Part of the answer is that if they are designed correctly then they can 
positively influence the performance of older adults so they must be considered. 
However, it is also important to think about the implementation of such systems. Given 
hardware requirements, the most likely application for GAS appears to be online 
accounts: GAS cannot be set up on older hardware like alarm boxes that do not 
incorporate high quality screen, if any at all. GAS are unlikely to be a secure enough 
system for banks to implement as an alternative to PINs, and the same problem as alarm 
boxes would apply to ATMs and payment terminals – poor quality screens and 
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environmental factors such as glare from sunny days. It is possible, however, for GAS 
to be part of a multifactor authentication solution for online banking. 
 
It should be noted that a large number of authentication codes are acquired from the 
online domain like shopping, email, social networking and forum accounts. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that if GAS are used for some internet accounts then the 
management of codes will improve. For example, if four online codes are graphical and 
a further four are passwords the load will have been halved. This was the initial 
motivation for graphical systems – to free memory for the management of other strong 
passwords – but the type of accounts that GAS would protect were never discussed. 
 
An interesting question for future research is whether recognition for computer-
generated faces is comparable to that of real faces. If this was found to be the case then 
the population of face banks would be less problematic. Currently, face banks are 
populated by faces of real people who have consented to be used for a commercial 
system. If GAS are to be widely used and image exclusivity is to be guaranteed, a very 
large bank will be needed. If a central organisation is allowed to generate artificial faces 
without impacting their memorability then exclusivity of images could become a reality. 
 
Graphical authentication using old faces has been shown to benefit older adults while 
not penalising younger adults. However, it would be interesting to explore the 
possibility of personalised authentication with the aim of eliciting the best possible 
performance from each user group – the ultimate form of inclusive authentication. It has 
been established that own race effects are present in face recognition (e.g. Meissner and 
Brigham, 2001), as are own-age (e.g. Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012) and to an extent own-
gender (e.g. Lovén et al., 2011). By knowing the gender, the age, and the race of the 
user, and tailoring the codes to that user (e.g. white Caucasian female undergraduate 
student receives four Caucasian female faces that are under 30 years old) an even better 
advantage could be achieved. This would be balanced by using foils that match the 
same criteria, but given the advantages described before the user should have no 
problems picking out the target faces. Additionally, this would make it more difficult 
for an attacker that does not fit the user’s demographics to launch a successful attack 
(e.g. a young black male would be penalised by the own-race effect and would not be 
able to take advantage of the own-gender effect).  
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A further step for the personalised authentication model could be the use of a single face 
per account. The user would be assigned multiple poses and angles from that single face 
and would be required to select a subset from challenge screens when authenticating. 
Research has shown that identifying an unknown person in different pictures is very 
difficult, with the majority of participants thinking that the two pictures portrayed 
different people (Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, & Mike Burton, 2011). However, if the 
person in the picture is familiar, then the task was fairly straightforward. In this case the 
familiarisation process would be very important and the user would need to be shown 
all the possible variations of the face pictures. However, once familiarised the 
recognition should be much easier as the user would only be looking for one face, in 
effect. Additionally, this would make it easier to guarantee image exclusivity as only 
one face is assigned to a user per account meaning a more economical face distribution 
model.  
 
8.7. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The studies in this thesis have demonstrated that PINs, one of the most commonly used 
authentication systems, penalise older adults who have to remember multiple codes over 
extended periods of time more than younger adults. This performance decrement was 
suspected due to limited previous studies suggesting that this was the case (e.g. 
Rasmussen & Rudmin, 2010), but this is the first study to empirically demonstrate this 
decrement.  
 
Several GAS were evaluated with the aim of improving the authentication experience 
for the older adult group. Results were mixed, with some systems proving to be 
detrimental to older adults while others proving to be beneficial. The main lesson 
learned was that the design of the graphical system could greatly influence the degree to 
which older adults managed to successfully remember their codes. Most importantly, 
the segmenting of images resulted in poor performance by the older group and the use 
of old faces improved the performance of older adults while not penalising younger 
adults. Work still needs to be done to eliminate the age effects – although younger 
adults are likely to always be more accurate and faster than older adults, but two key 
factors have already been identified for inclusiveness: own-age faces and the 
elimination of the image overlap. 
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Based on the studies conducted in this thesis, authentication with old faces is proposed 
as the best solution to inclusive authentication, with results having shown that the 
accuracy of both younger and older adults is comparable after a one-week delay. 
However, future work is encouraged on personalised authentication as it has the 
potential to benefit all age groups, races and genders if the literature is to be believed. 
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Appendix A: Sample Grids 
 
A selection of grids that were used for each study are presented here. Three grids from 
each condition are included, each from the same target for comparison. The original 
stimuli code is presented below each grid along with the grid number. 
 
Study 2 (Chapter 5) – Tiles 
 
BANK and NHS (Similar foils condition) 
 
 
2.1 – Grid 1 
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2.1 – Grid 10 
 
 
2.1 – Grid 15 
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EMAIL and SHOP (Dissimilar foils condition) 
 
 
1.1 – Grid 1 
 
 
1.1 – Grid 10 
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1.1 – Grid 15 
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Study 3 (Chapter 6) – Traditional Graphical Authentication Systems 
 
Faces 
 
 
K1-1 – Grid 1 
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K1-10 – Grid 10 
! #"""! Page viii 
 
K1-15 – Grid 15 
 
Pictures 
 
 
BolP1 – Grid 1 
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BolP10 – Grid 10 
 
 
BolP15 – Grid 15 
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Study 4 (Chapter 7) – YoungFaces and OldFaces 
 
YoungFaces 
 
 
KMY1 – Grid 1 
 
 
KMY1 – Grid 10 
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KMY1 – Grid 15 
 
OldFaces 
 
 
KMO1 – Grid 1 
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KMO1 – Grid 10 
 
 
 
KMO1 – Grid 15 
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Appendix B – Table of Means 
 
Study 1 (Chapter 4): PIN 
 
SET 1 
 
(average 
successful 
attempts) 
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
 Young Old Total Young Old Total Young Old Total 
Low  
Load 
4.61 
(0.99) 
3.22 
(2.43) 
3.92 
(1.94) 
4.39 
(1.65) 
2.72 
(2.27) 
3.56 
(2.11) 
4.33 
(1.64) 
2.61 
(2.16) 
3.47 
(2.06) 
High  
Load 
3.44 
(1.97) 
2.52 
(2.04) 
2.98 
(2.00) 
3.37 
(2.01) 
2.44 
(2.15) 
2.91 
(2.07) 
3.59 
(1.86) 
2.11 
(1.89) 
2.85 
(1.97) 
Total 
(Age) 
4.02 
(1.63) 
2.87 
(2.20) 
 3.88 
(1.86) 
2.58 
(2.15) 
 3.96 
(1.74) 
2.36 
(1.99) 
 
Total 
(Week) 
3.45 
(2.00) 
3.23 
(2.09) 
3.16 
(2.01) 
 
 
SET 2 
 
(average 
successful 
attempts) 
Week 2 Week 3 
 Young Old Total Young Old Total 
Low  
Load 
3.44 
(2.11) 
3.39 
(2.10) 
3.42 
(2.05) 
3.50 
(1.71) 
2.72 
(2.33) 
3.11 
(2.03) 
High  
Load 
4.63 
(0.74) 
2.44 
(1.77) 
3.54 
(1.73) 
3.93 
(1.42) 
1.48 
(1.73) 
2.70 
(1.98) 
Total 
(Age) 
4.04 
(1.65) 
2.92 
(1.95) 
 3.71 
(1.54) 
2.10 
(2.09) 
 
Total 
(Week) 
3.48 
(1.87) 
2.91 
(1.99) 
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Study 2 (Chapter 5) – Tiles 
 
SET 1 
 
 Similar Foils Dissimilar Foils 
 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
Young 
Group 
N=18 
4.89 
(0.47) 
4.78 
(0.43) 
3.78 
(1.62) 
5 
(0) 
4.56 
(1.15) 
4.28 
(1.49) 
Old 
Group 
N=18 
4.39 
(1.20) 
3.11 
(2.37) 
2.44 
(2.40) 
4.67 
(0.97) 
3.17 
(2.18) 
2.72 
(2.30) 
Total 4.64 
(0.93) 
3.94 
(1.88) 
3.11 
(2.11) 
4.83 
(0.70) 
3.86 
(1.85) 
3.50 
(2.06) 
 
 
SET 2 
 
 Similar Foils Dissimilar Foils 
 Week 2 Week 3 Week 2 Week 3 
Young 
N=18 
4.83 
(0.51) 
2.39 
(2.33) 
4.56 
(1.04) 
3.89 
(1.97) 
Old 
N=18 
3.78 
(1.48) 
2.28 
(2.40) 
4.33 
(1.24) 
1.39 
(2.03) 
Total 4.31 
(1.22) 
2.33 
(2.33) 
4.44 
(1.13) 
2.64 
(2.34) 
 
Study 3 (Chapter 6) – Traditional Graphical Authentication Systems 
 
SET 1 
 
 Faces Pictures 
 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 
Young 
Group 
n=18 
5 
(0) 
5 
(0) 
4.61 
(1.20) 
5 
(0) 
4.89 
(0.47) 
4.94 
(0.24) 
Old 
Group 
n=18 
5 
(0) 
4.94 
(0.24) 
4.17 
(1.58) 
4.94 
(0.24) 
4.67 
(0.59) 
3.61 
(1.72) 
Total 5 
(0) 
4.97 
(0.17) 
4.39 
(1.40) 
4.97 
(0.17) 
4.78 
(0.54) 
4.28 
(1.39) 
 
 
SET 2 
 
 Faces Pictures 
 Week 1 Week 2 Week 1 Week 2 
Young 
n=18 
4.94 
(0.24) 
4.67 
(1.19) 
5 
(0) 
4.89 
(0.32) 
Old 
n=18 
4.83 
(0.38) 
3.67 
(1.97) 
4.83 
(0.38) 
3.17 
(2.18) 
Total 4.89 
(0.32) 
4.17 
(1.68) 
4.92 
(0.28) 
4.03 
(1.76) 
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Study 4 (Chapter 7) – YoungFaces and OldFaces 
 
SET 1 
 
 
 Face Age  
Avg. Successful 
Attempts Part. Age Young Faces Old Faces 
Total 
(Week) 
Week 1 
Young 4.83 (0.24) 
4.81 
(0.35) 
 
 
4.61 
(0.75) Old 
4.07 
(1.15) 
4.70 
(0.68) 
Total 4.45 (0.90) 
4.76 
(0.54) 
Week 2 
Young 4.93 (0.14) 
4.76 
(0.55) 
 
 
4.36 
(1.19) Old 
3.67 
(1.61) 
4.07 
(1.39) 
Total 4.30 (1.30) 
4.41 
(1.10) 
Week 3 
Young 4.91 (0.25) 
4.78 
(0.50) 
 
 
4.16 
(1.45) Old 
3.26 
(2.03) 
3.69 
(1.50) 
Total 4.08 (1.65) 
4.23 
(1.23) 
 
 
SET 2 
 
 Face Age  
Avg. Successful 
Attempts Part. Age Young Faces Old Faces 
Total 
(Week) 
Week 2 
Young 4.89 (0.28) 
4.76 
(0.48) 
 
 
4.38 
(1.10) Old 
3.67 
(1.57) 
4.22 
(1.14) 
Total 4.28 (1.27) 
4.49 
(0.90) 
Week 3 
Young 4.81 (0.26) 
4.39 
(1.19) 
 
 
3.92 
(1.55) Old 
2.61 
(1.94) 
3.87 
(1.39) 
Total 3.71 (1.77) 
4.13 
(1.30) 
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Appendix C – SPSS Outputs 
 
C1: Study 1 (Chapter 4) – PIN 
 
C2: Study 2 (Chapter 5) – Tiles 
 
C3: Study 3 (Chapter 6) – Traditional Graphical Authentication Systems 
 
C4: Study 4 (Chapter 7) – YoungFaces and OldFaces 
 
Accuracy output is presented first, followed by average time output. Analyses are split 
by Set, with SET 1 results being presented first, followed by SET 2.  
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C1: Study 1 (Chapter 4) – PIN 
 
SET 1 
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 2\Results\ St2-OVERALL.sav 
Wit
hin-Subjects Factors Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
k 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 
3 
S1W1 
S1 W2 
S1 W3 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 
Value Label N 
Age 1 Young 18 
2 Old 18 
Load 1 Low 18 
2 High 18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load Mean Std. Deviation N 
Session 1 Young Low 4.611111 .9930313 9 
High 3.444444 1.9649710 9 
Total 4.027778 1.6252199 18 
Old Low 3.222222 2.4252720 9 
High 2.518519 2.0351843 9 
Total 2.870370 2.2018676 18 
Total Low 3.916667 1.9345922 18 
High 2.981481 1.9982745 18 
Total 3.449074 1.9955583 36 
Session 2 Young Low 4.388889 1.6541194 9 
High 3.370370 2.0100058 9 
Total 3.879630 1.8610258 18 
Old Low 2.722222 2.2653795 9 
High 2.444444 2.1473498 9 
Total 2.583333 2.1460177 18 
Total Low 3.555556 2.1066344 18 
High 2.907407 2.0731888 18 
Total 3.231481 2.0859613 36 
Session 3 Young Low 4.333333 1.6393596 
9 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load Mean Std. Deviation N 
Session 3 Young High 
3.592593 
1.8617329 
9 
Total 3.962963 1.7438553 18 
Old Low 2.611111 2.1618536 
9 
High 2.111111 1.8929694 9 
Total 2.361111 1.9879128 18 
Total Low 3.472222 2.0613547 18 
High 2.851852 1.9744188 18 
Total 3.162037 2.0140326 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Week Pillai's Trace 
.061 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Wilks' Lambda .939 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Hotelling's Trace .064 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Roy's Largest Root .064 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Week * Age Pillai's Trace .091 1.553a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Wilks' Lambda .909 1.553a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Hotelling's Trace .100 1.553a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Roy's Largest Root .100 1.553a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Week * Load Pillai's Trace .018 .285a 2.000 31.000 .754 
Wilks' Lambda .982 .285a 2.000 31.000 .754 
Hotelling's Trace .018 .285a 2.000 31.000 .754 
Roy's Largest Root .018 .285a 2.000 31.000 .754 
Week * Age * Load Pillai's Trace .057 .942a 2.000 31.000 .401 
Wilks' Lambda .943 .942a 2.000 31.000 .401 
Hotelling's Trace .061 .942a 2.000 31.000 .401 
Roy's Largest Root .061 .942a 2.000 31.000 .401 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + Age + Load + Age * Load Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
!
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of 
b. Design: Intercept Age * Load 
Within Subjects +esign: Age + Week Load 
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an identity matrix. 
If Within-Subjects Effects table. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Week Sphericity Assumed 1.615 2 .807 1.494 .232 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.615 1.303 1.239 1.494 .234 
Huynh-Feldt 1.615 1.463 1.104 1.494 .235 
Lower-bound 1.615 1.000 1.615 1.494 .231 
Week * Age Sphericity Assumed .931 2 .465 .861 .428 
Greenhouse-Geisser .931 1.303 .714 .861 .387 
Huynh-Feldt .931 1.463 .636 .861 .398 
Lower-bound .931 1.000 .931 .861 .360 
Week * Load Sphericity Assumed .547 2 .273 .506 .605 
Greenhouse-Geisser .547 1.303 .420 .506 .529 
Huynh-Feldt .547 1.463 .374 .506 .549 
Lower-bound .547 1.000 .547 .506 .482 
Week * Age * Load Sphericity Assumed .282 2 .141 .261 .771 
Greenhouse-Geisser .282 1.303 .217 .261 .674 
Huynh-Feldt .282 1.463 .193 .261 .701 
Lower-bound .282 1.000 .282 .261 .613 
Error(Week) Sphericity Assumed 34.588 64 .540   
Greenhouse-Geisser 34.588 41.699 .829   
Huynh-Feldt 34.588 46.818 .739   
Lower-bound 34.588 32.000 1.081   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sourc 
e Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Week Linear 
Quadratic 
1.483 
.132 
1 
1 
1.483 
.132 
1.934 
.420 
.174 
.522 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Week * Age Linear .889 1 .889 1.159 .290 
Quadratic .042 1 .042 .133 .718 
Week * Load Linear .446 1 .446 .581 .451 
Quadratic .101 1 .101 .321 .575 
Week * Age * Load Linear .056 1 .056 .072 .790 
Quadratic .227 1 .227 .723 .402 
Error(Week) Linear 24.543 32 .767   
Quadratic 10.045 32 .314   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Aver 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 1162.520 1 1162.520 112.111 .000 
Age 49.343 1 49.343 4.759 .037 
Load 14.569 1 14.569 1.405 .245 
Age * Load 1.565 1 1.565 .151 .700 
Error 331.819 32 10.369   !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
  
95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.281 .310 2.650 3.912 !
2. Age 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
3.957 
2.605 
.438 
.438 
3.064 
1.712 
4.849 
3.498 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old 1.352 .620 .037 .090 2.614 
Old Young -1.352 .620 .037 -2.614 -.090 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
16.448 
110 ROR 
1 
32 
16.448 
3 45R 
4.759 .037 !
The F tests theeffect of Age. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. Load 
Estimates 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 
High 
3.648 
2.914 
.438 
.438 
2.756 
2.021 
4.541 
3.806 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Load Load 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low High .735 .620 .245 -.528 1.997 
High Low -.735 .620 .245 -1.997 .528 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
4.856 
110 ROR 
1 
32 
4.856 
3 45R 
1.405 .245 
The F tests theeffect of Load. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
4. Week 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
k Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 3.449 .321 2.794 4.104 
2 3.231 .339 2.542 3.921 
3 3.162 .316 2.518 3.806 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Wee Wee 
k k k 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .218 .198 .842 -.283 .719 
3 .287 .206 .522 -.234 .809 
2 1 -.218 .198 .842 -.719 .283 
3 .069 .090 1.000 -.159 .298 
3 1 -.287 .206 .522 -.809 .234 
2 -.069 .090 1.000 -.298 .159 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .061 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Wilks' lambda 939 •999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Hotelling's trace .064 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Roy's largest root .064 .999a 2.000 31.000 .380 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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5. Age * Load 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 
High 
4.444 
3.469 
.620 
.620 
3.182 
2.207 
5.707 
4.731 
Old Low 
High 
2.852 
2.358 
.620 
.620 
1.590 
1.096 
4.114 
3.620 !
6. Age *Week 
Measure:MEA SURE 1 
Wee 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age k Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 4.028 .454 3.102 4.954 
2 3.880 .479 2.904 4.855 
3 3.963 .447 3.052 4.874 
Old 1 2. 870 .454 1.945 3 .796 
2 2.583 .479 1.608 3.559 
3 2.361 .447 1.450 3.272 !
7. Load * Week Measure 
:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Load k Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 1 3.917 .454 2.991 4.842 
2 3.556 .479 2.580 4.531 
3 3.472 .447 2.561 4.383 
High 1 2.981 .454 2.056 3.907 
2 2.907 .479 1.932 3.883 
3 2.852 .447 1.941 3.763 !
8. Age * Load * Week Measure 
:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age Load k Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 1 4.611 .643 3.302 5.920 
2 4.389 .677 3.009 5.769 
3 4.333 .633 3.045 5.622 
High 1 3.444 .643 2.135 4.754 
2 3.370 .677 1.991 4.750 
3 3.593 .633 2.304 4.881 
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8. Age * Load * Week Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age Load k Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Old Low 1 3.222 .643 1.913 4.531 
2 2.722 .677 1.342 4.102 
3 2.611 .633 1.322 3.900 
High 1 2.519 .643 1.209 3.828 
2 2.444 .677 1.065 3.824 
3 2.111 .633 .822 3.400 !
SET 2 
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 2\Results\ St2-OVERALL.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
k 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 
S2W1 
S2W2 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Age 1 Young 18 
2 Old 18 
Load 1 Low 18 
2 High 18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
S2W1 Young Low 3.4444 2.11312 9 
High 4.6296 .73493 9 
Total 4.0370 1.65146 18 
Old Low 3.3889 2.10324 9 
High 2.4444 1.77169 9 
Total 2.9167 1.94806 18 
Total Low 3.4167 2.04544 18 
High 3.5370 1.73069 18 
Total 3.4769 1.86835 36 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
S2W2 Young Low 3.5000 1.71391 9 
High 3.9259 1.42183 9 
Total 3.7130 1.54328 18 
Old Low 2.7222 2.33333 9 
High 1.4815 1.72491 9 
Total 2.1019 2.09039 18 
Total Low 3.1111 2.02598 18 
High 2.7037 1.98323 18 
Total 2.9074 1.98664 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Week Pillai's Trace .151 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Wilks' Lambda .849 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Hotelling's Trace .178 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Roy's Largest Root .178 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Week * Age Pillai's Trace .032 1.055a 1.000 32.000 .312 
Wilks' Lambda .968 1.055a 1.000 32.000 .312 
Hotelling's Trace .033 1.055a 1.000 32.000 .312 
Roy's Largest Root .033 1.055a 1.000 32.000 .312 
Week * Load Pillai's Trace .037 1.220a 1.000 32.000 .278 
Wilks' Lambda .963 1.220a 1.000 32.000 .278 
Hotelling's Trace .038 1.220a 1.000 32.000 .278 
Roy's Largest Root .038 1.220a 1.000 32.000 .278 
Week * Age * Load Pillai's Trace .007 •235a 1.000 32.000 .631 
Wilks' Lambda .993 .235a 1.000 32.000 .631 
Hotelling's Trace .007 •235a 1.000 32.000 .631 
Roy's Largest Root .007 •235a 1.000 32.000 .631 
a. Exact statistic b. Design: Intercept + Age + Load + Age * Load Within Subjects Design: Week 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
!
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of 
b. Design: Intercept Age * Load 
Within Subjects +esign: Age + Week Load 
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an identity matrix. 
If Within-Subjects Effects table. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Week Sphericity Assumed 5.837 1 5.837 5.681 .023 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5.837 1.000 5.837 5.681 .023 
Huynh-Feldt 5.837 1.000 5.837 5.681 .023 
Lower-bound 5.837 1.000 5.837 5.681 .023 
Week * Age Sphericity Assumed 1.084 1 1.084 1.055 .312 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.084 1.000 1.084 1.055 .312 
Huynh-Feldt 1.084 1.000 1.084 1.055 .312 
Lower-bound 1.084 1.000 1.084 1.055 .312 
Week * Load Sphericity Assumed 1.253 1 1.253 1.220 .278 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.253 1.000 1.253 1.220 .278 
Huynh-Feldt 1.253 1.000 1.253 1.220 .278 
Lower-bound 1.253 1.000 1.253 1.220 .278 
Week * Age * Load Sphericity Assumed .241 1 .241 .235 .631 
Greenhouse-Geisser .241 1.000 .241 .235 .631 
Huynh-Feldt .241 1.000 .241 .235 .631 
Lower-bound .241 1.000 .241 .235 .631 
Error(Week) Sphericity Assumed 32.877 32 1.027   
Greenhouse-Geisser 32.877 32.000 1.027   
Huynh-Feldt 32.877 32.000 1.027   
Lower-bound 32.877 32.000 1.027   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Source Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Week Linear 5.837 1 5.837 5.681 .023 
Week * Age Linear 1.084 1 1.084 1.055 .312 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Source Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Week * Load Linear 1.253 1 1.253 1.220 .278 
Week * Age * Load Linear .241 1 .241 .235 .631 
Error(Week) Linear 32.877 32 1.027   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Aver 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 733.658 1 733.658 134.387 .000 
Age 33.574 1 33.574 6.150 .019 
Load .371 1 .371 .068 .796 
Age * Load 16.213 1 16.213 2.970 .094 
Error 174.698 32 5.459   !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
  
95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.192 .275 2.631 3.753 !
2. Age 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
3.875 
2.509 
.389 
.389 
3.082 
1.716 
4.668 
3.302 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old 1.366 .551 .019 .244 2.488 
Old Young -1.366 .551 .019 -2.488 -.244 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
16.787 
R7 349 
1 
32 
16.787 
2 730 
6.150 .019 !
The F tests theeffect of Age. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. Load 
Estimates 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 
High 
3.264 
3.120 
.389 
.389 
2.471 
2.327 
4.057 
3.914 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Load Load 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low High .144 .551 .796 -.978 1.265 
High Low -.144 .551 .796 -1.265 .978 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
.185 
85 
R7 349 
1 
32 
.185 
2 73n 
.068 .796 
The F tests the of Load. This test is basedon the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
4. Week 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
k Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
3.477 
2.907 
.295 
.305 
2.875 
2.287 
4.079 
3.528 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Wee Wee 
k k 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .569 .239 .023 .083 1.056 
2 1 -.569 .239 .023 -1.056 -.083 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .151 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Wilks'lambda .849 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Hotelling's trace .178 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Roy's largest root .178 5.681 a 1.000 32.000 .023 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
! Page i 
5. Age * Load 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 
High 
3.472 
4.278 
.551 
.551 
2.350 
3.156 
4.594 
5.400 
Old Low 
High 3.056 
1.963 
.551 
.551 
1.934 
.841 
4.177 
3.085 !
6. Age * Week Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
Age k Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.037 
3.713 
.418 
.431 
3.186 
2.835 
4.888 
4.591 
Old 1 
2 
2.917 
2.102 
.418 
.431 
2.066 
1.224 
3.768 
2.980 !
7. Load * Week Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
Load k Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 1 
2 
3.417 
3.111 
.418 
.431 
2.566 
2.233 
4.268 
3.989 
High 1 
2 
3.537 
2.704 
.418 
.431 
2.686 
1.826 
4.388 
3.582 !
8. Age * Load * Week Measure:MEASURE 1 
Wee 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age Load k Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 1 3.444 .591 2.241 4.648 
2 3.500 .610 2.258 4.742 
High 1 4.630 .591 3.426 5.833 
2 3.926 .610 2.684 5.168 
Old Low 1 
3.389 
.591 2.185 4.592 
2 2.722 .610 1.480 3.964 
High 1 2.444 .591 1.241 3.648 
2 1.481 .610 .240 2.723 !
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Set 1 
[DataSetO] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 2\Results\ St2-OVERALLtime.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
ion 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 
3 
SiWi 
S1 W2 
S1 W3 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Age 1 Young 18 
2 Old 18 
Load 1 Low 18 
2 High 18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load Mean Std. Deviation N 
S1 W1 Young Low 1.9535 1.08365 9 
High 2.4255 1.49277 9 
Total 2.1895 1.28850 18 
Old Low 5.6619 3.54333 9 
High 4.9528 1.90098 9 
Total 5.3074 2.78245 18 
Total Low 3.8077 3.17826 18 
High 3.6891 2.10712 18 
Total 3.7484 2.65829 36 
S1 W2 Young Low 2.0987 .91004 9 
High 1.7964 .38866 9 
Total 1.9475 .69642 18 
Old Low 4.3269 1.31197 9 
High 4.8238 1.74213 9 
Total 4.5754 1.51777 18 
Total Low 3.2128 1.58556 18 
High 3.3101 1.98127 18 
Total 3.2614 1.76923 36 
S1 W3 Young Low 1.9337 .86089 9 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
51 W3 Young High 2.3611 1.09995 9 
Total 2.1474 .98309 18 
Old Low 4.5474 .94862 9 
High 4.5764 1.49543 9 
Total 4.5619 1.21494 18 
Total Low 3.2405 1.60638 18 
High 3.4687 1.70904 18 
Total 3.3546 1.63873 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Session Pillai's Trace .091 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Wilks' Lambda .909 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Hotelling's Trace .100 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Roy's Largest Root .100 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Session * Age Pillai's Trace .033 .531 a 2.000 31.000 .593 
Wilks' Lambda .967 .531 a 2.000 31.000 .593 
Hotelling's Trace .034 .531 a 2.000 31.000 .593 
Roy's Largest Root .034 .531 a 2.000 31.000 .593 
Session * Load Pillai's Trace .009 .134a 2.000 31.000 .875 
Wilks' Lambda .991 .134a 2.000 31.000 .875 
Hotelling's Trace .009 .134a 2.000 31.000 .875 
Roy's Largest Root .009 .134a 2.000 31.000 .875 
Session * Age * Load Pillai's Trace .152 2.769a 2.000 31.000 .078 
Wilks' Lambda .848 2.769a 2.000 31.000 .078 
Hotelling's Trace .179 2.769a 2.000 31.000 .078 
Roy's Largest Root .179 2.769a 2.000 31.000 .078 
a. Exact statistic b. Design: Intercept + Age + Load + Age * Load Within Subjects Design: Session 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
!
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of 
b. Design: Intercept + Age + Load + Age * Load Within Subjects Design: Session 
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an identity matrix. 
If Within-Subjects Effects table. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Session Sphericity Assumed 4.811 2 2.405 1.771 .178 
Greenhouse-Geisser 4.811 1.453 3.310 1.771 .188 
Huynh-Feldt 4.811 1.647 2.921 1.771 .185 
Lower-bound 4.811 1.000 4.811 1.771 .193 
Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 2.341 2 1.171 .862 .427 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2.341 1.453 1.611 .862 .397 
Huynh-Feldt 2.341 1.647 1.421 .862 .409 
Lower-bound 2.341 1.000 2.341 .862 .360 
Session * Load Sphericity Assumed .552 2 .276 .203 .817 
Greenhouse-Geisser .552 1.453 .380 .203 .745 
Huynh-Feldt .552 1.647 .335 .203 .774 
Lower-bound .552 1.000 .552 .203 .655 
Session * Age * Load Sphericity Assumed 4.477 2 2.238 1.648 .201 
Greenhouse-Geisser 4.477 1.453 3.080 1.648 .207 
Huynh-Feldt 4.477 1.647 2.718 1.648 .205 
Lower-bound 4.477 1.000 4.477 1.648 .208 
Error(Session) Sphericity Assumed 86.926 64 1.358   
Greenhouse-Geisser 86.926 46.506 1.869   
Huynh-Feldt 86.926 52.713 1.649   
Lower-bound 86.926 32.000 2.716   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Session Linear 
Quadratic 
2.791 
2.020 
1 
1 
2.791 
2.020 
1.374 
2.948 
.250 
.096 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Source Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Session * Age Linear 2.226 1 2.226 1.096 .303 
Quadratic .115 1 .115 .168 .685 
Session * Load Linear .541 1 .541 .266 .609 
Quadratic .011 1 .011 .016 .901 
Session * Age * Load Linear .689 1 .689 .339 .564 
Quadratic 3.787 1 3.787 5.527 .025 
Error(Session) Linear 65.000 32 2.031   
Quadratic 21.925 32 .685   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Aver 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 1289.070 1 1289.070 264.037 .000 
Age 199.766 1 199.766 40.918 .000 
Load .128 1 .128 .026 .872 
Age * Load .457 1 .457 .094 .762 
Error 156.229 32 4.882   !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
  
95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.455 .213 3.022 3.888 !
2. Age 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
2.095 
4.815 
.301 
.301 
1.482 
4.202 
2.707 
5.427 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -2.720 .425 .000 -3.586 -1.854 
Old Young 2.720 ~ .425 .000 1.854 3.586 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
66.589 
52 07R 
1 
32 
66.589 
1 R27 
40.918 .000 !
The F tests theeffect of Age. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. Load 
Estimates 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 
High 
3.420 
3.489 
.301 
.301 
2.808 
2.877 
4.033 
4.102 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Load Load 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low High -.069 .425 .872 -.935 .797 
High Low .069 .425 .872 -.797 .935 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
.043 
52 07R 
1 
32 
.043 
1 R27 
.026 .872 
The F tests the effect of Load. This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
4. Session 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 3.748 .369 2.997 4.499 
2 3.261 .200 2.855 3.668 
3 3.355 .188 2.972 3.737 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Sess Sess 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
 
a 
  
ion ion J) Std. Error Siq. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .487 .284 .287 -.229 1.203 
3 .394 .336 .749 -.455 1.242 
2 1 -.487 .284 .287 -1.203 .229 
3 -.093 .182 1.000 -.553 .367 
3 1 -.394 .336 .749 -1.242 .455 
2 .093 .182 1.000 -.367 .553 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .091 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Wilks' lambda .909 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Hotelling's trace .100 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Roy's largest root .100 1.551 a 2.000 31.000 .228 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Session. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
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5. Age * Load 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 
High 
1.995 
2.194 
.425 
.425 
1.129 
1.328 
2.861 
3.060 
Old Low 
High 
4.845 
4.784 
.425 
.425 3.979 
3.918 
5.712 
5.650 !
6. Age * Session 
Measure:MEA SURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 2.189 .521 1.127 3.251 
2 1.948 .282 1.373 2.522 
3 2.147 .266 1.606 2.689 
Old 1 5.307 .521 4.245 6.369 
2 4.575 .282 4.000 5.150 
3 4.562 .266 4.020 5.103 !
7. Load * Session Measure 
:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Load ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 1 
3.808 
.521 2.746 4.870 
2 3.213 .282 2.638 3.788 
3 3.241 .266 2.699 3.782 
High 1 
3.689 
.521 2.627 4.751 
2 3.310 .282 2.735 3.885 
3 3.469 .266 2.927 4.010 !
8. Age * Load * Session 
Measure :MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age Load ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 1 1.953 .737 .452 3.455 
2 2.099 .399 1.286 2.912 
3 1.934 .376 1.168 2.699 
High 1 2.426 .737 .924 3.927 
2 1.796 .399 .983 2.609 
3 2.361 .376 1.595 3.127 
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8. Age * Load * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age Load ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Old Low 1 5.662 .737 4.160 7.164 
2 4.327 .399 3.514 5.140 
3 4.547 .376 3.782 5.313 
High 1 4.953 .737 3.451 6.455 
2 4.824 .399 4.011 5.637 
3 4.576 .376 3.811 5.342 !
> 
%&'!(!
[DataSetO] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 2\Results\ St2-OVERALLtime.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
ion 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 
S2W1 
S2W2 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 
Value Label N 
Age 1 Young 18 
2 Old 18 
Load 1 Low 18 
2 High 18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load Mean Std. Deviation N 
S2W1 Young Low 2.6562 1.70859 9 
High 1.8237 .79984 9 
Total 2.2400 1.36318 18 
Old Low 4.7191 3.01766 9 
High 5.0685 .93414 9 
Total 4.8938 2.17446 18 
Total Low 3.6876 2.60490 18 
High 3.4461 1.87048 18 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Load Mean Std. Deviation N 
S2W1 Total Total 3.5669 2.23834 36 
S2W2 Young Low 2.0920 .51447 9 
High 1.9699 .71320 9 
Total 2.0309 .60652 18 
Old Low 4.7353 2.58967 
9 
High 6.3134 2.65194 9 
Total 5.5244 2.66923 18 
Total Low 3.4136 2.26495 18 
High 4.1417 2.92285 18 
Total 3.7776 2.60336 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Session Pillai's Trace .007 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Wilks' Lambda .993 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Hotelling's Trace .007 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Roy's Largest Root .007 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Session * Age Pillai's Trace .026 .860a 1.000 32.000 .361 
Wilks' Lambda .974 .860a 1.000 32.000 .361 
Hotelling's Trace .027 .860a 1.000 32.000 .361 
Roy's Largest Root .027 .860a 1.000 32.000 .361 
Session * Load Pillai's Trace .035 1.146a 1.000 32.000 .292 
Wilks' Lambda .965 1.146a 1.000 32.000 .292 
Hotelling's Trace .036 1.146a 1.000 32.000 .292 
Roy's Largest Root .036 1.146a 1.000 32.000 .292 
Session * Age * Load Pillai's Trace .003 .082a 1.000 32.000 .777 
Wilks' Lambda .997 .082a 1.000 32.000 .777 
Hotelling's Trace .003 .082a 1.000 32.000 .777 
Roy's Largest Root .003 .082a 1.000 32.000 .777 
a. Exact statistic b. Design: Intercept + Age +Load + Age * Load Within Subjects Design:Session 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
!
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of 
b. Design: Intercept + Age + Load + Age * Load Within Subjects Design: 
Session 
! Page i 
an identity matrix. 
If Within-Subjects Effects table. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Session Sphericity Assumed .800 1 .800 .217 .645 
Greenhouse-Geisser .800 1.000 .800 .217 .645 
Huynh-Feldt .800 1.000 .800 .217 .645 
Lower-bound .800 1.000 .800 .217 .645 
Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 3.172 1 3.172 .860 .361 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3.172 1.000 3.172 .860 .361 
Huynh-Feldt 3.172 1.000 3.172 .860 .361 
Lower-bound 3.172 1.000 3.172 .860 .361 
Session * Load Sphericity Assumed 4.230 1 4.230 1.146 .292 
Greenhouse-Geisser 4.230 1.000 4.230 1.146 .292 
Huynh-Feldt 4.230 1.000 4.230 1.146 .292 
Lower-bound 4.230 1.000 4.230 1.146 .292 
Session * Age * Load Sphericity Assumed .302 1 .302 .082 .777 
Greenhouse-Geisser .302 1.000 .302 .082 .777 
Huynh-Feldt .302 1.000 .302 .082 .777 
Lower-bound .302 1.000 .302 .082 .777 
Error(Session) Sphericity Assumed 118.084 32 
3.690 
  
Greenhouse-Geisser 118.084 32.000 3.690   
Huynh-Feldt 118.084 32.000 3.690   
Lower-bound 118.084 32.000 3.690   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Sessi 
Source on 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Session Linear .800 1 .800 .217 .645 
Session *Age Linear 3.172 1 3.172 .860 .361 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Sessi 
Source on 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Session * Load Linear 4.230 1 4.230 1.146 .292 
Session * Age * Load Linear .302 1 .302 .082 .777 
Error(Session) Linear 118.084 32 3.690   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Aver 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 970.961 1 970.961 292.239 
.000 
Age 170.049 1 170.049 51.181 .000 
Load 1.065 1 1.065 .321 .575 
Age * Load 9.346 1 9.346 2.813 .103 
Error 106.320 32 3.322   !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
  
95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.672 .215 3.235 4.110 !
2. Age 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
2.135 
5.209 
.304 
.304 
1.517 
4.590 
2.754 
5.828 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error %")*+! Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -3.074 .430 .000 -3.949 -2.198 
Old Young 3.074 ~ .430 .000 2.198 3.949 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
85.025 , - !./0! .!-(! 85.025 .!/1.! 51.181 .000 !
The F tests theeffect of Age. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. Load 
Estimates 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 
High 
3.551 
3.794 
.304 
.304 
2.932 
3.175 
4.169 
4.413 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Load Load 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error %")*+! Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low High -.243 .430 .575 -1.118 .632 
High Low .243 .430 .575 -.632 1.118 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
! Page i 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F %")*!
Contrast 
Prrnr 
.533 
9:(./0! .!:;( .533 .!/1.! .321 .575 
The F tests the effect of Load. This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
4. Session 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
3.567 
3.778 
.307 
.317 
2.942 
3.131 
4.191 
4.424 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Sess Sess 
ion ion 
Mean 
Difference (l- 
J) 
Std. Error *<=/>( Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.211 .453 .645 -1.133 .712 
2 1 .211 .453 .645 -.712 1.133 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df *<=/(
Pillars trace .007 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Wilks'lambda 993 •217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Hotelling's trace .007 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Roy's largest root .007 .217a 1.000 32.000 .645 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Session. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. Age * Load 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Load Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 
High 
2.374 
1.897 
.430 
.430 
1.499 
1.022 
3.249 
2.772 
Old Low 
High 
4.727 
5.691 
.430 
.430 
3.852 
4.816 
5.602 
6.566 
!6. Age * Session 
Sess 
Age ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
2.240 
2.031 
.434 
.449 
1.357 
1.116 
3.123 
2.945 
Old 1 
2 
4.894 
5.524 
.434 
.449 
4.011 
4.610 
5.777 
6.439 !
7. Load * Session Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
Load ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Low 1 
2 3.688 
3.414 
.434 
.449 
2.804 
2.499 
4.571 
4.328 
High 1 
2 
3.446 
4.142 
.434 
.449 
2.563 
3.227 
4.329 
5.056 !
8. Age * Load * Session Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age Load ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Low 1 2.656 .613 1.407 3.905 
2 2.092 .635 .799 3.385 
High 1 1.824 .613 .575 3.073 
2 1.970 .635 .677 3.263 
Old Low 1 4.719 .613 3.470 
5.968 
2 4.735 .635 3.442 6.029 
High 1 
5.069 
.613 3.819 6.318 
2 6.313 .635 5.020 7.607 !
  
!!
C2: Study 2 (Chapter 5) – Tiles 
 
SET1 
Notes 
18-Jan-2012 08:25:27 
/Users/jjnicholson/Dropbox/Ph D/Study 
4/Results/St4-Datasheet-Attem pts.sav 
DataSetl <none> 
<none> <none> 
36 
User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the model. 
GLM S1 S1 S2S1 S3S1 S1 D1 S2D1 S3D1 BY Age 
/WSFACTOR=Grid 2 Polynomial Week 3 Polynomial 
IMETHOD=SSTYPE(3) /EMMEANS=TAB 
LES(OVERALL) /EMMEANS=TAB LES(Age) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TAB LES(G rid) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TAB 
LES(Week) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(Age*Grid) /EMMEANS=TAB 
LES(Age*Week) /EMMEANS=TAB LES(G rid*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(A a*Grid*Week) /IRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P H A(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=Grid Week Grid*Week 
/DESIGN=Age. 
00:00:00.122 00:00:01.000 
!Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time !
!Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Grid Week 
Dependent 
Var iable 
1 1 S1S1 
 2 S251 
 3 S351 
2 
1 2 S2D1 
 
3 S3D1 !
Between-Subjects Factors Factors 
 Value Label  N 
Age 1 
2 
Young 
Old 
18 
18 !
Descr ipt ive pt ive Stat ist ics 
Age 
Mean 
Std.  
Deviat ion 
N 
S1-S1 Young 4.89 .471 18 
Old 4.39 1.195 18 
Total  4.64 .931 36 
S2-S1 Young 4.78 .428 18 
Old 3.11 2.374 18 
Total  3.94 1.881 36 
S3-S1 Young 3.78 1.629 18 
Old 2.44 2.357 18 
Total  3.11 2.108 36 
S1-D1 Young 5.00 .000 18 
Old 4.67 .970 18 
Total  4.83 .697 36 
S2-D1 Young 4.56 1.149 18 
Old 3.17 2.176 18 
Total  3.86 1.854 36 
S3-D1 Young 4.28 1.487 18 
Old 2.72 2.296 18 
Total  3.50 2.063 36 
!Mult ivar iate Testsb  
Effect  
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Gr id Pi l lars Trace .023 .800d  1.000 34.000 .377 
Wilks '  Lambda .977 .800a  1.000 34.000 .377 
Hotel l ing's Trace .024 .800a  1.000 34.000 .377 
Roy's Largest Root .024 .800a  1.000 34.000 .377 
Grid *  Age Pi l lars Trace .001 .040a  1.000 34.000 .844 
Wilks '  Lambda .999 .040a  1.000 34.000 .844 
Hotel l ing's Trace .001 .040a  1.000 34.000 .844 
Roy's Largest Root .001 .040a  1.000 34.000 .844 
Week Pi l lars Trace .422 12.042d  2.000 33.000 .000 
Wilks '  Lambda .578 12.042a  2.000 33.000 .000 
Hotel l ing's Trace .730 12.042a  2.000 33.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .730 12.042a  2.000 33.000 .000 
Week *Age Pi l lars Trace .161 3.168d  2.000 33.000 .055 
Wilks '  Lambda .839 3.168a  2.000 33.000 .055 
Hotel l ing's Trace .192 3.168a  2.000 33.000 .055 
Roy's Largest Root .192 3.168a  2.000 33.000 .055 
Grid *  Week Pi l lars Trace .046 .787d  2.000 33.000 .464 
Wilks '  Lambda .954 .787a  2.000 33.000 .464 
Hotel l ing's Trace .048 .787a  2.000 33.000 .464 
Roy's Largest Root .048 .787a  2.000 33.000 .464 
Grid *  Week * Age Pi l lars Trace .015 .256d  2.000 33.000 .775 
Wilks '  Lambda .985 .256a  2.000 33.000 .775 
Hotel l ing's Trace .016 .256a  2.000 33.000 .775 
Roy's Largest Root 
.016 .256a  2.000 33.000 .775 
a.  Exact stat ist ic 
b.  Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: Grid + Week + Grid * 
Week 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb  
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Within Subjects Effect      
EP si lona  
 
Mauchly 's W 
Approx. Chi-  
Square 
df  Sig.  
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt  
Lower- 
bound 
Grid 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Week .880 4.225 2 .121 .893 .967 .500 
Grid *  Week .992 .277 2 .871 .992 1.000 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proport ional  to an ident i ty matr ix.  
a.  May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of signif icance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of  Within-Subjects Effects table.  
b.  Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: Grid + Week + Grid * 
Week 
!Tests of  Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type I l l  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Gr id Spher ic i ty Assumed 1.500 1 1.500 .800 .377 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.500 1.000 1.500 .800 .377 
Huynh-Feldt  1.500 1.000 1.500 .800 .377 
Lower-bound 1.500 1.000 1.500 .800 .377 
Grid *  Age Spher ic i ty Assumed .074 1 .074 .040 .844 
Greenhouse-Geisser .074 1.000 .074 .040 .844 
Huynh-Feldt  .074 1.000 .074 .040 .844 
Lower-bound .074 1.000 .074 .040 .844 
Error(Grid)  Spher ic i ty Assumed 63.759 34 1.875   
Greenhouse-Geisser 63.759 34.000 1.875   
Huynh-Feldt  63.759 34.000 1.875   
Lower-bound 63.759 34.000 1.875   
Week Spher ic i ty Assumed 74.343 2 37.171 14.678 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 74.343 1.785 41.638 14.678 .000 
Huynh-Feldt  74.343 1.933 38.456 14.678 .000 
Lower-bound 74.343 1.000 74.343 14.678 .001 
Week * Age Spher ic i ty Assumed 13.787 2 6.894 2.722 .073 
Greenhouse-Geisser 13.787 1.785 7.722 2.722 .080 
Huynh-Feldt  13.787 1.933 7.132 2.722 .075 
Lower-bound 13.787 1.000 13.787 2.722 .108 
Error(Week) Spher ic i ty Assumed 172.204 68 2.532   
Greenhouse-Geisser 172.204 60.705 2.837   
Huynh-Feldt  172.204 65.728 2.620   
Lower-bound 172.204 34.000 5.065   
Gr id *  Week Spher ic i ty Assumed 2.028 2 1.014 .873 .423 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2.028 1.983 1.022 .873 .422 
Huynh-Feldt  2.028 2.000 1.014 .873 .423 
Lower-bound 2.028 1.000 2.028 .873 .357 
Grid *  Week * Age Spher ic i ty Assumed .620 2 .310 .267 .767 
Greenhouse-Geisser .620 1.983 .313 .267 .765 
Huynh-Feldt  .620 2.000 .310 .267 .767 
Lower-bound .620 1.000 .620 .267 .609 
Error(Grid*Week) Spher ic i ty Assumed 79.019 68 1.162   
Greenhouse-Geisser 79.019 67.437 1.172   
Huynh-Feldt  79.019 68.000 1.162   
Lower-bound 79.019 34.000 2.324   
!Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source G Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Grid Linear 1.500 1 1.500 .800 .377 
Grid * Age Linear .074 1 .074 .040 .844 
Error(Grid) Linear 63.759 34 1.875   
Week Linear 
Quadratic 
73.674 
.669 
1 
1 
73.674 
.669 
22.452 
.375 
.000 
.544 
Week * Age Linear 
Quadratic 
9.507 
4.280 
1 
1 
9.507 
4.280 
2.897 
2.400 
.098 
.131 
Error(Week) Linear 
Quadratic 
111.569 
60.634 
34 
34 
3.281 
1.783 
  
Grid * Week Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
.340 
1.688 
1 
1 
.340 
1.688 
.321 
1.336 
.575 
.256 
Grid * Week * Age Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
.340 
.280 
1 
1 
.340 
.280 
.321 
.222 
.575 
.641 
Error(Grid*Week) Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
36.069 
42.949 
34 
34 
1.061 
1.263 
  !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Average 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 3424.074 1 3424.074 588.909 .000 
Age 68.907 1 68.907 11.851 .002 
Error 197.685 34 5.814 
  !
Est imated  Marg ina l  Means  
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
  95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.981 .164 3.648 4.315 !
2 .  Age  
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Age 
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
4.546 
3.417 
.232 
.232 
4.075 
2.945 
5.018 
3.888 
!Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) Age (J) Age 
   
95% Confidence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old 1.130 .328 .002 .463 1.796 
Old Young 
-1.130 .328 .002 -1.796 -.463 
Based on estimated mated marginal means *. The mean difference is signif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 11.485 1 11.485 11.851 .002 
Error 32.948 34 .969   
The F tests the of Age. Age. This test isbasedon the linearlyi independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
3. Grid 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Grid   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
3.898 
4 
.188 
.189 
3.516 
3.680 
4.280 
4.450 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
asure:MEASURE 1 
(I) G r i d ( J )  Grid 
   95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
.!t 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.167 .186 .377 -.545 .212 
2 1 .167 .186 .377 - .212 .545 
Based on estimated matedmarginal means a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Pil lars trace .023 .800d 1.000 34.000 .377 
Wilks' lambda .977 .800a 1.000 34.000 .377 
Hotell ing's trace .024 •800a 1.000 34.000 .377 
Roy's largest root 
.024 •800a 1.000 34.000 .377 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Grid. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
!Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 4.  .127 4.478 4.994 
2 3.903 .227 3.442 4.363 
3 3.306 .289 2.718 3.893 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
( I )  W e e k ( J )  Week 
   95% Conf idence Interval  for Di f ferencea  
 
Mean 
Dif ference ( I-  
. ! t  
Std.  Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .833 .221 .002 .276 1.390 
3 1.431 * .302 .000 .670 2.191 
2 1 - .833 .221 .002 -1.390 - . 2 7 6  
3 .597 .266 .095 - .074 1.268 
3 1 -1.431 .302 .000 - 2 . 1 9 1  - .670 
2 - .597 .266 .095 -1.268 .074 
Based on est imated matedmarginal  means *.  The mean di f ference is s igni f icant at  the 
a.  Adjustment for  mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni .  
Mul t ivar iate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Pi l lars t race .422 12.042d  2.000 33.000 .000 
Wilks '  lambda .578 1 2 . 0 4 e  2.000 33.000 .000 
Hotel l ing's t race .730 1 2 . 0 4 e  2.000 33.000 .000 
Roy's largest root 
.730 1 2 . 0 4 e  2.000 33.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the l inearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a.  Exact stat ist ic 
5. Age * Grid 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Age Grid 
Mean Std.  Error 
95% Conf idence Interval  
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.481 
4.611 
.266 
.268 
3.941 
4.067 
5.022 
5.155 
Old 1 
2 3.315 
3.519 
.266 
.268 
2.774 
2.974 
3.855 
4.063 
!6 . A g e *  Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Age Week   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 4.944 .179 4.580 5.309 
2 4.667 .321 4.015 5.318 
3 4.028 .409409 3.197 4.859 
Old 1 .528 4.528 .179 4.163 4.892 
2 3.139 .321 2.487 3.790 
3 2.583 .409 1.752 3.414 !
7. Grid *  Week 
Meure:MEASURE_1 ure:MEASURE 1 
Grid Week   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 4.639 .151 4.331 4.947 
2 3.944 .284 3.367 4.522 
3 3.111 .338 2.425 3.797 
2 1 4.833 .114 4.601 5.066 
2 3.861 .290 3.272 4.450 
3 3.500 .322 2.845 4.155 !
8. *  Gr id *  Week 
ure:MEASURE 1 
Age Grid   95%Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 1 4.889 .214 4.454 5.324 
2 4.778 .402 3.961 5.595 
3 3.778 .478 2.807 4.748 
2 1 5.000 .162 4.671 5.329 
2 4.556 .410 3.722 5.389 
3 4.278 .456 3.351 5.204 
Old 1 1 4.389 .214 3.954 4.824 
2 3.111 .402 2.294 3.928 
3 2.444 .478 1.474 3.415 
2 1 4.667 .162 4.338 4.995 
2 3.167 .410 2.333 4.000 
3 2.722 .456 1.796 3.649 !
GLM S2S2 S3S2 S2D2 S3D2BY Age /WSFACTOR=Grid Grid 2 PolynomialWeek 2 Polynomial 
/METHOD= SSTYPE(3) / EMMEANS= TABLES( ) /EMMEANS=TABLES(Age) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Grid) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TABLES(Week) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TABLES(Age*Grid) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Age*Week) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Grid*Week) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Age*Grid*Week) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=Grid Week Grid*Week 
/DESIGN=Age. 
!SET2 
Notes 
[DataSetl] /Users/jjnicholson/Dropbox/PhD/Study 4/Results/St4-Datasheet-Attempts.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Grid Week 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
1 
2 
S2S2 
S3S2 
2 1 
2 
S2D2 
53D2 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Label N 
Age 1 
2 
Young 
Old 
18 
18 
! 18-Jan-2012 08:28:12 
/Users/jjnicholson/Dropbox/Ph 
D/Study 4/Results/St4-Datasheet-
Attem pts.sav 
DataSetl 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
36 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases 
with valid data for all variables in 
the model. 
GLM S2S2 S3S2 S2D2 S3D2 BY 
Age 
/WSFACTOR=Grid 2 Polynomial 
Week 2 Polynomial 
IMETHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(OVERALL) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES(Age) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(G rid) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(Week) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(Age*Grid) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(Age*Week) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(G rid*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(Age*Grid*Week) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P H A(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=Grid Week Grid*Week 
/DESIGN=Age. 
00:00:00.028 00:00:00.000 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time !
!Descr ipt ive Stat ist ics 
Age 
Mean 
Std.  
Deviat ion 
N 
S2-S2 Young 4.83 .514 18 
Old 3.78 1.478 18 
Total  4.31 1.215 36 
S3-S2 Young 2.39 2.330 18 
Old 2.28 2.396 18 
Total  2.33 2.330 36 
S2-D2 Young 4.56 1.042 18 
Old 4.33 1.237 18 
Total  4.44 1.132 36 
S3-D2 Young 3.89 1.967 18 
Old 1.39 2.033 18 
Total  2.64 2.344 36 !
Mult ivar iate Testsb  
Effect  
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Gr id Pi l lars Trace .033 1.156d  1.000 34.000 .290 
Wilks '  Lambda .967 1.156a  1.000 34.000 .290 
Hotel l ing's Trace 034 1.156a  1.000 34.000 .290 
Roy's Largest Root 034 1.156a  1.000 34.000 .290 
Grid *  Age Pi l lars Trace .094 3.541a  1.000 34.000 .068 
Wilks '  Lambda .906 3.541a  1.000 34.000 .068 
Hotel l ing's Trace 104 3.541a  1.000 34.000 .068 
Roy's Largest Root 104 3.541a  1.000 34.000 .068 
Week Pi l lars Trace .550 41.570a  1.000 34.000 .000 
Wilks '  Lambda .450 41.570a  1.000 34.000 .000 
Hotel l ing's Trace 1.223 41.570a  1.000 34.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 1.223 41.570a  1.000 34.000 .000 
Week * Age Pi l lars Trace .037 1.295d  1.000 34.000 .263 
Wilks '  Lambda .963 1.295a  1.000 34.000 .263 
Hotel l ing's Trace 038 1.295a  1.000 34.000 .263 
Roy's Largest Root 038 1.295a  1.000 34.000 .263 
Grid *  Week Pi l lars Trace .005 .158d  1.000 34.000 .694 
Wilks '  Lambda .995 .158a  1.000 34.000 .694 
Hotel l ing's Trace .005 .158a  1.000 34.000 .694 
Roy's Largest Root .005 .158a  1.000 34.000 .694 
Grid *  Week * Age Pi l lars Trace .302 14.739d  1.000 34.000 .001 
Wilks '  Lambda .698 14.739a  1.000 34.000 .001 
Hotel l ing's Trace 434 14.739a  1.000 34.000 .001 
Roy's Largest Root 
.434 14.739a  1.000 34.000 .001 
a.  Exact stat ist ic 
b.  Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: Grid + Week + Grid * 
Week 
!Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb  
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Within Subjects Effect      E s i lon
a  
P 
  Approx.  Chi-    Greenhouse-  Lower- 
 Mauchly 's 
's  W 
Square df  Sig.  Geisser Huynh-Feldt  bound 
Grid 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Week 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Grid *  Week 1.000 .000 0 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tests thenul l  thatthe error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformeddependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a.  May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of signif icance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of  Within-Subjects Effects table.  
b.  Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: Grid + Week + Grid * 
Week 
Tests of  Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Gr id Spher ic i ty Assumed 1.778 1 1.778 1.156 .290 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.778 1.000 1.778 1.156 .290 
Huynh-Feldt  1.778 1.000 1.778 1.156 .290 
Lower-bound 1.778 1.000 1.778 1.156 .290 
Grid *  Age Spher ic i ty Assumed 5.444 1 5.444 3.541 .068 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5.444 1.000 5.444 3.541 .068 
Huynh-Feldt  5.444 1.000 5.444 3.541 .068 
Lower-bound 5.444 1.000 5.444 3.541 .068 
Error(Grid)  Spher ic i ty Assumed 52.278 34 1.538   
Greenhouse-Geisser 52.278 34.000 1.538   
Huynh-Feldt  52.278 34.000 1.538   
Lower-bound 52.278 34.000 1.538   
Week Spher ic i ty Assumed 128.444 1 128.444 41.570 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 128.444 1.000 128.444 41.570 .000 
Huynh-Feldt  128.444 1.000 128.444 41.570 .000 
Lower-bound 128.444 1.000 128.444 41.570 .000 
Week * Age Spher ic i ty Assumed 4.000 1 4.000 1.295 .263 
Greenhouse-Geisser 4.000 1.000 4.000 1.295 .263 
Huynh-Feldt  4.000 1.000 4.000 1.295 .263 
Lower-bound 4.000 1.000 4.000 1.295 .263 
Error(Week) Spher ic i ty Assumed 105.056 34 3.090   
Greenhouse-Geisser 105.056 34.000 3.090   
Huynh-Feldt  105.056 34.000 3.090   
Lower-bound 105.056 34.000 3.090   
Gr id *  Week Spher ic i ty Assumed .250 1 .250 .158 .694 
Greenhouse-Geisser .250 1.000 .250 .158 .694 
Huynh-Feldt  .250 1.000 .250 .158 .694 
Lower-bound .250 1.000 .250 .158 .694 
Grid *  Week * Age Spher ic i ty Assumed 23.361 1 23.361 14.739 .001 
Greenhouse-Geisser 23.361 1.000 23.361 14.739 .001 
Huynh-Feldt  23.361 1.000 23.361 14.739 .001 
Lower-bound 23.361 1.000 23.361 14.739 .001 
!Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square 
Error(Grid*Week) Sphericity Assumed 53.889 34 1.585 
Greenhouse-Geisser 53.889 34.000 1.585 
Huynh-Feldt 53.889 34.000 1.585 
Lower-bound 53.889 34.000 1.585 !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source G Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Grid Linear 1.778 1 1.778 1.156 .290 
Grid * Age Linear 5.444 1 5.444 3.541 .068 
Error(Grid) Linear 52.278 34 1.538   
Week Linear 128.444 1 128.444 41.570 .000 
Week *Age Linear 4.000 1 4.000 1.295 .263 
Error(Week) Linear 105.056 34 3.090   
Grid * Week Linear Linear .250 1 .250 .158 .694 
Grid * Week * Age Linear Linear 23.361 1 23.361 14.739 .001 
Error(Grid*Week) Linear Linear 53.889 34 1.585   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Average 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 1694.694 1 1694.694 286.982 .000 
Age 34.028 1 34.028 5.762 .022 
Error 200.778 34 5.905 
  !
Est imated  Marg ina l  Means  ns  
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
  95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
3.431 .203 3.019 3.842 !
2 .  Age  
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Age 
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
3.917 
2.944 
.286 
.286 
3.335 
2.362 
4.499 
3.526 
!Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) Age (J) Age 
   
95% Confidence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old .972 .405 .022 .149 1.795 
Old Young 
-.972 .405 .022 -1.795 - . 1 4 9  
Based on estimated mated marginal means *. The mean difference is signif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 
Error 
8.507 
50.194 
1 
34 
8.507 
1.476 
5.762 .022 
The F tests theeffectof Age. This test is basedon the l inearly independent ndependent pairwise comparisons among the 
estimated marginal means. 
3. Grid 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Grid   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
3.319 
3 
.245 
.208 
2.821 
3.119 
3.817 
3.965 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
asure:MEASURE 1 
(I) G r i d ( J )  Grid 
   95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
.!t 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.222 .207 .290 -.642 .198 
2 1 .222 .207 .290 - .198 .642 
Based on estimated matedmarginal means a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Pil lars trace .033 1.156d 1.000 34.000 .290 
Wilks' lambda .967 1.156a 1.000 34.000 .290 
Hotell ing's trace .034 1.156a 1.000 34.000 .290 
Roy's largest root 
.034 1.156a 1.000 34.000 .290 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Grid. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
!Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 4.375 
2.486 
.139 
.325 
4.093 
1.825 
4.657 
3.147 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) Week (J) Week 
   
95% Confidence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
.!t 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 1.889 .293 .000 1.294 2.484 
2 1 -1.889 .293 .000 -2.484 -1.294 
Based on estimated mated marginal means *. The mean difference is signif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Pil lars trace .550 41.570d 1.000 34.000 .000 
Wilks' lambda .450 41.570a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Hotell ing's trace 1.223 41.570a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Roy's largest root 
1.223 41.570a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. Age * Grid 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Age Grid 
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
3.611 
4.222 
.347 
. 294 
2.907 
3.624 
4.315 
4.820 
Old 1 
2 
3.028 
2.861 
.347 
.294 
2.323 
2.263 
3.732 
3.459 !
6. Age * Week 
Meure:MEASURE_1 ure:MEASURE 1 
Age Week 
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.694 
3.139 
.196 
.460 
4.296 
2.204 
5.093 
4.073 
Old 1 
2 
4.056 
1.833 
.196 
.460 
3.657 
.899 
4.454 
2.768 
! Page i 
7. Grid * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Grid Week   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 
2 
4.306 
2.333 
.18484 
.394 
3.931 
1.533 
4.680 
3.134 
2 1 
2 
4.444 
2.639 
.191 
.333 
4.057 
1.961 
4.832 
3.316 !
8. *  Gr id *Week as 
ure:MEASURE 1 
Age G r i d W e e k    95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 1 4.833 .261 4.303 5.363 
2 2.389 .557 1.257 3.521 
2 1 4.556 .269 4.008 5.103 
2 3.889 .472 2.931 4.847 
Old 1 1 3.778 .261 3.248 4.308 
2 2.278 .557 1.146 3.410 
2 1 4.333 .269 3.786 4.881 
2 1.389 .472 .431 2.347 
!
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!
C3: Study 3 (Chapter 6) – Traditional GAS 
 
SET 1 
General Linear Model 
Notes 
2011-02-10T08:46:53.704 
C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My 
Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 
1 \Results\Spreadsheet-Attempts. sav 
DataSetl 
<none> <none> 
<none> 36 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the model. 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
! Page i 
Notes 
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 1\Results\ Spreadsheet-Attempts.sav 
Warnings 
Post hoc tests are not performed for Age because there are fewer than three groups. 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m 
Sess 
ion 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
1 
2 
3 
S1 F1 
52F1 
53F1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
S1 P1 
52P1 
53P1 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 
Value Label N 
Age 1 
2 
Young 
Old 
18 
18 
! Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
GLM S1 F1 S2F1 S3F1 S1 P1 S2P1 
S3P1 BY Age 
/WSFACTOR=System 2 Polynomial 
Session 3 Polynomial 
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/POSTHOC=Age(TUKEY) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(OVERALL) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(Agge) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(System) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(Session) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Age" System) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(A e" Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(System*Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
Age*System" Session 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P HA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=System Session 
System*Session 
/DESIGN=Age. 
0:00:00.140 0:00:00.169 
! Page i 
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
S1 F1 Young 
5.0000 .00000 
18 
Old 5.0000 .00000 18 
Total 5.0000 .00000 36 
S2F1 Young 
5.0000 .00000 
18 
Old 4.9444 .23570 18 
Total 4.9722 .16667 36 
S3F1 Young 4.6111 1.19503 18 
Old 4.1667 1.58114 18 
Total 4.3889 1.39955 36 
S1 P1 Young 5.0000 .00000 18 
Old 4.9444 .23570 18 
Total 4.9722 .16667 36 
S2P1 Young 4.8889 .47140 18 
Old 4.6667 .59409 18 
Total 4.7778 .54043 36 
S3P1 Young 4.9444 .23570 18 
Old 3.6111 1.71974 18 
Total 4.2778 1.38587 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
System Pillars Trace .045 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Wilks' Lambda .955 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Hotelling's Trace .047 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Roy's Largest Root .047 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
System * Age Pillars Trace .116 4.450a 1.000 34.000 .042 
Wilks' Lambda .884 4.450a 1.000 34.000 .042 
Hotelling's Trace .131 4.450a 1.000 34.000 .042 
Roy's Largest Root .131 4.450a 1.000 34.000 .042 
Session Pillars Trace .297 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Wilks' Lambda .703 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Hotelling's Trace .423 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Roy's Largest Root .423 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Session * Age Pillars Trace .145 2.800a 2.000 33.000 .075 
Wilks' Lambda .855 2.800a 2.000 33.000 .075 
Hotelling's Trace .170 2.800a 2.000 33.000 .075 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
! Page i 
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Session * Age Roy's Largest Root .170 2.800a 2.000 33.000 .075 
System * Session Pillai's Trace .075 1.337a 2.000 33.000 .277 
Wilks' Lambda .925 1.337a 2.000 33.000 .277 
Hotelling's Trace .081 1.337a 2.000 33.000 .277 
Roy's Largest Root .081 1.337a 2.000 33.000 .277 
System * Session * Age Pillai's Trace .080 1.432a 2.000 33.000 .253 
Wilks' Lambda .920 1.432a 2.000 33.000 .253 
Hotelling's Trace .087 1.432a 2.000 33.000 .253 
Roy's Largest Root .087 1.432a 2.000 33.000 .253 
a. Exact statistic b. Design: Intercept + Age 
Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb Measure:MEASURE 1 
     
Epsilon a 
Within Subjects  Approx. Chi-   Greenhouse-   
Effect Mauchly's W Square df Siq. Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
System 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Session .201 52.998 2 .000 .556 .578 .500 
c.-+- * c-;- RCA Ra 9RQ 9 nnn Ann RR7 cnn 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Siq. 
System Sphericity Assumed .667 1 .667 1.602 .214 
Greenhouse-Geisser .667 1.000 .667 1.602 .214 
Huynh-Feldt .667 1.000 .667 1.602 .214 
Lower-bound .667 1.000 .667 1.602 .214 
System * Age Sphericity Assumed 1.852 1 1.852 4.450 .042 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.852 1.000 1.852 4.450 .042 
Huynh-Feldt 1.852 1.000 1.852 4.450 .042 
Lower-bound 1.852 1.000 1.852 4.450 .042 
Error(System) Sphericity Assumed 14.148 34 .416   
Greenhouse-Geisser 14.148 34.000 .416   
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Error(System) Huynh-Feldt 14.148 34.000 .416   
Lower-bound 14.148 34.000 .416   
Session Sphericity Assumed 17.565 2 8.782 11.086 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 17.565 1.112 15.802 11.086 .001 
Huynh-Feldt 17.565 1.156 15.196 11.086 .001 
Lower-bound 17.565 1.000 17.565 11.086 .002 
Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 7.898 2 3.949 4.985 .010 
Greenhouse-Geisser 7.898 1.112 7.106 4.985 .028 
Huynh-Feldt 7.898 1.156 6.833 4.985 .027 
Lower-bound 7.898 1.000 7.898 4.985 .032 
Error(Session) Sphericity Assumed 53.870 68 .792   
Greenhouse-Geisser 53.870 37.792 1.425   
Huynh-Feldt 53.870 39.300 1.371   
Lower-bound 53.870 34.000 1.584   
System * Session Sphericity Assumed .250 2 .125 .272 .763 
Greenhouse-Geisser .250 1.215 .206 .272 .650 
Huynh-Feldt .250 1.273 .196 .272 .661 
Lower-bound .250 1.000 .250 .272 .605 
System * Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 1.843 2 .921 2.005 .142 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.843 1.215 1.516 2.005 .162 
Huynh-Feldt 1.843 1.273 1.447 2.005 .161 
Lower-bound 1.843 1.000 1.843 2.005 .166 
Error(System" Session) Sphericity Assumed 31.241 68 .459   
Greenhouse-Geisser 31.241 41.320 .756   
Huynh-Feldt 31.241 43.299 .722   
Lower-bound 31.241 34.000 .919   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square 
System Linear Session .667 1 .667 
System * Age Linear Session 1.852 1 1.852 
Error(System) Linear Session 14.148 34 .416 
Session System * Session Linear 
Quadratic 
15.340 
2.225 
1 
1 
15.340 
2.225 
Session * Age System * Session Linear 
Quadratic 
6.674 
1.225 
1 
1 
6.674 
1.225 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Source System Session F Siq. 
System Linear Session 1.602 .214 
System * Age Linear Session 4.450 .042 
Error(System) Linear Session   
Session System * Session 
Linear 
Quadratic 
12.804 
5.759 
.001 
.022 
Session * Age System * Session 
Linear 
Quadratic 
5.570 
3.170 
.024 
.084 !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Source System Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square 
Error(Session) System * Session Linear 40.736 34 1.198 
Quadratic 13.134 34 .386 
System * Session Linear Linear .062 1 .062 
Quadratic .188 1 .188 
System * Session * Age Linear Linear 1.563 1 1.563 
Quadratic .280 1 .280 
Error(System*Session) Linear Linear 20.125 34 .592 
Quadratic 11.116 34 .327 !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session F Siq. 
Error(Session) System * Session Linear 
Quadratic   
System * Session Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
.106 
.574 
.747 
.454 
System * Session * Age Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
2.640 
.857 
.113 
.361 
Error(System*Session) Linear Linear 
Quadratic   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 
Age 
4835.574 
6.685 
1 
1 
4835.574 
6.685 
5406.890 
7.475 
.000 
.010 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE _1 Transformed Variable:Aver 
Sour 
ce 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F %")*!
Error 30.407 34 .894   !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
  95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
4.731 .064 4.601 4.862 !
2. Age 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
4.907 
4.556 
.091 
.091 
4.722 
4.371 
5.092 
4.740 !
Pairwise Comparisons Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error %")*+! Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old .352 .129 .010 .090 .613 
Old Young -.352 ~ .129 .010 -.613 -.090 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
eh 
tests the effect of Age. This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
Sum of 
Squares df 
1 11A i 
Mean Square 
i i A  
F Sic 
7 Ala !
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Univariate Tests 
M easu 
r :MEASURE 1 
Sum of Squares 
df 
 
Mean Square F Sip. ! ! ! qA 1An    
e F tests the effect of Age. This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. System 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
4.787 
4.676 
.077 
.078 
4.630 
4.517 
4.944 
4.835 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Syste Syste 
m m 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Sip.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .111 .088 .214 -.067 .290 
2 1 -.111 .088 .214 -.290 .067 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .045 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Wilks'lambda 955 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Hotelling's trace .047 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Roy's largest root .047 1.602a 1.000 34.000 .214 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of System. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
4. Session 
rT~ 
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Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
4.986 .014 4.958 5.014 
2 4.875 .045 4.783 4.967 
3 4.333 .179 3.969 4.698 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Sess Sess 
ion ion 
Mean 
Difference (l- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .111 .049 
.090 
-.012 .235 
3 .653 .182 .003 .193 1.112 
2 1 -.111 .049 
.090 
-.235 .012 
3 .542 .174 .011 .103 .980 
3 1 -.653 .182 .003 -1.112 -.193 
2 -.542 .174 .011 -.980 -.103 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. *. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillars trace .297 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Wilks'lambda .703 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Hotelling's trace .423 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Roy's Iarqest root .423 6.974a 2.000 33.000 .003 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Session. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. Age * System 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
Age m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.870 
4.944 
.110 
.111 
4.648 
4.719 
5.093 
5.170 
Old 1 
2 
4.704 
4.407 
.110 
.111 
4.481 
4.182 
4.926 
4.633 
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6. Age * Session 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
5.000 
.020 4.960 5.040 
2 4.944 .064 4.814 5.075 
3 4.778 .254 4.262 5.293 
Old 1 4.972 .020 4.932 5.012 
2 4.806 .064 4.675 4.936 
3 3.889 .254 3.373 4.404 !
7. System * Session Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
m ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 5.000 .000 5.000 5.000 
2 4.972 .028 4.916 5.029 
3 4.389 .234 3.914 4.864 
2 1 4.972 .028 4.916 5.029 
2 4.778 .089 4.596 4.959 
3 4.278 .205 3.862 4.694 !
8. Age * System * Session Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age m ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 1 5.000 .000 5.000 5.000 
2 5.000 .039 4.920 5.080 
3 4.611 .330 3.940 5.282 
2 1 
5.000 .039 
4.920 
5.080 
2 4.889 .126 4.632 5.146 
3 4.944 .289 4.357 5.532 
Old 1 1 
5.000 .000 5.000 5.000 
2 4.944 .039 4.865 5.024 
3 4.167 .330 3.495 4.838 
2 1 4.944 .039 4.865 5.024 
2 4.667 .126 4.410 4.924 
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!
3 3.611 .289 3.023 4.199 !
 
 
SET 2 
General Linear Model 
Notes 
2011-02-10T08:52:29.309 
C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My 
Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 
1 \Results\Spreadsheet-Attempts. sav 
DataSetl 
<none> <none> 
<none> 36 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the model. 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
! Page i 
Notes 
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 1\Results\ Spreadsheet-Attempts.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m 
Bess 
ion 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
1 
2 
S2F2 
53F2 
2 
1 
2 
S2P2 
53P2 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Age 1 
2 
Young 
Old 
18 
18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
52F2 Young 
Old 
Total 
4.9444 
4.8333 
4.8889 
.23570 
.38348 
.31873 
18 
18 
36 
53F2 Young 4.6667 1.18818 18 
! Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
GLM S2F2 S3F2 S2P2 S3P2 BY Age 
/WSFACTOR=System 2 Polynomial 
Session 2 Polynomial 
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(OVERALL) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(Agge) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(System) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(Session) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Age" System) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(A e" Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(System*Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
Age*System" Session 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P HA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=System Session 
System*Session 
/DESIGN=Age. 
0:00:00.157 0:00:00.155 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
S3 F2 Old 3.6667 1.97037 18 
Total 4.1667 1.68184 36 
S2P2 Young 
5.0000 .00000 
18 
Old 4.8333 .38348 18 
Total 4.9167 .28031 36 
S3P2 Young 4.8889 
.32338 
18 
Old 3.1667 2.17607 18 
Total 4.0278 1.76451 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
System Pillai's Trace 
.003 .088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Wilks' Lambda .997 .088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Hotelling's Trace .003 .088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Roy's Largest Root .003 .088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
System * Age Pillai's Trace .031 1.076a 1.000 34.000 .307 
Wilks' Lambda .969 1.076a 1.000 34.000 .307 
Hotelling's Trace .032 1.076a 1.000 34.000 .307 
Roy's Largest Root .032 1.076a 1.000 34.000 .307 
Session Pillai's Trace .354 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .646 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .547 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 547 18.604 a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Session * Age Pillai's Trace .239 10.707a 1.000 34.000 .002 
Wilks' Lambda .761 10.707a 1.000 34.000 .002 
Hotelling's Trace .315 10.707a 1.000 34.000 .002 
Roy's Largest Root .315 10.707 a 1.000 34.000 .002 
System * Session Pillai's Trace .006 .217a 1.000 34.000 .645 
Wilks' Lambda .994 .217a 1.000 34.000 .645 
Hotelling's Trace .006 .217a 1.000 34.000 .645 
Roy's Largest Root .006 .217a 1.000 34.000 .645 
System * Session * Age Pillai's Trace .025 
.866a 
1.000 34.000 
.359 
Wilks' Lambda .975 .866a 1.000 34.000 .359 
Hotelling's Trace .025 .866a 1.000 34.000 .359 
Roy's Largest Root .025 .866a 1.000 34.000 .359 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
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Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb Measure:MEASURE 1 
     a 
Epsilon 
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi- 
Square 
df Siq. 
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
System 
Session 
c.-+- * c-;- 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
.000 
.000 
nnn 
0 
0 
n 
 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Siq. 
System Sphericity Assumed .111 1 .111 .088 .769 
Greenhouse-Geisser .111 1.000 .111 .088 .769 
Huynh-Feldt .111 1.000 .111 .088 .769 
Lower-bound .111 1.000 .111 .088 .769 
System * Age Sphericity Assumed 1.361 1 1.361 1.076 .307 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.361 1.000 1.361 1.076 .307 
Huynh-Feldt 1.361 1.000 1.361 1.076 .307 
Lower-bound 1.361 1.000 1.361 1.076 .307 
Error(System) Sphericity Assumed 43.028 34 1.266   
Greenhouse-Geisser 43.028 34.000 1.266   
Huynh-Feldt 43.028 34.000 1.266   
Lower-bound 43.028 34.000 1.266   
Session Sphericity Assumed 23.361 1 23.361 18.604 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 23.361 1.000 23.361 18.604 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 23.361 1.000 23.361 18.604 .000 
Lower-bound 23.361 1.000 23.361 18.604 .000 
Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 13.444 1 13.444 10.707 .002 
Greenhouse-Geisser 13.444 1.000 13.444 10.707 .002 
Huynh-Feldt 13.444 1.000 13.444 10.707 .002 
Lower-bound 13.444 1.000 13.444 10.707 .002 
Error(Session) Sphericity Assumed 42.694 34 1.256   
Greenhouse-Geisser 42.694 34.000 1.256   
Huynh-Feldt 42.694 34.000 1.256   
Lower-bound 42.694 34.000 1.256   
System * Session Sphericity Assumed .250 1 .250 .217 .645 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
System * Session Greenhouse-Geisser .250 1.000 .250 .217 .645 
Huynh-Feldt .250 1.000 .250 .217 .645 
Lower-bound .250 1.000 .250 .217 .645 
System * Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 1.000 1 1.000 .866 .359 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.000 1.000 1.000 .866 .359 
Huynh-Feldt 1.000 1.000 1.000 .866 .359 
Lower-bound 1.000 1.000 1.000 .866 .359 
Error(System*Session) Sphericity Assumed 39.250 34 1.154   
Greenhouse-Geisser 39.250 34.000 1.154   
Huynh-Feldt 39.250 34.000 1.154   
Lower-bound 39.250 34.000 1.154   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
System Linear Session .111 1 .111 .088 .769 
System * Age Linear Session 1.361 1 1.361 1.076 .307 
Error(System) Linear Session 43.028 34 1.266   
Session System * Session Linear 23.361 1 23.361 18.604 .000 
Session * Age System * Session Linear 13.444 1 13.444 10.707 .002 
Error(Session) System * Session Linear 42.694 34 1.256   
System * Session Linear Linear .250 1 .250 .217 .645 
System * Session * Age Linear Linear 1.000 1 1.000 .866 .359 
Error(System*Session) Linear Linear 39.250 34 1.154   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Aver 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 2916.000 1 2916.000 1861.859 
.000 
Age 20.250 1 20.250 12.930 .001 
Error 53.250 34 1.566   !
Estimated Marginal Means 2. Age 
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Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
4.875 
4.125 
.147 
.147 
4.575 
3.825 
5.175 
4.425 !
Pairwise Comparisons Measure:MEA 
SURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old .750 .209 .001 .326 1.174 
Old Young -.750 .209 .001 -1.174 -.326 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
5.062 
13 313 
1 
34 
5.062 
392 
12.930 .001 
The F tests theeffect of Age. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. System 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
4.528 
4.472 
.148 
.132 
4.228 
4.203 
4.828 
4.741 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Syste Syste 
m m 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .056 .187 .769 -.325 .437 
2 1 -.056 .187 .769 -.437 .325 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .003 .088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Wilks'lambda 997 •088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Hotelling's trace .003 .088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Roy's largest root .003 •088a 1.000 34.000 .769 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of System. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
4. Session 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
4.903 
4.097 
.038 
.194 
4.826 
3.702 
4.979 
4.492 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Sess Sess 
ion ion 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error 
a 
Siq. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .806 .187 .000 .426 1.185 
2 1 -.806 .187 .000 -1.185 -.426 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
! Page i 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillars trace 354 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Wilks'lambda .646 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Hotelling's trace .547 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Roy's largest root .547 18.604a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Session. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. Age * System 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
Age m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.806 
4.944 
.209 
.187 
4.381 
4.564 
5.230 
5.325 
Old 1 
2 
4.250 
4.000 
.209 
.187 
3.826 
3.620 
4.674 
4.380 !
6. Age * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
Age ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.972 
4.778 
.053 
.275 
4.864 
4.219 
5.080 
5.336 
Old 1 
2 
4.833 
3.417 .053 
.275 
4.725 
2.858 
4.942 
3.975 !
7. System * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
m ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 
2 
4.889 
4.167 .053 
.271 
4.781 
3.616 
4.997 
4.718 
2 1 
2 
4.917 
4.028 
.045 
.259 
4.825 
3.501 5.009 
4.555 !
8. Age * System * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
Age m ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 1 4.944 .075 4.792 5.097 
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!
8. Age * System * Session 
Syste Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age m ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 2 4.667 .383 3.887 5.446 
2 1 
5.000 
.064 4.870 5.130 
2 4.889 .367 4.144 5.634 
Old 1 1 4.833 .075 4.681 4.986 
2 3.667 .383 2.887 4.446 
2 1 4.833 .064 4.703 4.963 
2 3.167 .367 2.422 3.912 !!
 
SET 1 
General Linear Model 
Notes 
2011-02-10T08:58:41.180 
C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My 
Dropbox\PhD\Study 
1 \Results\Spreadsheet-TimeAve. sav 
DataSetl <none> 
<none> <none> 
36 
User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the model. 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
! Page i 
Notes 
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 1\Results\ Spreadsheet-TimeAve.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m 
Sess 
ion 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
1 
2 
3 
S1 F1 
52F1 
53F1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
S1 P1 
52P1 
53P1 !
Between- Subjects Factors 
 
Value Label N 
Age 1 
2 
Young 
Old 
18 
18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
S1 F1 Young 11.8225 .85141 18 
! Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
GLM S1 F1 S2F1 S3F1 S1 P1 S2P1 
S3P1 BY Age 
/WSFACTOR=System 2 Polynomial 
Session 3 Polynomial 
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(OVERALL) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(Age) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(System) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(Session) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Age" System) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(Age" Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(System*Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(Age" System" Session) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P HA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=System Session 
System*Session 
/DESIGN=Age. 
0:00:00.187 0:00:00.108 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
S1 F1 Old 16.6664 2.57368 18 
Total 14.2445 3.09884 36 
S2F1 Young 12.3014 1.31703 18 
Old 15.9811 2.66011 18 
Total 14.1412 2.78592 36 
S3 F1 Young 15.9148 4.92832 18 
Old 21.6618 6.01538 18 
Total 18.7883 6.15351 36 
S1 P1 Young 11.5600 1.44886 18 
Old 15.2979 2.47269 18 
Total 13.4290 2.75357 36 
S2P1 Young 12.8210 2.01832 18 
Old 18.6535 4.13740 18 
Total 15.7373 4.36353 36 
S3 P1 Young 12.8614 2.05233 18 
Old 23.5168 9.39208 18 
Total 18.1891 8.60736 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
System Pillars Trace .000 .017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
Wilks' Lambda 1.000 .017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
Hotelling's Trace .000 .017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
Roy's Largest Root .000 .017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
System * Age Pillars Trace .118 4.538a 1.000 34.000 .040 
Wilks' Lambda .882 4.538a 1.000 34.000 .040 
Hotelling's Trace .133 4.538a 1.000 34.000 .040 
Roy's Largest Root .133 4.538a 1.000 34.000 .040 
Session Pillars Trace .492 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .508 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .967 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .967 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Session * Age Pillars Trace .139 2.661 a 2.000 33.000 .085 
Wilks' Lambda .861 2.661 a 2.000 33.000 .085 
Hotelling's Trace .161 2.661 a 2.000 33.000 .085 
Roy's Largest Root .161 2.661 a 2.000 33.000 .085 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
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Multivariate Testsb 
Effect 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
System * Session Pillai's Trace .413 11.624a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .587 11.624a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .704 11.624a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .704 11.624 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
System * Session * Age Pillai's Trace .260 5.788a 2.000 33.000 .007 
Wilks' Lambda .740 5.788a 2.000 33.000 .007 
Hotelling's Trace .351 5.788a 2.000 33.000 .007 
Roy's Largest Root .351 5.788a 2.000 33.000 .007 
a. Exact statistic b. Design: Intercept + Age 
Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity Measure:MEASURE 1 
     
Epsilon a 
Within Subjects  Approx. Chi-   Greenhouse-   
Effect Mauchly's W Square df Siq. Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
System 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Session .442 26.928 2 .000 .642 .676 .500 
c.-+- * c-;- cn9 99 7R9 9 nnn RRR 7nc cnn 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Siq. 
System Sphericity Assumed .197 1 .197 .017 .898 
Greenhouse-Geisser .197 1.000 .197 .017 .898 
Huynh-Feldt .197 1.000 .197 .017 .898 
Lower-bound .197 1.000 .197 .017 .898 
System * Age Sphericity Assumed 53.194 1 53.194 4.538 .040 
Greenhouse-Geisser 53.194 1.000 53.194 4.538 .040 
Huynh-Feldt 53.194 1.000 53.194 4.538 .040 
Lower-bound 53.194 1.000 53.194 4.538 .040 
Error(System) Sphericity Assumed 398.520 34 11.721   
Greenhouse-Geisser 398.520 34.000 11.721   
Huynh-Feldt 398.520 34.000 11.721   
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Error(System) Lower-bound 398.520 34.000 11.721   
Session Sphericity Assumed 850.920 2 425.460 24.376 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 850.920 1.284 662.782 24.376 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 850.920 1.352 629.567 24.376 .000 
Lower-bound 850.920 1.000 850.920 24.376 .000 
Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 164.255 2 82.128 4.705 .012 
Greenhouse-Geisser 164.255 1.284 127.938 4.705 .027 
Huynh-Feldt 164.255 1.352 121.527 4.705 .025 
Lower-bound 164.255 1.000 164.255 4.705 .037 
Error(Session) Sphericity Assumed 1186.886 68 17.454   
Greenhouse-Geisser 1186.886 43.651 27.190   
Huynh-Feldt 1186.886 45.954 25.828   
Lower-bound 1186.886 34.000 34.908   
System * Session Sphericity Assumed 64.088 2 32.044 3.918 .025 
Greenhouse-Geisser 64.088 1.335 47.997 3.918 .043 
Huynh-Feldt 64.088 1.410 45.441 3.918 .040 
Lower-bound 64.088 1.000 64.088 3.918 .056 
System * Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 81.578 2 40.789 4.987 .010 
Greenhouse-Geisser 81.578 1.335 61.096 4.987 .021 
Huynh-Feldt 81.578 1.410 57.842 4.987 .020 
Lower-bound 81.578 1.000 81.578 4.987 .032 
Error(System" Session) Sphericity Assumed 556.197 68 8.179   
Greenhouse-Geisser 556.197 45.398 12.251   
Huynh-Feldt 556.197 47.952 11.599   
Lower-bound 556.197 34.000 16.359   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square 
System Linear Session .197 1 .197 
System * Age Linear Session 53.194 1 53.194 
Error(System) Linear Session 398.520 34 11.721 
Session System * Session Linear 
Quadratic 
779.072 
71.848 
1 
1 
779.072 
71.848 
Session * Age System * Session Linear 
Quadratic 
137.615 
26.641 
1 
1 
137.615 
26.641 
Error(Session) System * Session Linear 855.371 34 25.158 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Source System Session F Siq. 
System Linear Session .017 .898 
System * Age Linear Session 4.538 .040 
Error(System) Linear Session   
Session System * Session 
Linear 
Quadratic 30.967 
7.369 
.000 
.010 
Session * Age System * Session 
Linear 
Quadratic 
5.470 
2.732 
.025 
.108 
Error(Session) System * Session Linear   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square 
Error(Session) System * Session Quadratic 331.516 34 9.750 
System * Session Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
.421 
63.667 
1 
1 
.421 
63.667 
System * Session * Age Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
81.388 
.190 
1 
1 
81.388 
.190 
Error(System*Session) Linear Linear 
Quadratic 
404.275 
151.922 
34 
34 
11.890 
4.468 !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session F Siq. 
Error(Session) System * Session Quadratic   
System * Session Linear 
Linear 
Quadratic 
.035 
14.249 
.852 
.001 
System * Session * Age Linear 
Linear 
Quadratic 
6.845 
.042 
.013 
.838 
Error(System*Session) Linear 
Linear 
Quadratic 
  !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 53614.758 1 53614.758 1479.349 
.000 
Age 1785.004 1 1785.004 49.252 .000 
Error 1232.233 34 36.242   
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Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
  
95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
15.755 .410 14.922 16.587 !
2. Age 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
12.880 
18.630 
.579 
.579 
11.703 
17.452 
14.057 
19.807 !
Pairwise Comparisons Measure:MEA 
SURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -5.749 .819 .000 -7.414 -4.085 
Old Young 5.749 .819 .000 4.085 7.414 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
297.501 
2nFi 372 
1 
34 
297.501 
R n4n 
49.252 .000 
The F tests the effect of Age. This test is based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. System 
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Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
15.725 
15.785 
.462 
.480 
14.786 
14.809 
16.663 
16.762 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Syste Syste 
m m 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.060 .466 .898 -1.007 .886 
2 1 .060 .466 .898 -.886 1.007 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .000 •017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
Wilks'lambda 1.000 •017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
Hotelling's trace .000 •017a 1.000 34.000 .898 
Roy's larqest root .000 •017a 1.000 34.000 .898 !
Each F tests the multivariate effect of System. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
4. Session 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 13.837 .296 13.236 14.438 
2 14.939 .392 14.143 15.735 
3 18.489 .864 16.732 20.245 
! Page i 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Sess Sess 
ion ion 
Mean 
Difference (l- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -1.103 .353 .011 -1.992 -.213 
3 -4.652 .836 .000 -6.757 -2.547 
2 1 1.103 ~ .353 .011 .213 1.992 
3 -3.549 .794 .000 -5.550 -1.549 
3 1 4.652 .836 
.000 
2.547 6.757 
2 3.549 .794 .000 1.549 5.550 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillars trace .492 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Wilks' lambda .508 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Hotelling's trace .967 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Roy's largest root .967 15.951 a 2.000 33.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Session. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. Age * System 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
Age m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
13.346 
12.414 .653 
.680 
12.019 
11.033 
14.673 
13.795 
Old 1 
2 
18.103 
19.156 .653 
.680 
16.776 
17.775 
19.430 
20.537 !
6. Age * Session 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 11.691 .418 10.841 12.541 
2 12.561 .554 11.435 13.687 
3 14.388 1.223 11.904 16.873 
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6. Age * Session 
Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Old 1 15.982 . 418 15.132 16. 832 
2 17.317 .554 16.192 18.443 
3 22.589 1.223 20.105 25.074 !
7. System * Session 
Syste Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
m ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 14.244 .319 13.595 14.894 
2 14.141 .350 13.430 14.852 
3 18.788 .916 16.926 20.651 
2 1 13.429 .338 12.743 14.115 
2 15.737 .543 14.635 16.840 
3 18.189 1.133 15.887 20.492 !
8. Age * System * Session Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age m ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 1 11.823 .452 10.904 12.741 
2 12.301 .495 11.296 13.307 
3 15.915 1.296 13.281 18.549 
2 1 11.560 .478 
10.589 
12.531 
2 12.821 .767 11.262 14.380 
3 12.861 1.602 9.605 16.118 
Old 1 1 
16.666 
.452 15.748 17.585 
2 15.981 .495 14.976 16.986 
3 21.662 1.296 19.028 24.296 
2 1 15.298 .478 14.327 16.269 
2 18.653 .767 17.094 20.213 
3 23.517 1.602 20.261 26.773 !
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SET 2 
General Linear Model 
Notes 
2011-02-10T09:00:08.206 
C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My 
Dropbox\PhD\Study 
1 \Results\Spreadsheet-TimeAve. sav 
DataSetl <none> 
<none> <none> 
36 
User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the model. 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
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Notes 
[DataSetl] C:\Documents and Settings\u028488\My Documents\My Dropbox\PhD\Study 1\Results\ Spreadsheet-TimeAve.sav 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m 
Bess 
ion 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
1 
2 
S2F2 
53F2 
2 
1 
2 
S2P2 
53P2 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Age 1 
2 
Young 
Old 
18 
18 !
Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
52F2 Young 
Old 
Total 
14.5226 
19.2140 
16.8683 
2.24822 
3.61751 
3.80407 
18 
18 
36 
53F2 Young 16.0921 3.29972 18 
! Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time 
GLM S2F2 S3F2 S2P2 S3P2 BY Age 
/WSFACTOR=System 2 Polynomial 
Session 2 Polynomial 
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(OVERALL) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES(Agge) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(System) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMM 
EANS=TABLES(Session) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Age" System) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(A e" Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
(System*Session) 
/EMM EANS=TABLES 
Age*System" Session 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P HA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=System Session 
System*Session 
/DESIGN=Age. 
0:00:00.156 0:00:00.078 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Age Mean Std. Deviation N 
S3 F2 Old 22.6831 6.07457 18 
Total 19.3876 5.86363 36 
S2P2 Young 12.6232 2.42833 18 
Old 17.0416 4.22514 18 
Total 14.8324 4.06877 36 
S3P2 Young 14.8161 2.58684 18 
Old 24.5045 6.99650 18 
Total 19.6603 7.15282 36 !
Multivariate Testsb 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
System Pillai's Trace 
.047 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Wilks' Lambda .953 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Hotelling's Trace .049 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Roy's Largest Root .049 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
System * Age Pillai's Trace .030 1.065a 1.000 34.000 
.309 
Wilks' Lambda .970 1.065a 1.000 34.000 .309 
Hotelling's Trace .031 1.065a 1.000 34.000 .309 
Roy's Largest Root .031 1.065a 1.000 34.000 .309 
Session Pillai's Trace .466 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .534 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace .873 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .873 29.694 a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Session * Age Pillai's Trace .172 7.069a 1.000 34.000 .012 
Wilks' Lambda .828 7.069a 1.000 34.000 .012 
Hotelling's Trace .208 7.069a 1.000 34.000 .012 
Roy's Largest Root .208 7.069a 1.000 34.000 .012 
System * Session Pillai's Trace .109 4.143a 1.000 34.000 .050 
Wilks' Lambda .891 4.143a 1.000 34.000 .050 
Hotelling's Trace .122 4.143a 1.000 34.000 .050 
Roy's Largest Root .122 4.143 a 1.000 34.000 .050 
System * Session * Age Pillai's Trace .061 2.208a 1.000 34.000 .147 
Wilks' Lambda .939 2.208a 1.000 34.000 .147 
Hotelling's Trace .065 2.208a 1.000 34.000 .147 
Roy's Largest Root .065 2.208a 1.000 34.000 .147 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
! Page i 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb Measure:MEASURE 1 
     a 
Epsilon 
Within Subjects 
Effect 
Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi- 
Square 
df Siq. 
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
System 
Session 
c.-+- * c-;- 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
.000 
.000 
nnn 
0 
0 
n 
 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
1.000 
1.000 
I nnn 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + Age Within Subjects Design: System + Session + System * Session 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Siq. 
System Sphericity Assumed 27.979 1 27.979 1.661 .206 
Greenhouse-Geisser 27.979 1.000 27.979 1.661 .206 
Huynh-Feldt 27.979 1.000 27.979 1.661 .206 
Lower-bound 27.979 1.000 27.979 1.661 .206 
System * Age Sphericity Assumed 17.947 1 17.947 1.065 .309 
Greenhouse-Geisser 17.947 1.000 17.947 1.065 .309 
Huynh-Feldt 17.947 1.000 17.947 1.065 .309 
Lower-bound 17.947 1.000 17.947 1.065 .309 
Error(System) Sphericity Assumed 572.794 34 16.847   
Greenhouse-Geisser 572.794 34.000 16.847   
Huynh-Feldt 572.794 34.000 16.847   
Lower-bound 572.794 34.000 16.847   
Session Sphericity Assumed 485.835 1 485.835 29.694 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 485.835 1.000 485.835 29.694 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 485.835 1.000 485.835 29.694 .000 
Lower-bound 485.835 1.000 485.835 29.694 .000 
Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 115.654 1 115.654 7.069 .012 
Greenhouse-Geisser 115.654 1.000 115.654 7.069 .012 
Huynh-Feldt 115.654 1.000 115.654 7.069 .012 
Lower-bound 115.654 1.000 115.654 7.069 .012 
Error(Session) Sphericity Assumed 556.278 34 16.361   
Greenhouse-Geisser 556.278 34.000 16.361   
Huynh-Feldt 556.278 34.000 16.361   
Lower-bound 556.278 34.000 16.361   
System * Session Sphericity Assumed 47.965 1 47.965 4.143 .050 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
System * Session Greenhouse-Geisser 47.965 1.000 47.965 4.143 .050 
Huynh-Feldt 47.965 1.000 47.965 4.143 .050 
Lower-bound 47.965 1.000 47.965 4.143 .050 
System * Session * Age Sphericity Assumed 25.560 1 25.560 2.208 .147 
Greenhouse-Geisser 25.560 1.000 25.560 2.208 .147 
Huynh-Feldt 25.560 1.000 25.560 2.208 .147 
Lower-bound 25.560 1.000 25.560 2.208 .147 
Error(System*Session) Sphericity Assumed 393.662 34 11.578   
Greenhouse-Geisser 393.662 34.000 11.578   
Huynh-Feldt 393.662 34.000 11.578   
Lower-bound 393.662 34.000 11.578   !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source System Session 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
System Linear Session 27.979 1 27.979 1.661 .206 
System * Age Linear Session 17.947 1 17.947 1.065 .309 
Error(System) Linear Session 572.794 34 16.847   
Session System * Session Linear 485.835 1 485.835 29.694 .000 
Session * Age System * Session Linear 115.654 1 115.654 7.069 .012 
Error(Session) System * Session Linear 556.278 34 16.361   
System * Session Linear Linear 47.965 1 47.965 4.143 .050 
System * Session * Age Linear Linear 25.560 1 25.560 2.208 .147 
Error(System*Session) Linear Linear 393.662 34 11.578   !
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Aver 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Siq. 
Intercept 45048.297 1 45048.297 1616.136 
.000 
Age 1450.368 1 1450.368 52.033 .000 
Error 947.719 34 27.874   !
Estimated Marginal Means 2. Age 
! Page i 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
   
95% Confidence Interval 
Age Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
14.514 
20.861 
.622 
.622 
13.249 
19.596 
15.778 
22.125 !
Pairwise Comparisons Measure:MEA 
SURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(J) 
(Il Age Age 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -6.347 .880 .000 -8.136 -4.559 
Old Young 6.347 * .880 .000 4.559 8.136 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
Contrast 
Prrnr 
362.592 
23R q30 
1 
34 
362.592 
qRq 
52.033 .000 
The F tests theeffect of Age. This test is basedon thelinearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
3. System 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
18.128 
17.246 
.542 
.572 
17.026 
16.084 
19.230 
18.409 
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Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Syste Syste 
m m 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error Siq.a Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .882 .684 .206 -.509 2.272 
2 1 -.882 .684 .206 -2.272 .509 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Siq. 
Pillars trace .047 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Wilks'lambda .953 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Hotelling's trace .049 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Roy's largest root .049 1.661 a 1.000 34.000 .206 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of System. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
4. Session 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
15.850 
19.524 
.444 
.646 
14.949 
18.211 
16.752 
20.837 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
    95% Confidence Inerval for 
Difference 
(I) (J) 
Sess Sess 
ion ion 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
J) 
Std. Error 
a 
Siq. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -3.674 .674 .000 -5.044 -2.304 
2 1 3.674 .674 .000 2.304 5.044 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Pillars trace .466 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Wilks'lambda .534 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Hotelling's trace .873 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Roy's largest root .873 29.694a 1.000 34.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Session. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. Age * System 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste 
Age m Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
15.307 
13.720 
.767 
.809 
13.749 
12.076 
16.865 
15.364 
Old 1 
2 
20.949 
20.773 
.767 
.809 
19.391 
19.129 
22.507 
22.417 !
6. Age * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Sess 
Age ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
13.573 
15.454 
.627 
.914 
12.298 
13.597 
14.848 
17.311 
Old 1 
2 
18.128 
23.594 
.627 
.914 16.853 
21.736 
19.403 
25.451 !
7. System * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
m ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 1 
2 16.868 
19.388 
.502 
.815 
15.848 
17.732 
17.888 
21.043 
2 1 
2 
14.832 
19.660 
.574 
.879 
13.665 
17.874 
16.000 
21.447 !
8. Age * System * Session 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Syste Sess 
Age m ion Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 1 14.523 .710 13.080 15.965 
!8. Age * System * Session 
Syste Sess 
  95% Confidence Interval 
  
Age m ion Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 2 16.092 1.152 13.751 18.434 
2 1 12.623 .812 10.973 14.274 
2 14.816 1.243 12.290 17.343 
Old 1 1 19.214 .710 17.771 20.657 
2 22.683 1.152 20.342 25.025 
2 1 17.042 .812 15.391 18.692 
2 24.504 1.243 21.978 27.031 !
  
!!
C4: Study 4 (Chapter 7) – YoungFaces and OldFaces 
 
SET1 
Notes 
!
DataSet5 
<none> <none> 
<none> 
72 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for 
all variables in the model. 
GLM SETiSess1 SETlSess2 SET1 Sess3 BY PartAge 
FaceAge /WSFACTOR=Week 3 Polynomial 
IMETHOD=SSTYPE(3) /EMMEANS=TAB 
LES(OVERALL) IEMMEANS=TABLES(Page) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TAB LES(FaceAge) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES(Week) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*FaceAge) IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES (FaceAge*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
PartAge*FaceAge*Week 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE /CRITERIA=A L P H 
A(.05) /WSDESIGN=Week /DESIGN=PartAge 
FaceAge PartAge*FaceAge. 
00:00:00.031 00:00:00.000 
18-Jun-2012 01:56:16 
/Users/jjnicholson/Dropbox/Ph 
D/Study 5/Results/St5-Attempts. 
say 
!Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time !
!Within-Subjects 
Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week 
Dependent 
Var iable 
1 
2 
3 
SETlSessl  
SETlSess2 
SETlSess3 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label  N 
PartAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 3 6 
FaceAge 1.00 Young 3 6 
2.00 Old 3 6 !
Descr ipt ive r ipt ive Stat ist ics 
PartAge FaceAge 
Mean 
Std.  
Deviat ion 
N 
SETlSessi  Young Young 4.8333 .23570 18 
Old 4.8148 .34721 18 
Total  4.8241 .29262 36 
Old Young 4.0741 1.14650 1 8 
Old 4.7037 .68493 1 8 
Total  4.3889 .98400 36 
Total  Young 4.4537 .90204 36 
Old 4.7593 .53814 36 
Total  4.6065 .75335 72 
SETlSess2 Young Young 4.9259 .14260 18 
Old 4.7593 .54600 1 8 
Total  4.8426 .40226 36 
Old Young 3.6667 1.61286 1 8 
Old 4.0741 1.38882 1 8 
Total  3.8704 1.49768 36 
Total  Young 4.2963 1.29658 36 
Old 4.4167 1.09653 36 
Total  4.3565 1.19378 72 
SETlSess3 Young Young 4.9074 .25063 18 
Old 4.7778 .49836 1 8 
Total  4.8426 .39429 36 
Old Young 3.2593 2.03099 18 
Old 3.6852 1.49278 18 
Total  3.4722 1.76990 36 
Total  Young 4.0833 1.65304 36 
Old 4.2315 1.22881 36 
Total  4.1574 1.44808 72 
!Multivariate Testsb 
Effect 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Week Pil lai 's Trace .194 8.059d 2.000 67.000 .001 
Wilks' Lambda .806 8.059a 2.000 67.000 .001 
Hotell ing's Trace .241 8.059a 2.000 67.000 .001 
Roy's Largest Root .241 8.059a 2.000 67.000 .001 
Week * PartAge Pil lai 's Trace .208 8.783a 2.000 67.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .792 8.783a 2.000 67.000 .000 
Hotell ing's Trace .262 8.783a 2.000 67.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root .262 8.783a 2.000 67.000 .000 
Week * FaceAge Pil lai 's Trace .016 .538d 2.000 67.000 .587 
Wilks' Lambda .984 .538a 2.000 67.000 .587 
Hotell ing's Trace .016 .538a 2.000 67.000 .587 
Roy's Largest Root .016 .538a 2.000 67.000 .587 
Week * PartAge * Pil lai 's Trace .001 .026d 2.000 67.000 .974 
FaceAge Wilks' Lambda 
.999 .026a 2.000 67.000 .974 
Hotell ing's Trace .001 .026a 2.000 67.000 .974 
Roy's Largest Root 
.001 .026a 2.000 67.000 .974 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi- 
Square df Sig. 
 
Epsilona 
 
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower- 
bound 
Week .888 7.930 
2 
.019 .900 .963 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
!Tests of  Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Week Spher ic i ty Assumed 7.291 2 3.646 10.894 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 7.291 1.799 4.053 10.894 .000 
Huynh-Feldt  7.291 1.927 3.785 10.894 .000 
Lower-bound 7.291 1.000 7.291 10.894 .002 
Week * PartAge Spher ic i ty Assumed 7.929 2 3.965 11.847 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 7.929 1.799 4.407 11.847 .000 
Huynh-Feldt  7.929 1.927 4.116 11.847 .000 
Lower-bound 7.929 1.000 7.929 11.847 .001 
Week * FaceAge Spher ic i ty Assumed .359 2 .180 .536 .586 
Greenhouse-Geisser .359 1.799 .200 .536 .567 
Huynh-Feldt  .359 1.927 .186 .536 .579 
Lower-bound .359 1.000 .359 .536 .466 
Week * PartAge * Spher ic i ty Assumed .022 2 .011 .032 .968 
FaceAge Greenhouse-Geisser 
.022 1.799 .012 .032 .958 
Huynh-Feldt  .022 1.927 .011 .032 .965 
Lower-bound .022 1.000 .022 .032 .858 
Error(Week) Spher ic i ty Assumed 45.510 136 .335   
Greenhouse-Geisser 45.510 122.343 .372   
Huynh-Feldt  45.510 131.006 .347   
Lower-bound 45.510 68.000 .669   !
Tests of  Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source Week 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Week Linear 7.260 1 7.260 16.267 .000 
Quadrat ic  .031 1 .031 .140 .710 
Week * PartAge Linear 7.871 1 7.871 17.636 .000 
Quadrat ic  .058 1 .058 .260 .612 
Week * FaceAge Linear .223 1 .223 .500 .482 
Quadrat ic  .136 1 .136 .610 .437 
Week * PartAge * Linear .019 1 .019 .043 .836 
FaceAge Quadrat ic  
.002 1 .002 .010 .919 
Error(Week) Linear 30.349 68 .446   
Quadrat ic  15.162 68 .223   !
Tests of  Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Average 
Source 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Intercept 4131.459 1 4131.459 1530.781 .000 
PartAge 46.296 1 46.296 17.154 .000 
FaceAge 1.977 1 1.977 .733 .395 
PartAge * FaceAge 4.741 1 4.741 1.757 .189 
Error 183.527 68 2.699 
  !
Est imated  Margina l  Means  
!1. Grand Mean 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
  95% Conf idence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
4.373 .112 4.150 4.597 !
2. PartAge 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
4.836 
3.910 
.158 
.158 
4.521 
3.595 
5.152 
4.226 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) PartAge(J) PartAge 
   95% Conf idence Interval for Dif ferencea  
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
. ! t  
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old .926 .224 .000 .480 1.372 
Old Young 
-.926 .224 .000 -1.372 -.480 
Based on est imated mated marginal means *. The mean dif ference is s ignif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 15.432 1 15.432 17.154 .000 
Error 61.176 68 .900 
  
The F tests the effect of PartAge. This test is based on the l inear ly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
3. FaceAge 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Youngng 
Old 
4.278 
4.469 
.158 
.158 
3.962 
4.154 
4.593 
4.785 !
U Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 
Error 
.659 
61.176 
1 
68 
.659 
.900 
.733 .395 
F tests the effect of FaceAge. This testis based on the l inear! y 
independent pairwise comparisons among the est imated marginal means. 
!Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 4.606 .082 4.442 4.771 
2 4 .130 4.098 4.615 
3 4.157 .152 3.854 4.461 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
( I )  W e e k ( J )  Week 
   95% Conf idence Interval  for Di f ferencea  
 
Mean 
Dif ference ( I-  
. ! t  
Std.  Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .250 .089 .019 .032 .468 
3 .449 .111 .000 .176 .722 
2 1 - .250 .089 .019 - .468 - .032 
3 .199 .087 .077 - . 0 1 5  .413 
3 1 - .449 .111 .000 - .722 - . 1 7 6  
2 - .199 .087 .077 - . 4 1 3  .015 
Based on est imated matedmarginal  means *.  The mean di f ference is s igni f icant at  the 
a.  Adjustment for  mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni .  
Mul t ivar iate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Pi l lars t race .194 8.059d  2.000 67.000 .001 
Wilks '  lambda .806 8 . 0 5 e  2.000 67.000 .001 
Hotel l ing's t race .241 8 . 0 5 e  2.000 67.000 .001 
Roy's largest root 
.241 8 . 0 5 e  2.000 67.000 .001 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the l inearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a.  Exact stat ist ic 
5. PartAge * FaceAge 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge FaceAge   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 
Old 
4.889 
4.784 
.224 
.224 
4.443 
4.338 
5.335 
5.230 
Old Young 
Old 
3.667 
4.154 
.224 
.224 
3.221 
3.708 
4.113 
4.600 
!6.PartAge* Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 4.824 .117 4.591 5.057 
2 4.843 .18383 4.476 5.209 
3 4.843 .215 4.413 5.272 
Old 1 4.389 .117 4.156 4.622 
2 3.870 .183 3.504 4.237 
3 3.472 .215 3.043 3.902 !
7. * Week 
Meure:MEASURE_1 ure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ng 1 
Young 4.454 .117 4.221 4.686 
2 4.296 .183 3.930 4.662 
3 4.083 .215 3.654 4.513 
Old 1 4.759 .117 4.526 4.992 
2 4.417 .183 4.051 4.783 
3 4.231 .215 3.802 4.661 !
8.PartAge* FaceAge * Week 
Meure:MEASURE_1 ure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 1 4.833 .165 4.504 5.163 
2 4.926 .260 4.408 5.444 
3 4.907 .304 4.300 5.515 
Old 1 4.815 .165 4.486 5.144 
2 4.759 .260 4.241 5.277 
3 4.778 .304 4.171 5.385 
Old Young 1 4.074 .165 3.745 4.403 
2 3.667 .260 3.149 4.184 
3 3.259 .304 2.652 3.866 
Old 1 4.704 .165 4.374 5.033 
2 4.074 .260 3.556 4.592 
3 3.685 .304 3.078 4.292 !
!SET2 
Notes 
[DataSet5] /Users/jjnicholson/Dropbox/PhD/Study 5/Results/St5-Attempts.sav 
Within-Subjects 
Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 SET2Sess2 
SET2Sess3 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
PartAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 36 
FaceAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 36 
! 18-Jun-2012 01:57:02 
/Users/jjnicholson/Dropbox/Ph 
D/Study 5/Results/St5-Attempts. 
say 
DataSet5 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
72 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases 
with valid data for all variables in 
the model. 
GLM SET2Sess2 SET2Sess3 BY 
PartAge FaceAge 
/WSFACTOR Week 2 Polynomial 
IMETHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(OVERALL) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(PartA e) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONIJ 
/EMMEANS=TAB LES(FaceAge) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES(Week) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*FaceAge) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(FaceAge*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*FaceAge*Week) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=A L P H A(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=Week 
/DESIGN=PartAge FaceAge 
PartAge*FaceAge. 
00:00:00.029 00:00:00.000 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time !
!Descr ipt ive Stat ist ics 
PartAge FaceAge 
Mean 
Std.  
Deviat ion 
N 
SET2Sess2 Young Young 4.8889 .28006 1 8 
Old 4.7593 .48244 1 8 
Total  4.8241 .39429 36 
Old Young 3.6667 1.57181 1 8 
Old 4.2222 1.13759 1 8 
Total  3.9444 1.38128 36 
Total  Young 4.2778 1.27366 36 
Old 4.4907 .90321 36 
Total  4.3843 1.10151 72 
SET2Sess3 Young Young 4.8148 .26127 18 
Old 4.3889 1.18955 18 
Total  4.6019 .87585 36 
Old Young 2.6111 1.94449 18 
Old 3.8704 1.38686 18 
Total  3.2407 1.78283 36 
Total  Young 3.7130 1.76591 36 
Old 4.1296 1.30025 36 
Total  3.9213 1.55393 72 !
Mult ivar iate ate Testsb  
Effect  
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Week Pi l la i 's  Trace .173 14.216d  1.000 68.000 .000 
Wilks '  Lambda .827 14.216a  1.000 68.000 .000 
Hotel l ing's Trace 209 14.216a  1.000 68.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 209 14.216a  1.000 68.000 .000 
Week * PartAge Pi l la i 's  Trace .054 3.844a  1.000 68.000 .054 
Wilks '  Lambda .946 3.844a  1.000 68.000 .054 
Hotel l ing's Trace 057 3.844a  1.000 68.000 .054 
Roy's Largest Root 057 3.844a  1.000 68.000 .054 
Week * FaceAge Pi l la i 's  Trace .010 .688d  1.000 68.000 .410 
Wilks '  Lambda .990 .688a  1.000 68.000 .410 
Hotel l ing's Trace 010 .688a  1.000 68.000 .410 
Roy's Largest Root 010 .688a  1.000 68.000 .410 
Week * PartAge * Pi l la i 's  Trace .057 4.146d  1.000 68.000 .046 
FaceAge Wilks '  Lambda 
.943 4.146a  1.000 68.000 .046 
Hotel l ing's Trace 061 4.146a  1.000 68.000 .046 
Roy's Largest Root 
061 4.146a  1.000 68.000 .046 
a. Exactstatistic b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: Week 
!Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's 
's W 
Approx. Chi- 
Square df Sig. 
 E si lon
a 
P 
 
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower- 
bound 
Week 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tests thenull thatthe error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformeddependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Week Sphericity Assumed 7.716 1 7.716 14.216 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 7.716 1.000 7.716 14.216 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 7.716 1.000 7.716 14.216 .000 
Lower-bound 7.716 1.000 7.716 14.216 .000 
Week * PartAge Sphericity Assumed 2.086 1 2.086 3.844 .054 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2.086 1.000 2.086 3.844 .054 
Huynh-Feldt 2.086 1.000 2.086 3.844 .054 
Lower-bound 2.086 1.000 2.086 3.844 .054 
Week * FaceAge Sphericity Assumed .373 1 .373 .688 .410 
Greenhouse-Geisser .373 1.000 .373 .688 .410 
Huynh-Feldt .373 1.000 .373 .688 .410 
Lower-bound .373 1.000 .373 .688 .410 
Week * PartAge * Sphericity Assumed 2.250 1 2.250 4.146 .046 
FaceAge 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2.250 1.000 2.250 4.146 .046 
Huynh-Feldt 2.250 1.000 2.250 4.146 .046 
Lower-bound 2.250 1.000 2.250 4.146 .046 
Error(Week) Sphericity Assumed 36.907 68 .543   
Greenhouse-Geisser 36.907 68.000 .543   
Huynh-Feldt 36.907 68.000 .543   
Lower-bound 36.907 68.000 .543 
  !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Week Linear 7.716 1 7.716 14.216 .000 
Week * PartAge Linear 2.086 1 2.086 3.844 .054 
Week * FaceAge Linear .373 1 .373 .688 .410 
Week * PartAge * Linear 
FaceAge 
2.250 1 2.250 4.146 .046 
Error(Week) Linear 
36.907 68 .543 
  
!Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Average 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 2483.361 1 2483.361 1092.477 .000 
PartAge 45.188 1 45.188 19.879 .000 
FaceAge 3.568 1 3.568 1.570 .215 
PartAge * FaceAge 12.642 1 12.642 5.561 .021 
Error 154.574 68 2.273 
  !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
  95% Conf idence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
4.153 .126 3.902 4.403 !
2. PartAge 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
4.713 
3.593 
.178 
.178 
4.358 
3.238 
5.068 
3.947 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) PartAge (J) PartAge 
   95% Conf idence Interval for Dif ferencea  
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
. ! t  
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old 1.120 .251 .000 .619 1.622 
Old Young 
-1.120 .251 .000 -1.622 -.619 
Based on est imated marginal means 
*. The mean dif ference is s ignif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univar iate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 22.594 1 22.594 19.879 .000 
Error 77.287 68 1.137 
  
The F tests the effect of PartAge. This test is based on the l inear ly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
!Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
3.995 
4.310 
.178 
.178 
3.641 
3.956 
4.350 
4.665 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) FaceAge FaceAge 
   
95% Conf idence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old - . 3 1 5  .251 .215 -.816 .187 
Old Young 
.315 .251 .215 -.187 .816 
Based on est imated marginal means a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 
Error 
1.784 
77.287 
1 
68 
1.784 
1.137 
1.570 .215 
The F tests the of FaceAge. FaceAge. This test isbased on the linearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
4.  Week 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
4.384 
3.921 
.119 
.158 
4.147 
3.606 
4.622 
4.237 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) Week (J) Week 
   95% Conf idence Ins terval for 
Dif ference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
. ! t  
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 
.463 .123 .000 .218 .708 
2 1 - .463 .123 .000 - .708 - .218 
Based on est imated marginal means 
*. The mean dif ference is s ignif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni. 
!Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Pil lai 's trace .173 14.216d 1.000 68.000 .000 
Wilks' lambda .827 14.216a 1.000 68.000 .000 
Hotell ing's trace .209 14.216a 1.000 68.000 .000 
Roy's largest root 
.209 14.216a 1.000 68.000 .000 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. PartAge * FaceAge 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge FaceAge   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 
Old 
4.852 
4.574 
.251 
.251 
4.350 
4.073 
5.353 
5.076 
Old Young 
Old 
3.139 
4.046 
.251 
.251 
2.637 
3.545 
3.640 
4.548 !
6. PartAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.824 
4.602 
.168 
.223 
4.488 
4.156 
5.160 
5.048 
Old 1 
2 
3.944 
3.241 
.168 
.223 
3.609 
2.795 
4.280 
3.687 !
7. FaceAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
4.278 
3.713 
.168 
.223 
3.942 
3.267 
4.613 
4.159 
Old 1 
2 
4.491 
4.130 
.168 
.223 
4.155 
3.684 
4.826 
4.575 !
8. PartAge * FaceAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 1 4.889 .238 4.414 5.364 
2 4.815 .316 4.184 5.445 
Old 1 4.759 .238 4.284 5.234 
2 4.389 .316 3.758 5.019 
Old Young 1 3.667 .238 3.192 4.141 
2 2.611 .316 1.981 3.242 
Old 1 4.222 .238 3.747 4.697 
!!
2 3.870 .316 3.240 4.501 
!
 
 
 
SET1 
Notes 
21-Jun-2012 09:54:17 
/Users/j jnicholson/Documents/St 5-Time.sav 
DataSetl 
<none> <none> 
<none> 
72 
User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for 
all variables in the model. 
GLM SETiSess1 SETlSess2 
SET1 Sess3 BY PartAge FaceAge /WSFACTOR=Week 
3 Polynomial IMETHOD=SSTYPE(3) /EMMEANS=TAB 
LES(OVERALL) /EMMEANS=TABLES(PartA e) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONIJ /EMMEANS=TAB 
LES(FaceAge) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES(Week) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*FaceAge) IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES (FaceAge*Week) 
IEMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*FaceAge*Week) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE /CRITERIA=A L P H 
A(.05) /WSDESIGN=Week /DESIGN=PartAge 
FaceAge PartAge*FaceAge. 
00:00:00.046 00:00:00.000 
!Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time !
!Within-Subjects 
Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 
3 
SETi Sessi 
SETi Sess2 
SETi Sess3 
!
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
PartAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 36 
FaceAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 36 !
D Descriptive Statistics 
PartAge FaceAge 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
SETlSessi Young Young 9.4808 1.88997 18 
Old 10.8162 4.78964 18 
Total 10.1485 3.65187 36 
Old Young 16.8604 5.90808 18 
Old 16.3272 5.74912 18 
Total 16.5938 5.75162 36 
Total Young 13.1706 5.71775 36 
Old 13.5717 5.91662 36 
Total 13.3711 5.78045 
72 
SETlSess2 Young Young 8.9023 1.34064 18 
Old 9.4178 1.65904 18 
Total 9.1600 1.50936 36 
Old Young 17.5713 7.34871 18 
Old 19.3449 7.23524 18 
Total 18.4581 7.24332 36 
Total Young 13.2368 6.81381 36 
Old 14.3813 7.21832 36 
Total 13.8091 6.99316 
72 
SETlSess3 Young Young 9.0465 2.01211 18 
Old 9.5133 1.90492 18 
Total 9.2799 1.94551 36 
Old Young 19.2032 9.44568 18 
Old 19.5483 8.87877 18 
Total 19.3757 9.03640 36 
Total Young 14.1249 8.47520 36 
Old 14.5308 8.12078 36 
Total 14.3278 8.24376 72 
!Multivariate Testsb 
Effect 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Week Pil lai 's Trace .029 .991d 2.000 67.000 .376 
Wilks' Lambda .971 .991a 2.000 67.000 .376 
Hotell ing's Trace .030 .991a 2.000 67.000 .376 
Roy's Largest Root .030 .991a 2.000 67.000 .376 
Week * PartAge Pil lai 's Trace .142 5.539a 2.000 67.000 .006 
Wilks' Lambda .858 5.539a 2.000 67.000 .006 
Hotell ing's Trace .165 5.539a 2.000 67.000 .006 
Roy's Largest Root .165 5.539a 2.000 67.000 .006 
Week * FaceAge Pil lai 's Trace .014 .484d 2.000 67.000 .619 
Wilks' Lambda .986 .484a 2.000 67.000 .619 
Hotell ing's Trace .014 .484a 2.000 67.000 .619 
Roy's Largest Root .014 .484a 2.000 67.000 .619 
Week * PartAge * Pil lai 's Trace .045 1.563d 2.000 67.000 .217 
FaceAge Wilks' Lambda 
.955 1.563a 2.000 67.000 .217 
Hotell ing's Trace .047 1.563a 2.000 67.000 .217 
Roy's Largest Root 
.047 1.563a 2.000 67.000 .217 
a. Exact statistic 
b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi- 
Square df Sig. 
 
Epsilona 
 
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower- 
bound 
Week .788 15.964 
2 
.000 .825 .880 .500 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
!Tests of  Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Week Spher ic i ty Assumed 33.028 2 16.514 1.378 .256 
Greenhouse-Geisser 33.028 1.650 20.015 1.378 .255 
Huynh-Feldt  33.028 1.761 18.760 1.378 .255 
Lower-bound 33.028 1.000 33.028 1.378 .245 
Week * PartAge Spher ic i ty Assumed 132.606 2 66.303 5.531 .005 
Greenhouse-Geisser 132.606 1.650 80.360 5.531 .008 
Huynh-Feldt  132.606 1.761 75.322 5.531 .007 
Lower-bound 132.606 1.000 132.606 5.531 .022 
Week * FaceAge Spher ic i ty Assumed 6.589 2 3.294 .275 .760 
Greenhouse-Geisser 6.589 1.650 3.993 .275 .717 
Huynh-Feldt  6.589 1.761 3.742 .275 .732 
Lower-bound 6.589 1.000 6.589 .275 .602 
Week * PartAge * Spher ic i ty Assumed 22.097 2 11.049 .922 .400 
FaceAge Greenhouse-Geisser 
22.097 1.650 13.391 .922 .385 
Huynh-Feldt  22.097 1.761 12.552 .922 .390 
Lower-bound 22.097 1.000 22.097 .922 .340 
Error(Week) Spher ic i ty Assumed 1630.279 136 11.987   
Greenhouse-Geisser 1630.279 112.210 14.529   
Huynh-Feldt  1630.279 119.716 13.618   
Lower-bound 1630.279 68.000 23.975   !
Tests of  Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source Week 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Week Linear 32.950 1 32.950 1.956 .166 
Quadrat ic  .078 1 .078 .011 .917 
Week * PartAge Linear 119.937 1 119.937 7.120 .010 
Quadrat ic  12.669 1 12.669 1.777 .187 
Week * FaceAge Linear .000 1 .000 .000 .997 
Quadrat ic  6.588 1 6.588 .924 .340 
Week * PartAge * Linear 6.866 1 6.866 .408 .525 
FaceAge Quadrat ic  
15.232 1 15.232 2.136 .148 
Error(Week) Linear 1145.397 68 16.844   
Quadrat ic  484.882 68 7.131   !
Tests of  Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Average 
Source 
Type I I I  Sum 
of Squares 
df  Mean Square F Sig.  
Intercept 41350.005 1 41350.005 579.935 .000 
PartAge 4005.995 1 4005.995 56.184 .000 
FaceAge 22.852 1 22.852 .320 .573 
PartAge * FaceAge .804 1 .804 .011 .916 
Error 4848.474 68 71.301 
  !
Est imated  Margina l  Means  
!1. Grand Mean 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
  95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
13.836 .575 12.690 14.982 !
2. PartAge 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
9.529 
18.143 
.813 
.813 
7.908 
16.521 
11.151 
19.764 !
Pairwise rwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) P a r t A g e ( J )  PartAge 
   95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
.!t 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -8.613 1.149 .000 -10.906 -6.320 
Old Young 8.613 1.149 .000 6.320 10.906 
Based onesti estimated marginal means *. The mean difference is signif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 1335.332 1 1335.332 56.184 .000 
Error 1616.158 68 23.767 
  
The F tests the effect of PartAge. This test is based on the l inearly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
3. FaceAge 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
13.511 
14.161 
.813 
.813 
11.889 
12.540 
15.132 
15.783 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) FaceAge (J) FaceAge 
   
95% Confidence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
!Young Old -.651 1.149 .573 -2.943 1.642 
Old Young .651 1.149 .573 -1.642 2.943 
Based on estimated mated marginal means a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
Univariate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 7.617 1 7.617 .320 .573 
Error 1616.158 68 23.767 
  
The F tests theeffectof FaceAge. This test isbased on the l inearly nearly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
4.  Week 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 13.371 .573 12.228 14.514 
2 13.809 .621 12.571 15.047 
3 14.328 .781 12.769 15.887 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) Week (J) Week 
   95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
 Mean     
 Difference (I- .!t 
Std. Error 
a 
Sig. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.438 .450 1.000 -1.542 .666 
3 -.957 .684 .499 -2.636 .722 
2 1 .438 .450 1.000 -.666 1.542 
3 -.519 .573 1.000 - 1 . 9 2 6  .888 
3 1 .957 .684 .499 -.722 2.636 
2 .519 .573 1.000 -.888 1.926 
Based on estimated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
!Mult ivar iate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Pi l lars t race .029 .991d  2.000 67.000 .376 
Wilks '  lambda .971 .991a  2.000 67.000 .376 
Hotel l ing's t race .030 .991a  2.000 67.000 .376 
Roy's largest root 
.030 .991a  2.000 67.000 .376 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the l inearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a.  Exact stat ist ic 
5.  PartAge * FaceAge 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge FaceAge   95% Conf idence Interval  
 Mean Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 
Old 
9.143 
9.916 
1.149 
1.149 
6.850 
7.623 
11.436 
12.209 
Old Young 
Old 
17.878 
18.407 
1.149 
1.149 
15.585 
16.114 
20.171 
20.700 !
6. PartAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge Week   
95% Conf idenceIntervalM e a n  
  Std.  Error LowerBound U p p e r n d  
Young 1 10.148 .810 8.532 11.765 
2 9.160 .878 7.409 10.911 
3 9.280 1.105 7.076 11.484 
Old 1 16.594 .810 14.978 18.210 
2 18.458 .878 16.707 20.209 
3 19.376 1.105 17.171 21.580 !
7.FaceAge* Week 
Meure:MEASURE_1 ure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge Week   
95% Conf idenceIntervalM e a n  
  Std.  Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 13.171 .810 11.554 14.787 
2 13.237 .878 11.486 14.988 
3 14.125 1.105 11.920 16.329 
Old 1 13.572 .810 11.955 15.188 
2 14.381 .878 12.630 16.133 
3 14.531 1.105 12.326 16.735 
!8. PartAge * FaceAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 1 9.481 1.145 7.195 11.766 
2 8.902 1.241 6.426 11.379 
3 9.046 1.562 5.929 12.164 
Old 1 10.816 1.145 8.530 13.102 
2 9.418 1.241 6.941 11.894 
3 9.513 1.562 6.396 12.631 
Old Young 1 16.860 1.145 14.575 19.146 
2 17.571 1.241 15.095 20.048 
3 19.203 1.562 16.086 22.321 
Old 1 16.327 1.145 14.041 18.613 
2 19.345 1.241 16.868 21.821 
3 19.548 1.562 16.431 22.666 !
GLM SET2Ses2 SET2Ses3 s3 BY PartAge FaceAge /WSFACTOR=Wek ek 2 Polynomial /METHOD= SSTYPE( 3) /EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(PartAge) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TABLES(FaceAge) COMPARE 
ADJ(BONFERRONI) /EMMEANS=TABLES(Week) COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(PartAge*FaceAge) /EMMEANS=TABLES(PartAge*Week) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(FaceAge*Week) /EMMEANS=TABLES(PartAge*FaceAge*Week) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=Week 
/DESIGN=PartAge FaceAge PartAge*FaceAge. 
SET 2 
!Notes 
[DataSeti] /Users/jjnicholson/Documents/St5-Time.sav 
Within-Subjects 
Factors 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 
2 SET2Sess2 
SET2Sess3 !
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
PartAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 36 
FaceAge 1.00 Young 36 
2.00 Old 36 
! 21-Jun-2012 09:56:03 
/Users/jjnicholson/Documents/St 5-
Time.sav 
DataSetl 
<none> 
<none> 
<none> 
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User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Statistics are based on all cases 
with valid data for all variables in 
the model. 
GLM SET2Sess2 SET2Sess3 BY 
PartAge FaceAge 
/WSFACTOR=Week 2 Polynomial 
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(OVERALL) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(PartA e) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONII) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(FaceAge) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES(Week) 
COMPARE ADJ(BONFERRONI) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*FaceAge) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge*Week) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES 
(FaceAge*Week) 
/EMMEANS=TABLES 
(PartAge" FaceAge*Week) 
/PRINT=DESCRIPTIVE 
/CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05) 
/WSDESIGN=Week 
/DESIGN=PartAge FaceAge 
PartAge*FaceAge. 
00:00:00.029 00:00:00.000 
Output Created 
Comments 
Input Data 
Active Dataset 
Filter 
Weight 
Split File 
N of Rows in Working 
Data File 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
Cases Used 
Syntax 
Resources Processor Time 
Elapsed Time !
!Descr ipt ive Stat ist ics 
PartAge FaceAge 
Mean 
Std.  
Deviat ion 
N 
SET2Sess2 Young Young 10.6758 4.24554 1 8 
Old 11.2123 2.58247 1 8 
Total  10.9440 3.47392 36 
Old Young 18.1900 6.68781 1 8 
Old 18.4322 7.24076 1 8 
Total  18.3111 6.87058 36 
Total  Young 14.4329 6.70807 36 
Old 14.8222 6.48913 36 
Total  14.6276 6.55580 72 
SET2Sess3 Young Young 10.4230 2.73499 1 8 
Old 11.5495 4.19588 1 8 
Total  10.9863 3.53705 36 
Old Young 21.3692 8.60239 1 8 
Old 19.4727 7.60187 1 8 
Total  20.4210 8.05834 36 
Total  Young 15.8961 8.38970 36 
Old 15.5111 7.26378 36 
Total  15.7036 7.79391 
72 !
Mult ivar iate ate Testsb  
Effect  
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df  
Error df  Sig.  
Week Pi l la i 's  Trace .043 3.029d  1.000 68.000 .086 
Wilks '  Lambda .957 3.029a  1.000 68.000 .086 
Hotel l ing's Trace 045 3.029a  1.000 68.000 .086 
Roy's Largest Root 045 3.029a  1.000 68.000 .086 
Week * PartAge Pi l la i 's  Trace .039 2.796a  1.000 68.000 .099 
Wilks '  Lambda .961 2.796a  1.000 68.000 .099 
Hotel l ing's Trace 041 2.796a  1.000 68.000 .099 
Roy's Largest Root 041 2.796a  1.000 68.000 .099 
Week * FaceAge Pi l la i 's  Trace .006 .392d  1.000 68.000 .533 
Wilks '  Lambda .994 .392a  1.000 68.000 .533 
Hotel l ing's Trace 006 .392a  1.000 68.000 .533 
Roy's Largest Root 006 .392a  1.000 68.000 .533 
Week * PartAge * Pi l la i 's  Trace .018 1.217d  1.000 68.000 .274 
FaceAge Wilks '  Lambda 
.982 1.217a  1.000 68.000 .274 
Hotel l ing's Trace .018 1.217a  1.000 68.000 .274 
Roy's Largest Root 
018 1.217a  1.000 68.000 .274 
a. Exactstatistic b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: Week 
!Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Within Subjects Effect 
Mauchly's 
's W 
Approx. Chi- 
Square df Sig. 
 E si lon
a 
P 
 
Greenhouse- 
Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower- 
bound 
Week 1.000 .000 0  1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tests thenull thatthe error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformeddependent variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept + PartAge + FaceAge + PartAge * FaceAge Within Subjects Design: 
Week 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Week Sphericity Assumed 41.684 1 41.684 3.029 .086 
Greenhouse-Geisser 41.684 1.000 41.684 3.029 .086 
Huynh-Feldt 41.684 1.000 41.684 3.029 .086 
Lower-bound 41.684 1.000 41.684 3.029 .086 
Week * PartAge Sphericity Assumed 38.475 1 38.475 2.796 .099 
Greenhouse-Geisser 38.475 1.000 38.475 2.796 .099 
Huynh-Feldt 38.475 1.000 38.475 2.796 .099 
Lower-bound 38.475 1.000 38.475 2.796 .099 
Week * FaceAge Sphericity Assumed 5.396 1 5.396 .392 .533 
Greenhouse-Geisser 5.396 1.000 5.396 .392 .533 
Huynh-Feldt 5.396 1.000 5.396 .392 .533 
Lower-bound 5.396 1.000 5.396 .392 .533 
Week * PartAge * Sphericity Assumed 16.753 1 16.753 1.217 .274 
FaceAge Greenhouse-Geisser 
16.753 1.000 16.753 1.217 .274 
Huynh-Feldt 16.753 1.000 16.753 1.217 .274 
Lower-bound 16.753 1.000 16.753 1.217 .274 
Error(Week) Sphericity Assumed 935.795 68 13.762   
Greenhouse-Geisser 935.795 68.000 13.762   
Huynh-Feldt 935.795 68.000 13.762   
Lower-bound 935.795 68.000 13.762 
  !
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts Measure:MEASURE 
1 
Source Week 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Week Linear 41.684 1 41.684 3.029 .086 
Week * PartAge Linear 38.475 1 38.475 2.796 .099 
Week * FaceAge Linear 5.396 1 5.396 .392 .533 
Week * PartAge * Linear 
FaceAge 
16.753 1 16.753 1.217 .274 
Error(Week) Linear 
935.795 68 13.762 
  
!Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE 1 Transformed 
Variable:Average 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 33119.305 1 33119.305 592.269 .000 
PartAge 2540.685 1 2540.685 45.435 .000 
FaceAge .000 1 .000 .000 .999 
PartAge * FaceAge 24.758 1 24.758 .443 .508 
Error 3802.517 68 55.919 
  !
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
  95% Conf idence Interval 
Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
15.166 .623 13.922 16.409 !
2. PartAge 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
10.965 
19.366 
.881 
.881 
9.207 
17.607 
12.724 
21.125 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) PartAge (J) PartAge 
   95% Conf idence Interval for Dif ferencea  
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
. ! t  
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -8.401 1.246 .000 -10.888 -5.914 
Old Young 
8.401 1.246 .000 5.914 10.888 
Based on est imated marginal means 
*. The mean dif ference is s ignif icant at the 
a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni.  
Univar iate Tests 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 1270.342 1 1270.342 45.435 .000 
Error 1901.258 68 27.960 
  
The F tests the effect of PartAge. This test is based on the l inear ly independent pairwise comparisons 
among the estimated marginal means. 
!Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 
Old 
15.164 
15.167 
.881 
.881 
13.406 
13.408 
16.923 
16.925 !
Pairwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) FaceAge FaceAge 
   
95% Conf idence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Old -.002 1.246 .999 -2.489 2.485 
Old Young 
.002 1.246 .999 -2.485 2.489 
Based on est imated marginal means a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni.  
Univariate Tests 
ure:MEASURE 1 
 Sum of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Contrast 8.682E-5 1 8.682E-5 .000 .999 
Error 1901.258 68 27.960 
  
The F tests theeffectof FaceAge. This testisbased on the l inearly nearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
4.  Week 
Estimates 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
Week   95% Conf idence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 
2 
14.628 
15.704 
.650 
.738 
13.330 
14.231 
15.926 
17.176 !
Pairwise rwise Comparisons 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
(I) Week (J) Week 
   
95% Conf idence Interval for 
s 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Difference (I- 
. ! t  
Std. Error Sig.a  Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 
-1.076 .618 .086 -2.310 .158 
2 1 1.076 .618 .086 - .158 2.310 
Based on est imated marginal means 
a. Adjustment for mult ip le comparisons: Bonferroni. 
"!!
Multivariate Tests 
 
Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig. 
Pil lai 's trace .043 3.029d 1.000 68.000 .086 
Wilks' lambda .957 3.029a 1.000 68.000 .086 
Hotell ing's trace .045 3.029a 1.000 68.000 .086 
Roy's largest root 
.045 3.029a 1.000 68.000 .086 
Each F tests the multivariate effect of Week. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise 
comparisons among the estimated marginal means. 
a. Exact statistic 
5. PartAge * FaceAge 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge FaceAge   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 
Old 
10.549 
11.381 
1.246 
1.246 
8.062 
8.894 
13.036 
13.868 
Old Young 
Old 
19.780 
18.952 
1.246 
1.246 
17.293 
16.465 
22.267 
21.439 !
6. PartAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
PartAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
10.944 
10.986 
.920 
1.044 
9.108 
8.904 
12.780 
13.069 
Old 1 
2 
18.311 
20.421 
.920 
1.044 
16.476 
18.338 
20.147 
22.504 !
7. FaceAge * Week 
Measure:MEASURE 1 
FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young 1 
2 
14.433 
15.896 
.920 
1.044 
12.597 
13.813 
16.268 
17.979 
Old 1 
2 
14.822 
15.511 
. 920 
1.044 
12.987 
13.428 
16. 658 
17.594 !
8. PartAge * FaceAge * Week Measure:MEASURE 
1 
PartAge FaceAge Week   95% Confidence Interval 
 Mean Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Young Young 1 10.676 1.301 8.080 13.272 
2 10.423 1.476 7.478 13.368 
Old 1 11.212 1.301 8.616 13.808 
2 11.550 1.476 8.604 14.495 
Old Young 1 18.190 1.301 15.594 20.786 
2 21.369 1.476 18.424 24.315 
Old 1 18.432 1.301 15.836 21.028 
2 19.473 1.476 16.527 22.418 
!
""!!
Appendix D – Published Papers 
 
D1:  
Nicholson, J., Dunphy, P., Coventry, L., Briggs, P., & Olivier, P. L. (2012). A 
security assessment of Tiles: a new portfolio-based graphical authentication system. 
CHI 2012 Works-in-Progress. Texas, USA. 
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